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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
DOES U.S. COUNTER-DRUG POLICY AFFECT NATIONALISM IN THE 
ANGLOPHONE CARIBBEAN? A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON THE IMPACT OF 
COUNTER-DRUG POLICY ON NATIONALISM IN JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD 
AND TOBAGO. 
by 
Krystel Ramdathsingh 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Eduardo Gamarra, Major Professor 
This dissertation examined the effect of United States counter-drug policy on 
nationalism in small states, focusing on Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The states 
were selected for their roles and geostrategic importance in the illegal drug trade; Jamaica 
being the largest drug producing country in the Anglophone Caribbean and having strong 
links to the trade of Colombian cocaine, and Trinidad being a mere seven miles from the 
South American coast. 
Since U.S. counterdrug policies have frequently been viewed in the region as 
imperialistic, this dovetails into ideas on the perceptions of smallness and powerlessness 
of Caribbean nations.  Hence, U.S. drug policies affect every vulnerability faced by the 
Caribbean, individually and collectively. Thus, U.S. drug policy was deemed the most 
appropriate independent variable, with nationalism as the dependent variable. 
 In both countries four Focus Groups and one Delphi Study were conducted 
resulting in a total of 60 participants. Focus Group participants, recruited from the 
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general population, were asked about their perception of the illegal drug trade in the 
country and the policies their government had created. They were also asked their 
perception on how deeply involved the U.S. was in the creation of these policies and their 
opinions on whether this involvement was positive or negative. The Delphi Study 
participants were experts in the field of local drug policies and also gave their 
interpretations of the role the U.S. played in local policy creation. Coupled with this data, 
content analysis was conducted on various newspaper articles, press releases, and 
speeches made regarding the topic.  
 In comparing both countries, it was found that there is a disconnect between 
government actions and the knowledge and perceptions of the general public. In Trinidad 
and Tobago this disconnect was more apparent given the lack of awareness of local drug 
policies and the utter lack of faith in government solutions.  The emerging conclusion 
was that the impact of U.S. drug policy on nationalism was more visible in Trinidad and 
Tobago where there was a weaker civil society-government relationship, while the impact 
on nationalism was more obscure in Jamaica, which had a stronger civil-society 
government relationship. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION OF RESEARCH 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For the islands of the Anglophone Caribbean, nationalism has been thought of as a 
construct emanating from their colonial past and their postcolonial struggle. In general, 
scholarship has recognized their nationalism as something established by past forces and 
for the most part very little has been done to acknowledge how their nationalism would 
have changed after its initial postcolonial incarnation, indicating that nationalism in the 
region has largely been looked at as a stagnant, monolithic construct rather than as an 
ongoing process of survival and consistent re-affirmation of collective identity.  
 For these small states, nationalism cannot be considered like a photograph from the 
past that can continue to be referenced as relevant today. Instead, their nationalism must 
be seen as a constantly evolving process that, while having its foundations in the past, 
also responds to the current international climate. As such, the current domestic and 
regional dynamics will also play a role in the shaping of nationalism for the individual 
small states. Moreover, in a society where nationalism has been forged out of colonial 
and postcolonial relationships and the reaction against the colonial hegemon, the ongoing 
version of nationalism is affected by the relationship to both past and present hegemons.  
Thus, the US-Caribbean relationship is of utmost importance when examining 
nationalism in these former colonial states. Building on Said’s ideas about identity 
formation and, by extension, nationalism (the collective identity of the nation) as 
distinguishing an other from which the self can be deemed opposite, or contrasted, US-
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Caribbean political relationships not only serve to enhance cooperation among the 
countries in the region but also act as a way for each side to continually re-affirm its 
identity and its position in the world.  
In this dissertation, I break nationalism into three components in order to examine the 
process of identity affirmation more closely. I see nationalism as consisting of self-
perception, perception of the other and self-projection. These three components drive the 
process of nationalism forward and serve to forge and re-forge the collective identity for 
a country. 
To demonstrate the process of identity formation my dissertation will outline one of 
the most glaring Caribbean security threats – the illegal drug trade. The states of the 
Caribbean region have asserted that illegal drug trafficking poses the most grievous 
collective security threat.  Along with the movement of illegal drugs through the island 
chain, there are also the added consequences of small arms trafficking, human trafficking, 
and money laundering which accompany the drug trade. The drug trade as a security 
issue is also inextricably linked to the fears of economic marginalization for these 
nations, since not only is there the risk of instability in their legitimate economies at the 
hands of drug lords and traffickers, but there is also the consequence of cutbacks in US 
aid and investment when their counterdrug policies do not meet US-prescribed 
specifications.  
The fact that the US promotes counterdrug policies as a ‘war on drugs’ in itself is a 
way of couching its policies in nationalist sentiments – as a direct attack on the 
homeland.  The framing of the issue has seemingly allowed the US to construct policy as 
it sees fit rather than fostering a concerted regional cooperative effort. Anglophone 
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Caribbean nations have not been able to project similar forms of nationalist sentiments in 
the formation of their own counterdrug policies since they must first ensure that they 
complement those of the regional hegemon. In fact, regional cooperation with US efforts 
has more or less been assumed or expected by the hemispheric power, creating an ‘us-
versus-them’ framework. The counterdrug discourse in the hemisphere can then be 
viewed in some degree as a situation of competing nationalisms where one is clearly 
stronger. In effect, cooperating with US drug policies has become a means of survival for 
these small states.  
Rather than simply looking at the effect of the drug trade on small states, since that 
research is exhaustive, the dissertation emphasizes the way in which drug policy relations 
with the regional hegemon and the small states affect nationalism. Examining the 
relationship between nationalism and drug policy arguably revives, the vestiges of the 
colonial past that these small states have long struggled to shirk. As such, it is 
hypothesized that the US-small state relations with regards to this major security issue 
(perhaps the biggest collective issue for the western hemisphere) plays a significant role 
in the evolutionary process of nationalism, affecting not only the strategies adopted at the 
official level, but also the way that the general population perceives itself and their 
country’s role in the illegal drug trade. 
The present study places emphasis on the Anglophone Caribbean, specifically 
focusing on two states – Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (which will subsequently be 
referred to as Trinidad). These states were selected on the basis of their roles and geo-
strategic importance in the illegal drug trade. Jamaica is the largest drug producing 
country in the Anglophone Caribbean and possesses strong links to the trade of 
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Colombian cocaine, while Trinidad is the country closest to the supply nations, a mere 
seven miles off the South American coast. The counterdrug policies of the US have in 
many instances been viewed as invasive or imperialistic following Jacqueline Braveboy-
Wagner’s (2004) ideas on the perceptions of smallness and powerlessness of Caribbean 
nations. Thus, securitization of the illegal drug trade and resulting policies affect every 
vulnerability experienced by the Caribbean, as individual nations and as a collective. In 
light of the drug trade-security-vulnerability connection, drug policy is deemed the most 
appropriate independent variable to use in examining nationalism in the selected 
countries as the dependent variable. 
To gain a deeper understanding of the impact of US drug policy on the selected cases, 
the sub-questions of the present thesis examine the aspects of nationalism in each 
country. First, it must be determined if US drug policy actions have deepened ethnic or 
class tensions in Trinidad and/or Jamaica. The second task is examining whether or not 
US drug policy actions have been met with anti-US sentiments in each country. The third 
task is to ascertain whether official statements from each country reflect cooperation and 
complementarity with US drug policies, or instead show an assertion of independence in 
their policy actions. 
 
US DRUG POLICY 
According to former ambassador to Colombia, William R. Brownfield, “If your 
drug policy is an exclusively ‘hard side’ negative policy, it will not succeed…there has to 
be a positive side: providing alternative economic livelihoods, clinics, roads – the sort of 
things that actually give poor communities a stake in their future so they do not 
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participate in narcotics trafficking.”1 From this quote, there seems to be a shift in the 
rhetoric of the ongoing drug war, ostensibly away from the heavy emphasis on 
interdiction and military presence, to capacity and social building. Additionally, there is 
evidence that cocaine usage in the US is on the decline. In spite of this information, 
federal monetary allocations and performance measures outlined in US government 
documents show that the main objectives and traditional strategies still attract the most 
funding.  
Yet, there has been an undeniable shift in rhetoric. Under the Obama 
Administration, and even prior to his election, the reframing of issues in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, which have traditionally been labeled security issues, has been visible. 
In the lead up to Obama’s election in 2008, he criticized the Bush administration for 
being “negligent toward our friends, ineffective with our adversaries, disinterested in the 
challenges that matter in people’s lives, and incapable of advancing our interests in the 
region.”2 On his electoral platform, he this vowed a ‘fundamental commitment’ to the 
Latin American region. The difference in rhetoric relating to illegal drug policies has 
likely occurred in response to changing attitudes within the American public and also at 
the state level to certain drugs, like marijuana. According to the Pew Research Center, 
support from the general (American) public for the legalization of marijuana has showed 
a marked increase, with 52% of respondents in its national survey. At the state level, 
                                                          
1 Former Ambassador to Colombia William R. Brownfield quoted by Damien Cave, Charlie Savage, and 
Thom Shanker, in The New York Times “A New Frontline in the US Drug War” May 31 2012. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/americas/honduran-drug-raid-deaths-wont-alter-us-
policy.html?pagewanted=all  
 
2 Barack Obama, “ Embargoed for Delivery: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas,” Remarks to the 
Cuban American National Foundation, May 23, 2008. 
http://blogs.suntimes.com/sweet/2008/05/obama_latin_america_speech_in.html 
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there has also been considerable relaxation on the laws against marijuana, with some 
states legalizing the use of medical marijuana or enacting various degrees of 
decriminalization (see Figure 1). In Uruguay, President Jose Mujica has enacted law 
which legalizes marijuana at the end of 2013. He states that his decision comes from the 
recognition of the failure of prohibitionist regimes and the resulting repression that 
ensues.3  
  
                                                          
3 Matt Sledge, “How Uruguay Legalized Marijuana Dealing” Huffington Post, December 12, 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/12/uruguay-marijuana-legalization_n_4433971.html 
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Figure 1: Marijuana Law in 50 States 
 
Source: “Public Opinion and Marijuana: Shifting Attitudes, Events and Laws,” Pew Research Center for 
the People and the Press, April 4 2013. http://www.people-press.org/2013/04/04/marijuana-timeline/ 
According to Buxton, the Obama Administration has approached the war on drugs 
in much the same way as its predecessors with only the minor adjustment of directing 
more attention to domestic and overseas demand-reduction strategies. In every other 
respect she argues, the Obama Administration has merely continued the past supply-
oriented strategies without much interest in creating a new one.4 The traditional strategy 
                                                          
4 Julia Buxton, “Forward Into History: Understanding Obama’s Latin American Policy” Latin American 
Perspective, Issue 178, Vol. 38, No. 4, July 2011, 29-45. 
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involves the formation of a “Plan”, be it the Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative, or as 
relevant to the region under study, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, which is 
directly modeled after the two formerly mentioned plans. Thus, despite Brownfield’s 
comments and the changes to public opinion, the US government has maintained a 
singular war on drugs strategy in the region. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that US officials are anticipating a shift in the 
transshipment routes and are already reinforcing its monitoring of the Caribbean5 because 
of the success of DEA actions like those of the Foreign-deployed Advisory Support Team 
(FAST) in Central America which have disrupted the air transshipment routes (to 
Honduras for example where there have been successes in cocaine seizures).  
 The US’s assumed regional hegemony provides the context in determining 
whether US-Caribbean relations shape nationalism of the smaller states in the post-
colonial setting. Arguably, the US assumed this mantle upon declaring the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823. Dent asserts that this role was expanded to include the policing of the 
region with the addition of the Roosevelt Corollary.6 The new terms added by the 
amendment now meant not only keeping potential foreign colonizers out of the 
hemisphere, but also asserted that that the US would guide the ideology in the region. 
Authors such as Griffith7 and Thoumi8 support the idea of a hegemonic role in that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
5 See and Coletta Youngers and Eileen Rosin, Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. 
Policy, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2005) 
 
6 David Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999. 
 
7 Ivelaw Griffith, “Drugs and Crime as Problems Without Passports in the Caribbean: How Secure is 
Security and How Sovereign is Sovereignty?” 13th Annual Eric Williams Memorial Lecture, October 8 
2011, Florida International University. 
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counter-drug policies within the hemisphere have an element of directionality – they are 
shaped mostly by US efforts. Griffith further elaborates on this directionality in his 
discussion of US-Caribbean security relations. To him Caribbean security is not only the 
traditional threat of war or invasion, but he also adds the components of marginalization 
and increased vulnerability because of small size and underdevelopment. In looking at 
the post-9/11 impact on the Caribbean, he notes that happenings in the more powerful 
state and the resulting policy decisions have a prominent effect on the smaller states. 
 
CONTEXT & SIGNIFICANCE 
Four key elements establish the foundational context for the research question:  
the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad in 1962; the declaration of the “war on drugs” 
by President Nixon in the early 1970s; the relaunching of this war on drugs under 
Reagan; and, the end of the Cold War in 1989/90. 
These nations are relatively young, which means that at the time of asserting their 
sovereignty, they were immediately plunged into the Cold War politics of alignment. As 
such, for almost the first two decades of independence, the attention they received from 
the hemispheric hegemon was mostly aimed at encouraging and maintaining democratic 
governance and was far from comprehensive, which exemplified the ad hoc nature of the 
attention that the region received from the hegemon. Robert Pastor (1994) refers to this as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
8 Thoumi, Francisco.  “Paris International Symposium on Global Drug Policy: Local Innovations and 
International Challenges” from The Senlis Council Drug Policy Advisory Forum.  November 2004. 
  10
the whirlpool effect in which the smaller nations are only cyclically important to a 
hegemon based on its own policy objectives at a given time.9  
By the 1970s, drug trafficking through the Latin American and Caribbean region 
into the US grew to be perceived as a more threatening hemispheric opponent for the US 
than the nearby communists. Opinion polls for the US conducted in the mid-70s showed 
that people were becoming more afraid of the cocaine problem than the possibility of war 
against Soviet forces.10 Increasingly, the US began dealing with its neighbors not only in 
terms of the battle against communism, but as allies (or enemies) in the “war on drugs”.   
The limited attention narrowed even further at the end of the Cold War, when the politics 
of alignment receded and many newly independent nations lost the political leverage that 
flirtations with the communism could bring.  
According to Andres Serbin (1998) the end of the Cold War marked the end of a 
strategic relationship between the Caribbean and the US.11 The dynamic of bipolarity 
presented Caribbean political elites with a bargaining chip with which to negotiate for 
better trade arrangements (such as the Lomé Convention with the European Union). It 
also provided the option of alternative political systems for the region and gave it the 
notorious ‘Cuban card’ as a way of making the politics of alignment work in their favor. 
However, the end of the Cold War meant the end of these intricacies in the US-Caribbean 
relationship since with the ushering in of the period of US unipolarity, there was no 
                                                          
9 Robert Pastor, Whirlpool: US Foreign Policy Toward Latin America, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994).  
 
10 Paul Gootenberg, Cocaine, (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
 
11 Andres Serbin, “Globalization, Regionalization, and Civil Society in the Greater Caribbean,” in From 
Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post-Cold War Caribbean Security Environment, by Michael Desch, Jorge I. 
Dominguez and Andres Serbin, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998). 
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longer the ability on the part of the islands to leverage their ideological leanings to attract 
trade and aid. 
At the same time the Cold War was drawing to a close Caribbean states were   
faced with marginalization in the increasingly open international economic system. 
Economic liberalization, especially during the decade of the 1990s, became a challenge 
for the region as it increasingly saw its preferential trade with former colonizers recede 
into the framework of the new trade regime proposed by the WTO. Here again, the end of 
the Cold War mattered, because it became more difficult to bargain for economic 
assistance. Thus, issues such as illegal drugs and the related problems were integral parts 
of not only Caribbean security agendas, but also a way of once again attracting US policy 
attention in the post-Cold War setting and preventing them from drifting out to the edge 
of the whirlpool, in keeping with Pastor’s metaphor. 
Basdeo and Mount argue that until the late 1980s, the threat of communist 
subversion left Caribbean leaders unaware that 70% of illegal drugs trafficked from Latin 
America to the US traveled up the archipelago.12 Though DEA activities were already 
underway at that time, like Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT)13 begun in 
1982, the general perception throughout the region was that illegal drugs were not really 
a “Caribbean” problem. Likewise, the “war on drugs” at the time was being fought 
primarily in the production zone with less attention on the transit countries.  
                                                          
12 Sahadeo Basdeo and Graeme Mount, The Foreign Relations of Trinidad and Tobago 1962-2000: The 
case of a small state in the global arena, (Lexicon: Texas, 2001), 101. 
 
13 OPBAT is a joint effort among the US Coast Guard, DEA and Government of the Bahamas against drug 
trafficking through these countries and into the US. 
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Interestingly, the war on drugs provided an opportunity for the renewed 
importance of the region (and countries like Jamaica and Trinidad) – allowing them an 
opening to re-enter Pastor’s proverbial whirlpool. Jamaica was arguably more in a 
position to do this since it was both a production and transshipment zone. During the 
1980s Jamaican drug dons diversified from marijuana cultivation and developed a strong 
Colombian connection, becoming an important player in the transfer of cocaine from 
Colombia to the US. This was more profitable for the dons since marijuana was less 
profitable, bulkier and more difficult to conceal than cocaine.  
Trinidad, on the other hand, was initially deemed a more popular transshipment 
point for illegal drugs headed to the UK, according numerous US State Department 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Reports (INCSRs).  However, the Scott Drug 
Report commissioned by the Trinidad government in 1985, found instances of regular 
movements of illegal drugs to the US with many local police and customs officials 
complicit in facilitating the exchange. When the report became public in 1987, the 
Commissioner of Police immediately resigned in response to the allegations of his 
corruption. 
Past and present governments of both case countries assert that the illegal drugs 
trade has become endemic to their societies accounting for a considerable percentage of 
internal crime and instability. Trinidad’s current Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, 
has blamed recent drug seizures (estimated in excess of TT$20 million) for the surge in 
violent crimes.14 In 2002, then Minister of National Security, Peter Phillips, claimed that 
                                                          
14 Reshma Ragoonath, “PM Declares Limited State of Emergency,” Trinidad Guardian, August 22, 2011. 
 
  13
Jamaica was at the center of the cocaine trafficking flow which he averred to be the main 
cause for the high level of crime.15 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
For the purpose of the study, nationalism should not be considered merely as a 
harmonious sense of belonging to a territorial space. “Nations are not natural features of 
the geopolitical landscape.”16 Instead, they are imagined collectivities promoted by states 
to enable the formation of a shared identity, which legitimizes that political construct of 
the state.17 Therefore, nationalism can be defined as those processes and practices, which 
combine the values, histories, myths and symbols of the nation with the appeals to 
sovereignty and territoriality necessary for political recognition. 
More specifically, in each country, one can see that defining moments, that helped 
galvanize the transition from slavery/colonization to citizens of independent countries.  
For Trinidad, this is very clearly espoused in the “Massa Day Done” speech given by Eric 
Williams, who would become the nation’s first Prime Minister in the following year. The 
speech was delivered in 1961, outdoors, in a town square, which by that time had become 
a popular soapbox for national discussion. Williams dubbed this the University of 
Woodford Square, at a time when education was accessible only to elites. Therefore, he 
forcefully elevated the grassroots culture to the elite status. As the title suggests, 
nationalism for the country meant an overt intellectual and ideological assault on colonial 
                                                          
15 Lloyd Williams, “Jamaica’s cocaine story” Jamaica Gleaner online edition, Sunday July 4, 2004. 
 
16 Lars Erik Cederman and T. Camber Warren, “Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization and 
the Severity of War,” forthcoming International Organization, (2011), 4. 
 
17 Using Benedict Anderson’s understanding of a nation. 
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rule and an acceptance that many once enslaved or dominated ethnic groups were now 
the true representation of the nation. Trinidadian nationalism relies on the recognition and 
harmony of the multiplicity of ethnic groups (perception of self), the freedom from 
oppressive inter-state relationships (perception of the other) and its recognition as a valid 
member of the international community (projection of self).  
For Jamaica, these second and third factors also provide the basis for its 
nationalism. Regarding self-perception, both Bogues18 and Thomas19 identify the notion 
of the “creole negro”20 as the starting point from which to measure Jamaican-ness. From 
the late 1930s21 Norman Manley, founder of the People’s National Party, began pushing 
the idea of the Jamaican as essentially a creole nationalist – a westernized black person, 
both educated and aware of his politics and his nation. Though Manley has been 
criticized for emphasizing the post-colonial while underplaying the history of slavery and 
ties to Africa, this was his way of mobilizing Jamaicans as a unified and politically 
mobilized mass vying for self-determination. The sense of elevation (as educated and 
politically conscious) of formerly oppressed masses unifies Jamaicans and is the 
foundation of their self-perception. Together with his cousin Alexander Bustamante, who 
went on to become the first Jamaican Prime Minister, he created the impetus for 
                                                          
18 Anthony Bogues, “Politics, Nation and PostColony: Caribbean Inflections,” Small Axe, No. 11, Vol. 6, 
(March, 2002). 
 
19 Deborah Thomas, Modern Blackness: Nationalism, Globalization and the Politics of Culture in Jamaica, 
(Duke University Press: Durham, 2004), p. 5-6. 
 
20 This term comes from Anthony Trollope’s The West Indies. In the same way that Europeans born in the 
colonies rather than their homeland were called creoles (French creole, Spanish criollos etc.), the term 
creole was applied to black people not born in the African continent. 
 
21 Particularly, Manley’s “This Jamaica” speech from 1938. 
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nationhood, leading first to universal suffrage in 1944, and eventually independence in 
1962. 
Much research has been conducted on Caribbean nationalism,22 and also on the 
operations of the drug trade in the region.23 Many of these analyses center on US 
assistance in counter-drug efforts, and the unequal relationship purportedly favoring US 
interests. The clash here is important since it broaches the issue of sovereignty, which is 
of utmost importance to these states and a main component of nationalism for the case 
countries. Sovereignty may seem to be an outdated concept, but Krasner shows 
otherwise. He states that, “although sovereignty might provide little more than 
international recognition, that recognition guarantees access to international organizations 
and sometimes to international finance.”24 There is profound complexity present in the 
relationship between sovereignty and drug policy for these countries. While the 
international signaling that goes hand in hand with sovereignty is important in attracting 
foreign investment or qualifying nations for IMF assistance, the nations are under threat 
of decertification25 by the US if their drug policies are not complementary with US drug 
policy objectives. Thus the resulting impact (if any) on nationalism overall in light of this 
paradox may be an interesting aspect of the relationship between the hegemon and the 
smaller states. 
                                                          
22 See works of Selwyn Ryan, Ralph Premdas, Deborah A. Thomas, Holger Henke and Frank Reno 
 
23 See Maingot, Griffith, Bagley and Walker,  
 
24 Stephen Krasner, “Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy No. 22 (Jan-Feb 2001), 20. 
 
25 Decertification refers to the loss of aid and foreign assistance from the US for any uses other than 
counter-drug activities in that financial year. 
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Foreign assistance for development is particularly important for nations which 
only gained independence in the 1960s, as is the idea that the state should be free from 
intervention in its affairs by another state. After colonial rule, the idea of intervention not 
only possesses political, but cultural elements which makes these states acutely averse to 
interference from other nations and indeed makes issues of sovereignty relevant to their 
foreign policy and international relations. Escaping the vestiges of colonialism has been a 
primary struggle since independence and US counter-drug policy is to some extent 
viewed as an infringement of sovereignty. While Jamaica and Trinidad would not prefer 
to combat the illegal drugs trade without assistance, there is some indication (Jamaica’s 
reaction to the Shiprider Agreement26 for example) 27 that there is a desire for a more 
reciprocal policy relationship, which is not necessarily conveyed by DEA operations 
named “Conquistador.”28 
                                                          
26 The Shiprider Agreement refers to the US-proposed bilateral agreement on maritime surveillance and 
patrol entered into between the various Caribbean countries and the US between 1996 to 1998, in light of 
the key role that the island chain’s territorial waters played in the trafficking of illegal drugs from South 
America into the US. 
 
27 Jamaica held out on signing the Shiprider Agreement the longest out of the islands in the archipelago. As 
a result, Jamaica faced decertification by the US. Its refusal to sign was a clear blow to US-Jamaica 
relations and necessitated an emergency meeting of CARICOM heads of government to ascertain how this 
action might affect overall US-Caribbean relations. The sticking point was that the lack of reciprocity in the 
terms of the agreement equated an infringement of Jamaican sovereignty. It eventually signed after the US 
amended the terms to reflect more reciprocity in search and seizure activity conducted between Jamaica 
and the US in the Caribbean Sea. 
 
28 Conquistador translates to “conqueror” and is also the label for the soldiers of the Spanish Empire 
between the 15th and 17th centuries, which arguably stirs up notions and memories of colonialism that are 
perceived negatively by these Caribbean nations. Operation Conquistador was a joint operation between the 
DEA and 26 nations in the Caribbean, and Central and South America executed in March 2000. It was 
aimed at reducing the trafficking of cocaine in the region and resulted in the seizure of over 5 tons of 
cocaine, 120 pounds of heroin, approximately 100 arrests and the seizures of over $2 million dollars (USD) 
in property. After the operation, DEA agents noted that during the exercise the price of cocaine shot up 
from between $8,000-$14,000 per kilogram to up to $24,000 per kilogram. (Source: Los Angeles Times, 
“Operation Aimed at Drugs for the U.S. is Cited as a Model,” March 30, 2000. 
http://articles.latimes.com/2000/mar/30/news/mn-14294). 
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In examining the effects of these policy exercises and their labels, the linkage 
between counter-drug policy and nationalism has been vastly under-theorized. Rather, 
emphasis has been on statistics – tonnage of seizures, number of arrests, acreage of illegal 
crops destroyed and crime or arrest rates. Yet, successive reports continue to note the 
glaring shortcomings of all policy efforts to significantly curb the flow of illegal drugs. 
Arguably, the policies need to be examined on a different level, not simply to look at its 
impact on the trade, but also the impact on the country in which it is implemented.  Thus 
the study aims to determine what the impact on nationalism is, whether the policy 
relationship affects nationalism in the two case nations differently, and what this may 
ultimately mean for regional cooperation in counter-drug initiatives.  
Anderson posits that the imagined nature of the nation is what inherently forms 
the basis for a national consciousness.29 However, national identity is not necessarily the 
singular identity that a person or group can have. The multiple identities of groups and 
individuals are an especially important concept for such ethnically diverse nations as 
Jamaica and Trinidad. Which layer of identity gains primacy within the territorial space, 
becomes an important dynamic to examine when looking at the impact of policies from 
the outside on the nationalism of each country.  For instance, if the ethno-local identities 
outlined by Premdas are stronger then it makes a cohesive nationalism less likely and as 
such, weaker. However, there is evidence to suggest that given certain circumstances or 
environments, nationalism will stand out over the ethnic or group affiliation. Braveboy-
                                                          
29 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,  
(Verso: New York, 2006).  
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Wagner alludes to this when relating the transnational nature of Jamaican-ness.30 Outside 
of the national space, the macro-level of identity is adopted. Hence outside of Jamaica, 
the individual may no longer self-identify as primarily from a specific class or 
community, but from Jamaica, his home country. Likewise, Trinidadians outside of 
Trinidad identify as such rather than cleaving to their Indian or African heritage. 
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
The main question of how US drug policies have and are affecting nationalism in 
the case countries is primarily a descriptive task. This is a necessary undertaking since 
most explanatory undertakings of why the war on drugs has failed, have themselves 
failed to incorporate all sides of the illegal drugs problem. Indeed, there is exhaustive 
discussion of the international political economy side and the public health aspect, but 
little attention has been given to the most basic elements of nation, power and politics at 
the very heart of the issue. As such, examining the effect on nationalism in the face of US 
drug policies towards the countries will provide that starting point to examine what that 
could potentially mean for good policymaking in the future. 
The drug policy of the US presents a challenge to the ideas of sovereignty and 
territoriality that work in concert with myth-symbol complexes and histories to create 
identity. Therefore, this challenge can either act as an obstacle against which the already 
formulated nationalism is reinforced or even fortified, it can erode  those existing ideas of 
nationalism for the particular territory, or it can result in a changed idea about 
territoriality/sovereignty which gradually alter the myth-symbol complex and change 
                                                          
30 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign Policies of the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM), (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2004). 
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nationalism altogether. Granted, US drug policy is not the only variable that may impact 
nationalism and nationalist responses to policy in these countries, but given its label as 
the most pressing Caribbean security issue, it is worth examining whether this impact 
exists and what form it takes. It is on the basis of their similar histories, strategic 
positioning, and roles in the drug trade, that the case countries were chosen. Recognizing 
that the nationalism is based on internal dynamics such as collective history, language 
and religion, as much as it is a reaction to that which is deemed ‘other,’ the cases were 
selected with the aim to control for these internal dynamics. In comparison, the countries 
have similar colonial histories and ethnic compositions which can be taken as a point of 
departure and make it easier to look at the external dynamics impact nationalism.  
The cases also lend themselves well to contrast since their attitudes towards US 
policies have differed at various points since independence.  Their contrast is most clearly 
evidenced by their initial attitudes to the mid-90s Shiprider Agreement. While Trinidad 
readily signed it, Jamaica fervently refused on the grounds that the agreement infringed 
upon its sovereignty.  Only after the agreement was revised to include stipulations of 
reciprocity did Jamaica acquiesce and sign. It did not matter that Jamaica was never in a 
position to utilize this reciprocity, it is merely important to note how it slowed down and 
altered the terms of the policy exercise. It must also be noted that public opinion in 
Trinidad differed considerably to the official decision to sign the Agreement as proposed 
by the US. Then Prime Minister, Basdeo Panday, faced a blow to his popularity for 
signing, as he was criticized for too easily bending to the will of the US.31 The national 
                                                          
31 Panday himself is noted as saying that the media had a particular role in condemning his signing of the 
agreement, which affected public opinion. 
(http://trinicenter.com/TrinidadandTobagoNews/pseudoracist.htm). Additionally noted by Tyrone Ferguson 
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outcry against the official decision shows that that there is some causal linkage between 
US drug policies and nationalism since the public opinion disagreed with what was 
deemed a projection of weakness on the part of that administration. 
Given the definition of nationalism as processes and practices, the aim of the 
research is to see what US drug policy does to them.  Does it reinforce them so they may 
be continually reproduced, weaken them so the practices disappear, or change them in 
such a way that new processes and practices are instituted in order to affirm nationalism? 
We have some evidence of an impact on national values from Trevor Munroe who notes 
the reification of US culture portrayed in movies among deviant youth in Trinidad, 
showing a replacement of Trinidadian nationalism with ideals of the American-ness.32 
But one example alone cannot decide the relationship; so further examination is required 
to see if this holds for both nations. Moreover, Munroe examines this phenomenon from 
the side of the illegal drug trade and not necessarily the policy side, so a consideration not 
only of the deviance (or acting out against the policy) is needed, but whether this acting 
out is caused by the policy or the trade itself. 
To be more broadly comparative, Bolivia also provides an example of the 
relationship between US drug policies and the impact on nationalism that this thesis 
explores. In Bolivia, Evo Morales epitomizes nationalism, given his close ties with civil 
society and his continued role in the coca union. Additionally, since he comes from the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
where he quotes the Trinidad Express’s (March 8 1997) view that the Trinidad leadership displayed “the 
most supine of postures towards the so-called Shiprider transaction” (Ferguson, “Shiprider Revisited: 
Security and Transnational Crime in the Caribbean.”) See also, Darius Figueira, Cocaine and Heroin 
Trafficking in the Caribbean: The Case of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana, (Lincoln: iUniverse 
Inc., 2004). 
 
32 Trevor Munroe, “The Menace of Drugs,” Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror, ed. Ivelaw Griffith, 
(Ian Randle Publishers: Kingston, 2004), 164. 
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Aymara Indian ethnic group, he represents a previously marginalized group that has 
gained a political voice in Bolivia, which has strengthened his ties to the poor and the 
rural populations. According to Gamarra (2007), Morales’s rise to leadership is not only 
because of these ties to the civil society and working class, but also  because of the 
aggressive supply-side policies used by the US in the Andean region.33 The crop-
eradication strategies employed by the US in the region were viewed as particularly 
unfavorable in Bolivia, especially since coca is widely grown and a part of the culture. 
Hence, a surge in Bolivian nationalism is clear in that Evo Morales was jettisoned to 
power because of his strong opposition to US drug policies.  
Likewise for Venezuela, Petras has argued that the US promotion of neoliberal 
political administrations in the country during the 1980s and 1990s led to economic 
policies which created pockets of wealth, privatized important sectors such as natural 
resources, finance, transport, and telecommunications, and generally reversed 50 years of 
social policy.34 These perceived negatives resulted in public disenchantment with 
neoliberalism and the clientelistic administrations which emerged in this time period. 
Disenchantment gave way to populist uprisings and the advent of nationalist populist 
figures, namely Hugo Chavez. These two preceding examples show a wider pattern of 
US policies perceived as unfavorable resulting in the strengthening of nationalism and 
nationalist responses from smaller countries. 
                                                          
33 Eduardo Gamarra, “Bolivia on the Brink,” CSR No. 24, Council on Foreign Relations, p.14. 
 
34 James Petras, “US-Venezuela Relations: A Case Study of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism,” Global 
Research, 2013. http://www.globalresearch.ca/us-venezuela-relations-a-case-study-of-imperialism-and-
anti-imperialism/5354929 
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Thus the simplified hypothesis here is that: US drug policy affects nationalism in 
Jamaica and Trinidad. The addendum to this is that it affects nationalism with one of 
three possible outcomes: reinforcing existing nationalism; changing nationalism (in the 
sense of the processes/practices) while retaining a national identity that is very distinct 
from that of the US; or eroding nationalism to the point where it is no longer clear what it 
means to be Trinidadian or be Jamaican (Figure 2). 
Nationalism of both countries consists of three components: 1) self-perception; 2) 
perception of the other; and 3) projection of self. The issue of self-perception in each 
country is somewhat different since the issue of ethnic difference is an important aspect 
of notions of Trinidadian-ness, while class and political division is the key concern in 
Jamaica. Component 1 for Trinidad will be level the harmony among the ethnic groups, 
and for Jamaica it will be the level of political and class consciousness. Harmony here 
refers to whether they primarily self-identify as Trinidadian rather than cleaving to ethnic 
differences. Political and class consciousness refers to whether Jamaican identity is given 
primacy over party or community alignment. 
For both countries, parts 2 and 3 are the freedom from the inordinately coercive 
inter-state relationship which existed during colonialism and the recognition as a member 
of the international political community respectively.  
 
Figure 2 
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Three sub-questions, which follow the components of nationalism, will clarify the 
relationship between US drug policy and nationalism in each country:  
• Self-perception – Has there been a deepening of inter-ethnic tensions in Trinidad 
or inter-class tensions in Jamaica in response to US drug policy actions? 
• Perception of Other – Have anti-US sentiments increased in response to these 
policy actions? 
• Self-projection – Have government statements emphasized each country’s 
cooperation and complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there 
been an assertion (or exaltation) of independent policy formation? 
Each question is intended to examine the impact of US drug policy on the components of 
nationalism with the aim of better understanding the nature of the relationship between 
the variables and ascertaining which one of the outcomes (altered, reinforced or 
weakened) most aptly fits. 
 
HYPOTHESIS, EXPECTATION, METHOD 
It is broadly hypothesized that US drug policy affects nationalism for the selected 
states in some way. But the main hypothesis here is that in each state, there is a different 
effect on nationalism which is due to the cohesion and strength of the dependent variable, 
nationalism, in the first place. Thus it is being hypothesized that nationalism in Trinidad 
is more greatly impacted by US drug policy because that country’s nationalism is more 
susceptible to influence as a result of the deep ethnic divisions that have become 
embedded throughout its history. Arguably, Jamaica does not have these same types of 
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divisions or has managed to transcend them in such a way that it can put forth a stronger 
and more cohesive national front than Trinidad when dealing with the regional hegemon.  
The method that is used to examine this hypothesis is multi-layered. Respondents 
at both the general and elite level were asked to participate in group discussion sessions 
(focus groups and a Delphi study) in both countries. The responses from these groups are 
partnered with archival documents and speeches which are emblematic for each country’s 
nationalism and/or drug policies. Additionally, US documents which outline their own 
drug policy towards these countries and their reports on the levels of cooperation (or 
difference) are also used to concretize the linkage between the issue of policy influence 
from a hegemonic state and nationalism in a small state. The chosen method applies 
multiple layers of analysis to the question – individual/group level, official (political) 
level and professional level (epistemic community level). 
 
CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter Two provides an in-depth review of the literature pertaining to 
nationalism and frames this literature in a way that can be examined in relation to drug 
policy. The chapter also provides  more detailed background about the illegal drug trade 
in the three countries as well as the history of US drug policy in the hemisphere. 
 Chapter Three gives a detailed account of the methods used in this thesis, 
explaining the research framework, the data collection, and the analysis. 
Chapter Four is the first analytical chapter dealing with Trinidad and will provide 
an overview of the roots of nationalism for the country and go on to examine the 
operations of the illegal drug trade, the policies constructed to deal with it and the 
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findings from the group sessions conducted in the country and the archival data 
examined. Chapter Five covers this same ambit with regards to Jamaica. 
Chapter Six concretizes the comparisons that can be drawn from the two case 
studies and demonstrate the conclusions that can arise out of this comparative exercise. 
The chapter also provides a general summary the findings and illustrates how they have 
answered the question of the impact of US drug policy on nationalism being stronger in 
Trinidad than in Jamaica.  From this, generalizations can be drawn on the impact of US 
drug policy on nationalism in small states. It is not the expectation that an impact on the 
nationalism of the case countries will merit a grand revision of drug policy for the US, 
but in light of the ongoing claims of failure in the drug war, it is possible that some 
attention to the way these countries are affected may reveal a nuanced policy position that 
may be more successful on some level. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
“And so everywhere they went they turned it into England; and everybody they met they 
turned English. But no place could ever really be England, and nobody who did not look 
exactly like them would ever be English, so you can imagine the destruction of people 
and land that came from that.” 
 - Jamaica Kincaid, A Small Place, London: Virago, 1988. 
________________________________________________ 
INTRODUCTION 
The intent of this chapter is threefold; to examine the literature which has shaped 
the theoretical structure of the dissertation, to showcase the different schools of thought 
relating to the variables, and to highlight the gap in the literature which the present 
dissertation intends to address. It will start with an explanation of the terms used 
throughout the project and proceed with an outline of the literature surrounding the 
variables under study. The following section of terms will simply provide their 
definitions. Later in the chapter, their meanings will be discussed further to clearly denote 
what these terms mean when used throughout the text. 
 
Terminology 
Nation: A politically sovereign collective established on the basis of the shared 
experiences, beliefs, and/or qualities of its members. 
Nation-state: A national group that is recognized as a sovereign territory and political 
entity. 
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Ethnicity: “A set of ideas concerning a group's real or imagined cultural links with an 
ancestral past” (Baronov and Yelvington, 2009).35  
Ethnic Group or Unit: A group bound together by the belief of shared ethnicity.  
Ethno-national: A sub-state level form of identification wherein the individual locates 
himself first as a part of his ethnic group and then as a part of his sovereign collective. 
National Identity: The perception of self wherein individuals see themselves as 
belonging to a national collective, which is shaped by the political, social and 
institutional practices and conditions. According to David Campbell, “the identity of any 
particular state should be understood as “tenuously constituted in time…through a 
stylized repetition of acts,” and achieved, “not [through] a founding act, but rather a 
regulated process of repetition.””36 For the purposes of this project however, national 
identity is posited as resulting from both a founding act (or series of actions) as well as 
the repetition. This interpretation is useful later on when looking at the distinction 
between civic and ethnic nationalism (as outlined by Hearn) in the case studies.  
Nationalism: The practices and processes wherein cultural elements of nation are melded 
with the notions of territoriality and sovereignty necessary for formation of the state and 
its survival. 
US Drug Policy: This term specifically refers to the drug policies and policy initiatives 
constructed by the United States, which are geared at stemming the flow of illegal drugs 
across its borders and into its territory. It may also be used at certain points to discuss the 
                                                          
35 David Baronov and Kevin A. Yelvington, “Ethnicity, Race, Class, and Nationality,” in Understanding 
the Contemporary Caribbean, p. 225. 
 
36 David Campbell, Writing Security, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992), p. 9. 
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prohibitionist regime in place within the US, but in those cases, the context will be 
emphasized to clarify the distinction. 
Prohibition: refers to severe penalties for possession, distribution, use, and production, 
which essentially follows the notion of deterrence. 
Harm Reduction: utilizes a public health approach, emphasizing drug prevention 
education and safer usage practices in place of incarceration. 
Legalization: implies the creation of a regulatory regime around the use of drugs much 
like the regime constructed for alcohol and tobacco. However, the noticeable problems 
are that prolonged tobacco use can have deleterious effects to the health such as cancer 
and likewise alcohol also affects the health, impacts judgment and behavior, and can 
cause linked problems such as drunk driving. 
Decriminalization: pertains to no longer using criminal law to deal with individual users. 
Mostly used in reference to marijuana, not ‘harder’ drugs like cocaine and heroin. 
 
PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONALISM 
Özkirimli explains nationalism as “the fundamental organizing principle of the 
inter-state order, as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, as a readily available 
cognitive and discursive frame, as the taken-for-granted context of everyday life [which] 
not only forms the horizon of international and domestic political discourse, and the 
natural framework for all political interaction, but also structures our daily lives and the 
way we perceive and interpret the reality that surrounds us.”37 His definition lines up 
perfectly with the intention of the present thesis to look at nationalism not only in the 
                                                          
37 Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010), p. 2 
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context of the domestic level but at the higher, international level in which perception 
plays a significant role for policy interaction. Nationalism is not often a main concern in 
the study of inter-state relations, but that has a great deal to do with the notion that it is 
taken as a given, which in itself is a myth upon which many analyses of state-to-state 
relations are founded. Thus, a problem arises when looking at the relationships between 
stronger and weaker states, because nationalism as an influencing characteristic tends to 
be overlooked in the stead of the “more important” qualities such as economic or military 
strength. In fact, nationalism has generally been overlooked as a necessary field of study 
unless there is some level of conflict surrounding it (and this conflict is usually intra-
state), which means only the extreme cases are examined, giving nationalism as a quality 
of states somewhat of a bad name – dangerous, irrational, and conflict inducing.38 
Ideas from the main scholars of nationalism will be acknowledged here to 
enhance the understanding of the dependent variable. Particularly the notions of national 
identity as a segment of nationalism are instructive as this sheds light on the issue of self-
perception which is the most abstract component that will be measured in this study. The 
views of nationalism only provide a partial fit for the selected countries, since these 
theorists tend to describe the formation of European nations. The existing literature on the 
nation and nationalism generally fall into two major categories – the view of the nation as 
a product of social and historical processes (modernists), and the nation emerging from 
the cohesion of ethnic ties (primordialists). Literature falling into the first category and 
discussed here comes from Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm, who cleave to the idea of 
nationalism as part of modernization of the society. Situated in the second category, are 
                                                          
38 See articles by V. P. Gagnon Jr. (1994), and S. Van Evra (1994). 
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authors John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Benedict Anderson also falls into the 
first category, but his assertion of linguistic based ties forming following the advent of 
the print capitalism suggests that he may tread close to the line between these two camps.  
Gellner’s defines nationalism as “a principle which holds that the political and 
national unit should be congruent.”39 He goes further to explain that in this definition he 
is giving primacy to the political unit since it is the main thrust of modern nationalism as 
opposed to more primitive forms of collective identification. Hobsbawm tends to defer to 
Gellner in his definition of nationalism since he does not see the point of divorcing the 
concept of nation from that of the territorial state.40 Indeed, the primordialist endeavor to 
claim some sort of chicken-and-egg ordering between nationalism and nation is 
unnecessary to the modernization camp, since they cleave to the idea that the construction 
of these two concepts (nation and state) coincide too closely to be analyzed individually. 
Keep the concepts of nation, the social construct, and state, the political construct, 
together is useful in the present thesis since the objective is to asses how events in the 
political realm impact the national realm. Ultimately however, Gellner’s idea that there 
must be some kind of homogenization of culture for a state to be considered a nation-
state, is not a universally applicable concept and cannot be used to aptly describe the 
dynamics of Anglophone Caribbean nation-states. 
                                                          
39 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1 
 
40 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: programme, myth, reality, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 9 
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Anderson argues that national identity comes from imagining a political 
community which is both ‘limited and sovereign.’41 His idea is founded upon thinking 
first of a space upon which “nation-ness” can be layered. Gellner too, has argued along 
similar lines as Anderson, saying that nationalism does not awake nations to self-
consciousness, but creates nations where they did not before exist.42  The logic behind 
imagined communities, is that an individual will feel a sense of belonging and collective 
membership, and be confident in this such that it makes up a part of their personal 
identity, despite only having an abstract idea of who the other members of the community 
are. Anderson uses the illustration that Americans may not all know one another, yet one 
American man can be sure that he is in fact one person out of many other Americans, and 
this knowledge becomes an integral part of how he understands himself.43 Hutchinson 
criticizes these ideas by taking the primordial route, saying that while they tend to think 
of national identities in too functional or instrumental terms or as some type of 
modernization process, this leaves behind the importance of ethnic communities.44  The 
matter of ethnic communities is particularly important for looking at the composition of 
nations in the Anglophone Caribbean. 
The issue with these differing theorists, however, is that while aspects of their 
theories of nationalism are useful in describing the Caribbean, they cannot singularly or 
completely explain it. Anderson’s idea of nationalism as a form of attributing meaning 
                                                          
41 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism,  
(Verso: New York, 2006). 
 
42 Ernest Gellner, noted in Ethnicity, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford University Press: 
New York, 1996). 
 
43 Anderson, p. 26 
 
44 Hutchinson and Smith (1996). 
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upon a territorial space is indeed useful, especially given the clear boundaries of that 
space for Caribbean islands. Gellner’s idea of nationalism coming before nation does not 
especially hold true for the Caribbean experience, nor does his idea that cultural 
homogeneity is a necessary component of this nation formation, but his 
acknowledgement of the role of modernization in the formation of nations can help in 
understanding why so many Caribbean nations began vying for independence in the late 
1950s to early 1960s.45 Hutchinson’s emphasis on ethnic communities in the emergence 
of nationalism is also important, but not quite in the way that he intended; for him the 
difference of ethnic community allowed for explanations of continued ethnic and civil 
conflicts.46 For the Caribbean experience, however, the ethnic difference is what has 
ultimately forged each nation’s identity.  
In discussing the underlying assumptions of the breadth of nationalism literature 
Hearn notes that there have been varied starting points for the conceptualization of 
nationalism – as a feeling, an identity, an ideology, a social movement and a historical 
process.47 He cleaves to the idea that nationalism can at once be all of these things. 
However, for the purposes of this research, the focus is on the idea of nationalism as an 
identity and ideological process (albeit both historical and ongoing). Therefore, 
nationalism is viewed as a way of distinguishing the self and others to fulfill the human 
need for this type of labeling as well as a particular system of “beliefs about the world, 
                                                          
45 Hutchinson and Smith (1996). 
 
46 Hutchinson and Smith (1996). 
 
47 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2006) p. 6. 
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which sees the world as naturally made up of discrete nations, each with a natural right to 
self-determination.”48 The notion of self-determination is especially important for 
understanding the linkage between nationalism and sovereignty, a concept of utmost 
importance to the small states in the present study. 
Chatterjee discusses nationalism using a post-colonial framework, criticizing 
previous work on nationalism as failing to recognize the nuances of nation formation in a 
post-colonial setting. His work highlights nationalism built on difference rather than 
collective identification as a better description of the post-colonial world.49 He asserts 
that “Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our 
behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our 
anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain 
forever colonized.”50 Here, he is saying that the former colonizers have largely been able 
to ascribe their own meaning to Third World nationalisms and this has left the picture 
incomplete. By saying that the post-colonial nations ‘remain forever colonized’ he 
insinuates that the descriptions that they have been given of themselves by the former 
colonial (now) outsiders, has indelibly affected their own sense of self-perception. 
George Beckford also recognizes this quality in former plantation societies, stating, “until 
we decolonize the mind, there is little hope that genuine independence can be achieved. 
Genuine independence is the ultimate objective of the process of decolonization which 
                                                          
48 Jonathan Hearn (2006) p.6 
 
49 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments Colonial and Postcolonial Histories, (Princeton: 
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today characterizes the struggles of all colonial peoples.” 51 In demanding the 
“decolonization of the mind,” he is asserting that this is the only way to eke out and 
project a truer sense of self. Chatterjee and Beckford are acknowledging that within the 
processes of nationalism there are already the interplays of power – of a hegemonic state 
or former colonizer ascribing an interpretation to a ‘lesser unit’ to which it is expected to 
adhere. The difficulty is that there is a contestation of the interpretation ascribed from the 
outside, and the self-perception of the less powerful nation and the projection of self that 
it wants to achieve. 
 
Self & Other 
It is essential to examine the identity component of nationalism in the chosen 
cases since the dichotomous relationship of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ which is so pivotal in 
identity consolidation plays an important role in the way in which otherness is understood 
in the foreign policy realm, and also the way in which it affects internal dynamics for the 
case countries. According to Thomas Hylland Eriksen the case countries would fall under 
the category of proto-nations, which are groups arising out of two or three of his other 
categories and politically organized to actively pursue statehood.52 If ethnic identity is 
sharpened by competition between groups, then shifting this idea to national level means 
that foreign policy relationships can also serve to consolidate a country’s nationalism. 
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Nationalisms in any country thus arises out of the “interactions of ethnicity-making and 
state-making processes.”53 
Thus, it is clear that in studying nationalism, the notions of self and other and 
their interrelation are major concerns. The interrelation is precisely why nationalism as a 
variable in the present thesis was broken down into three categories and analyzed through 
that lens – self-perception, self-projection and perception of the other. These qualities are 
theorized as creating a full picture of nationalism and closely follow Taylor’s ideas on the 
self which he sees as following three dimensions – the obligation to others, the assertion 
of self as superior to others, and the presentation of self.54 The point of departure for this 
idea comes from Said who used his Orientalist framework to explain how meanings of 
self can be applied from both the outside and the inside in an instrumental way. Said’s 
understanding helps to build the conceptualized linkage between nationalism and policy, 
since the perception of self and other, and the impression of self that a state tries to 
promote will undoubtedly have an effect on its behavior towards another state. Said 
shows a classification of the other as coming from outside and being imposed on a 
territory that is described as an exteriority of representation.55 Exteriority of 
representation serves two purposes. Aside from the obvious descriptive purpose of 
classifying and categorising an Other, it also serves as a point from which the self can be 
understood. It is a form of self representation through creating a contrast to something 
else. Therefore, the discourse of Orientalism which shows the difference between the 
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West and the Eastern other is a process of distancing one territory from another. Out of 
this distancing, Said argues that constructs of power have emerged which have indelibly 
become linked to ideas, cultures and histories of both the West and the East.56 He 
proffered that the historical Western dominance over the East had allowed for the West to 
create a discourse of the East which rather than being actually representative, has been 
more purposive, to show the usefulness of the Eastern territory for the West. Going 
further with this idea, this form of ascribing meaning or ‘othering’ is multidirectional. 
Thus in looking at the small state relationship with the US, the attribution of meanings of 
self and other happens both ways – although one certainly has more ability to make 
meanings stick. 
 In international security classifying an other has become a habitual and necessary 
task, and an example of this can be found in examining drug policies. Campbell argues 
the importance of this connection between identity and policymaking stating that, “the 
construction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as 
political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”57 Said’s idea of the pattern 
of relative strength that emerged between the East and the West can now be moved into 
the discourse between the North and the South (between the US and Trinidad and 
Jamaica in the current thesis). It can be argued that another characteristic has been 
attributed to the Southern other. In much the same way as Gregory saw an expansion of 
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the other to encompass the concept of the axis of evil;58 it is evident that there has been 
an othering of these countries by the US in order to create a consistent drug policy 
discourse through which to address them. However, the othering process is reciprocated 
by the small states which in turn affects how they react to US policies and subsequently 
in this co-constitutive relationship of self/other, how their own sense of collective identity 
is affected. 
 
Caribbean Nationalism 
Recalling Caribbean history and the influx of slaves from dissimilar African 
tribes, then the brief experiments with Chinese, Syrian and Lebanese indentureship prior 
to East Indian indentureship; the multiplicity of partial communities re-distributed 
throughout the Anglophone Caribbean poses an obvious challenge to the emergence of a 
supra-ethnic nationalism.  The nations were still able to achieve this however, not 
because of their collective identity or past experiences, but their lack thereof.  
Nationalism was therefore asserted as a completely ‘original’ quality of these newly 
sovereign nations.  Waters suggests then that their nationalism does not come from 
‘collective identification’ but from the stripping away of the collective memories of these 
redistributed peoples by the colonial influences.59  
The focus of authors who write on nationalism tends to be on how a society can 
collectively shape for itself, a unique identity.  For example, Anderson’s noting how print 
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capitalism brought together as a nation, people who spoke the same language, while at 
the same time distancing them from the Latin-speaking clerical elites. However, when 
examining small states such as the Caribbean nations, it is indelibly important that this 
identity be seen as something more reactionary than local dynamics becoming prominent 
and that the socially constructed nature of nationalism itself be acknowledged. In forging 
the post-colonial nations under study, it is possible to see this social construction and how 
malleable it can be. Aligning with Waters’ notion of nationalism emerging as a reaction, 
the notion of social construction brings the understanding that nationalism is redefined 
and renegotiated from one generation to the next upon the basis of the changing 
circumstances which surround a population.  Seeing nationalism as a socially constructed 
phenomenon, then implies that there are fluid boundaries of the concept that are 
constantly being remade in response to both in-group and out-group stimuli. As such, 
nationalism can be understood as both the practice/replication of its constituent elements 
and the processes which impact these elements. As such, nationalism can be defined for 
the purpose of this thesis as the practice or process wherein cultural elements of nation 
are melded with the notions of territoriality and sovereignty necessary for state formation 
and continued existence.  If the preceding definition is accepted, then a cohesive supra-
ethnic national identity becomes the result for the countries under consideration. 
Therefore, national identity is the sense of self that develops from practicing and through 
the processes of, nationalism.  
Therefore the aim of my thesis is to ascertain the impact of policy on nationalism, 
‘practices and processes’ must be identified and examined. Perhaps the most obvious of 
these will be the rhetoric that builds up that notion of national identity. Rhetoric can be 
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traced through the years since independence by looking at the major newspapers in each 
nation, the Guardian and Express in Trinidad, and the Gleaner and Observer in Jamaica, 
specifically regarding how they represent the strength of the nation. Speeches made by 
Prime Ministers are also incredibly valuable since they often attempt to stir national 
feeling in order to sway the general population. Practices such as the observance of 
national holidays also fall under nationalism since they helps to reinforce cohesive 
national identity by celebrating milestones such as independence and becoming a 
republic (representing the political achievement and survival of the nation), emancipation 
(collectively sharing a historical struggle) and the various ethnic holidays (including all 
groups). Even subjects broached in Trinidadian comedy talk tents60 and Jamaica stage 
clashes can be deemed part of these processes.  
According to Miller’s survey of nationalism authors’ attention to Latin America, 
the region (under which the Caribbean is subsumed) has been relegated to a mere 
footnote in these works which more aptly describe European nationalism.61 They are 
acknowledged as not fitting into the neat theory boxes which have been outlined by 
previously mentioned scholars such as Gellner, Hutchinson and Smith. While these 
authors acknowledge that regions outside of the developed world do not fit their theories, 
they have not adjusted them to suit or attempted an alternate explanation. Granted, each 
theory fits Latin America and by extension the Caribbean in some fashion, but only 
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through a piecemeal picking of each model, can an alternate version which suits the Latin 
American and Caribbean region come out. For example, the aforementioned 
characteristic, language, is seen as an integral part of nation formation. Anderson’s 
example of print capitalism linking people who shared English as opposed to the 
alienating and elite Latin that previously dominated printed literature readily comes to 
mind. In controlling for other variables which may affect nationalism such as language, it 
is necessary to note that language for Trinidad and Jamaica was not instrumental in 
creating a sense of national unification like in early state formation in Europe. Moreover, 
it is a point of commonality among the case countries, so it is not a quality that 
distinguishes the nationalism in either small state. 
Thus, language (in its institutionalized form) cannot be applied as a causal factor 
in establishing nationalism for the islands in the Anglophone Caribbean. While it serves 
as an easy characterization of them here, it is not major factor which initially linked the 
people of these countries together. English was an imposed language/institution and thus 
not something that these transplanted populations held in common, nor did it help them to 
feel connected to one another. In fact, it may rather have been the opposite – a source of 
shared derision, but the only form of common communication which they possessed. 
While the English language has developed localized nuances in both countries considered 
here, this evolution was not a crystallizing factor in either nation’s development. 
Moreover, the Jamaican patois has become more so a modernized identifying factor 
rather than an initial unifier on the path to nationhood.  
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Regarding nationalism today, the language component is arguably more important 
today for Jamaica in that Jamaican patois62 is regarded as the key identification 
characteristic for Jamaicans abroad, is used as the common language throughout the 
island, and is recognized internationally as an official dialect. The distinctiveness of the 
patois coupled with the Jamaican accent has proliferated as not only a main identifier for 
the country, but also the Caribbean as a whole. Many foreigners have approached non-
Jamaicans and attempted to adopt the Jamaican cadence fully believing that this is the 
accent of all Caribbean peoples. Thus demonstrating that Jamaica is quite big for a small 
country since it has become the ambassador to the region as a whole on the global stage. 
In Trinidad (and outside as an identifying factor), the creole does not occupy such a 
space. While Trinidadian creole has drawn on West African, Hindi and Amerindian 
words, the language has not traveled well, meaning that it is more or less invisible outside 
of the country. Even in the country, you will generally not find Trinidadian creole used in 
formal settings. You will more often encounter surprise from outsiders at the ‘singsong’ 
tone of the Trinidadian accent rather than a lack of understanding of the actual spoken 
words. Additionally, Trinidadians have proven very susceptible to losing their accents 
after spending time abroad, such persons being labeled ‘freshwater yankees’ for their 
speedy adoption of the American accent. 
Only Hobsbawm (1995) has seemed to acknowledge the region, using the Latin 
American experience to support his claim that the nation must be seen as primarily a 
political construct which can therefore transcend ethnic divisions or changes. Yet in 
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applying Hobsbawm’s idea to the Caribbean region, it is not comfortable to say that the 
political construct has taken primacy over ethnic divisions since the ethnic distinction, 
maybe more for Trinidad than in Jamaica, continually colors the relationship it has with 
the rest of the world. But Hobsbawm’s general position does indeed lend support for the 
idea that in order to awake the nations in quest to nationhood, the leaders of the time 
utilized the voice of political awareness as a way of unifying the masses (though along 
with a healthy dose of distinguishing ‘self’ from the white colonizer). 
Hearn talks about mobilization of the civil society happening as a result of power 
relations within a societal hierarchy, as a distinct form of nationalism to that created out 
of linkages to the past/idealization of a fatherland, not necessarily rooted in political or 
social reality.63 In forging nationhood in Trinidad for example, the path outlined by 
Selwyn Ryan (who points out that icons like Arthur Andrew Cipriani, Uriah “Buzz” 
Butler and eventually Eric Williams were able to transcend the notions of racial and 
ethnic difference to mobilize the middle/working class masses), is vastly different to the 
nationalism postulated by primordialists wherein ethnic groups are the primary form of 
identification prior to the national level, because nationalism for these post-colonial states 
came as a reaction to an external phenomenon. 
Chatterjee’s version of anticolonialism then is probably the closest way to 
describe the dynamics of nationalism in the case countries. He determines that in the path 
to independence and the post-colonial era, colonies did not have the task of creating 
“institutional space” for their nationalism. In that respect, the language, economic and 
political institutions were already in place and instead needed to be redefined to fit the 
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postcolonial populations. Chatterjee deviates from Anderson’s idea of imagined 
communities in that the institutionalization of cultural traits such as language or religion 
do not create nationalism if there are no other conditions which facilitate its development. 
In the Trinidadian case, while the institutions which linked the different ethnic 
populations did in fact exist, each population was so repressed in the colonial era that it 
was difficult for cohesion to be achieved. Instead, Chatterjee posits a dichotomy which he 
calls the material and the spiritual.64 The material refers to those institutions, practices or 
constructs which are modeled after the colonizer, while the spiritual carries the 
distinguishing features of cultural identity. Thus he hypothesizes that if a country can 
replicate the Western skills in the material domain (i.e., economic style, politics etc.), 
then the greater the need will be to sure up the spiritual domain (i.e., cultural identity) – 
what makes it distinct to other societies. 
 
Policy & Identity 
To explore fully the question of the thesis it is necessary to establish the 
relationship between policy and identity in the Caribbean. Braveboy-Wagner asserts that 
the core identity for Caribbean states is one of smallness,65 while Premdas argues that 
many layers of identity exist in the Caribbean ranging from the ethno-local to the 
national.66  Both authors find agreement in that the insular structure and unambiguous 
                                                          
64 Chatterjee p.6 
 
65 Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, “International Relations,” Understanding the Contemporary 
Caribbean, eds. Richard S. Hillman and Thomas J. D’Agostino, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2009), 167.  
 
66 Ralph Premdas, “Ethnicity and Identity in the Caribbean: Decentering a Myth,” Working Paper 234 
(December, 1996). 
  44
borders of Caribbean island states are a primary factor in shaping identity, but their 
opinions of how size and geography meld with race and ethnicity to form a national 
identity are vastly different.  Braveboy-Wagner sees the size component as taking 
frontstage in the expression of identity and translating accordingly to foreign policy 
strategies and situations.  She argues that other identities become secondary to this.  
However, she further states that each state perceives its size and vulnerability differently 
depending on the presence of resources and relationships with more powerful nations.67  
As such, nations which perceive their smallness as less of a constraint, will naturally have 
more space in which to express a national identity.  Premdas on the other hand, sees the 
differing cultures among ethnic groups as sometimes superseding nationalism and as a 
result, national identity.  He seems to suggest therefore, that more homogenized 
Caribbean nations will have a stronger expression of national identity.68  His idea also 
implies that transnational ethnic linkages are significant elements in identity formation.  
Each author’s view holds merit in explaining why national identity and nationalism may 
seem stronger in one Caribbean nation and weaker in another.  Looking at Jamaica and 
Trinidad, specifically allows us to more fully explore the identity and nationalism 
dynamic since both nations are considered to be the more developed ones in the region.  
As such, there is space for the expression of a national identity beside their purported 
core identity of smallness and Premdas’ ethnic nuances of national identity can be 
analyzed more closely.   Premdas’ assumptions of national identity suggest that in more 
ethnically plural societies, identification with the ethnic group takes prominence over the 
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formation of a unified identity at the national level.69  The primacy given to ethnic 
identification may translate into ethnic groups at home feeling more association with 
similar ethnic groups abroad or with the ‘motherland.’  If applying this idea to specific 
countries for example, it can be posited that nationalism and national identity may be 
more stable in Jamaica because it is more culturally homogenous than Trinidad, which 
has a somewhat more diverse ethnic composition (consisting of people with Amerindian, 
African, East Indian, Spanish, French, English, Chinese, Syrian, and Lebanese heritage).  
John LaGuerre alludes to this idea, arguing that cultural awareness in Jamaica is more 
developed because it possesses a “less complicated social structure” than Trinidad.70  
Braveboy-Wagner presents evidence supporting this idea in her analysis of US felons 
deported back to their countries of original nationality and their impact on crime.71  
While in Jamaica criminal deportees are considered to contribute significantly to 
increases in gang populations, this is not true in Trinidad.  In fact, it has been noted that 
deportees to Trinidad have had difficulty re-integrating into society, which might be an 
indication of the strength of these countries’ nationalism abroad. Jamaican nationalism 
can be deemed stronger since deportees can get re-situated into society well enough to 
affect the crime level whereas deported felons in Trinidad are not seen as significantly 
elevating the crime rate nor re-integrating in the society, not only because there are less 
of them, but also because they identify less with their Trinidadian nationality after having 
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spent a long time abroad.  In that sense the notion of Jamaican-ness seems transnational 
and persists beyond the nation’s borders, while the Trinidadian identity seems more 
constructed along ethno-local lines and as such nationalism becomes weaker when 
influenced by an external force. 
The question then becomes, how the operations of drug policy designed by the US 
in its “territorial space” affects the espousal of identity.  It is quite possible that national 
identity may be reinforced by the perception of policies from the outside as an unwanted 
‘other’ but given that the US is the hemispheric hegemon, it is equally possible that 
national identity may be suppressed in order to maintain cordial relations with the 
hegemon.  In either case, the achievement of policy objectives can be impacted since it 
would likely require the use of more (or less) coercive measures. At the basis of the 
analysis lies the question of which is more important in identity formation – the self or 
the other.  Said’s thoughts on the interaction between the self and the other explains 
national identity as not an internal creation projected outward, but rather an external one 
which is attributed to an entity.72  This corresponds to the idea of nationalism and identity 
in small states as being reactionary since it suggests that these nations project the image 
according to how they perceive themselves based on their relationship with more 
powerful states. 
 
US-CARIBBEAN RELATIONS 
Robert Pastor examines how the Latin America and the Caribbean in the past has 
been drawn into the US "whirlpool" by its preoccupation with small countries, only to 
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drift later to the edge of the whirlpool in what he terms a repetitive "neglect-panic" 
cycle.73 He notes that US-Latin American relations have largely been influenced by the 
personality and leadership styles of the presidents involved. Pastor saw deepening 
nationalism within Latin America in particular as diminishing US power in the region, 
since the Latin American version of nationalism very closely resembled anti-
Americanism. After the Cold War, the US lost sight of the region as a whole until the 
drug war.  This alternating cycle of fixation and inattention is a central characteristic of 
the whirlpool metaphor. Another attribute is that all actors in the crisis tend to stereotype 
one another or project motives (an othering process which creates boundaries) – some 
view the US as Satan and others view it as Savior but few see it as an actor which is 
driven by circumstance. The whirlpool metaphor is an important contextual element in 
this dissertation because it underpins the discussion on the US policy attention that has 
been given to the Anglophone Caribbean region since its independence.  
Dent has argued that the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine was the 
main announcement that the US was taking on the responsibility to exercise policing 
power in the Caribbean region, an area which would later be labeled its “third border.”74 
Roosevelt recognized the increase in anti-US sentiments in the region due to the high 
level of intimidation and interventionism that they had pursued so in 1933 he introduced 
the Good Neighbor Policy. The policy did not mean that the principles of the Monroe 
Doctrine were abandoned but instead of the heavy handed policy position that had been 
                                                          
73 Robert Pastor, Exiting the Whirpool: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America and the Caribbean, 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 2001). 
 
74 David W. Dent, The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide to U.S. Involvement in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1999). 
 
  48
followed up to that point, the US switched to less confrontational ways of pursuing their 
policy objectives such as diplomatic pressuring and economic leveraging.75 
The Roosevelt Corollary has set the stage for US-Caribbean relations since then, 
but it also served a major identity forming process by creating the sense of the US as not 
only the protector of the region, but the enforcer of order. In that respect, the Caribbean 
was placed into the role of receiving the security that could be afforded by the hegemon. 
However, security is not a universal concept for all states, thus Pastor’s metaphor of the 
whirlpool works perfectly to denote that while at certain stages the Caribbean region has 
been more or less significant to US interests, the US has always been important to the 
Caribbean because their security is structured by lines of economic development and 
survival rather than security, in the traditional sense. By that token, the US is consistently 
at the center the “Caribbean whirlpool.” Blasier asserts that the governments of Latin 
America and the Caribbean have historically been expected to conform the US foreign 
policies, stating that in view of the rivalry between the US and “extra-hemispheric great 
powers…security interests justify hegemonic behavior.”76 This leaves the Caribbean 
region very little space within which to assert their own interests, especially if they do not 
align with the primary hegemonic interests. 
In Sigmund’s comparison of the policy approaches of the Reagan and Carter 
administrations, he notices that while the rhetoric coming from each camp was very 
different, there was not a great deal of fundamental change in actual policy, a criticism 
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which is still made today.77 Both administrations had remained having seemingly 
aggressive policies towards the region in terms of solutions being military driven rather 
than focusing on the social, economic and political realms of assistance. Given that the 
Reagan Administration heavily criticized the policies of the previous Carter 
Administration, it was indeed contradictory that its own policies tended towards the same 
military bent. Sigmund also maintains that the main reason for the very small changes in 
the foreign policy approaches between the two administrations was really a result of the 
lack of clarity in what the US hoped to achieve by its involvement in South America and 
the rest of the region.  As such, the policy prescriptions remained centered on traditional 
efforts rather than the non-traditional approaches. Despite this lack of change however, 
there was indeed a change in the political culture of Latin America around this time. 
Many nations moved closer towards democratic governance. Latin American democracy 
was far from consolidated at this point but there was definitive evidence of movement. 
Therefore, this could also be the reason for the limited changes in US policy towards the 
region rather than an actual pointed effort by the Reagan Administration to change the 
way things had been done previously. If Sigmund postulates a change in Latin American 
political culture in response to US policy, it is then not unlikely that there would be a 
similar corresponding effect on Caribbean political culture, which would affect the 
perceptions/identities of the small states in the region as well as their perceptions of, and 
reactions to the hegemon. 
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Cottam argues that the image held by US policymakers of Latin American and 
Caribbean states as dependents has distorted their perception of these countries' political 
situations and predisposed them to resort to coercive methods. 78 Thus a picture of US-
Caribbean relations emerges wherein the inequalities of power are very clear. The 
difference in relative power and the resulting interactions affect perceptions in both 
directions, the US of the smaller states and vice versa; and this is ultimately what has 
shaped the drug policy discourse and informed the formation of drug policies. 
 
DRUG POLICY 
Prior to the twentieth century, governments did not view drug flows as an 
international problem. Now illegal drugs were first used as legitimate prescriptions for 
pain or used as additives to beverages. In 1906 the Pure Food and Drug Act was the first 
measure towards problematizing drugs. The legislation acknowledged that drugs should 
no longer be considered harmless and mandated that doctors label their medicines to 
show the potentially harmful ingredients. In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Act became the 
first prohibitive federal drug policy in the US, restricting the sale and manufacture of 
heroin, cocaine, marijuana and morphine. 
The first international agreement on illegal drugs, the Hague International Opium 
Convention of 1912 was proposed by the US and began what is now an accepted counter-
drug regime globally. The League of Nations then established an Opium Board and a 
Drug Supervisory Board in 1920s but in an international climate where regulating drug 
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flows was not of much concern. These bodies were later absorbed by the UN 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs after WWII.  In 1961, the Single Convention on 
Narcotics Drugs established the International Narcotics Control Board and concretized a 
global prohibitory regime for illegal drug flows. 
 
United States 
Often the Latin American and Caribbean region is associated with the thriving 
and pervasive drug trade.  As far back as the 1970s, countries like Colombia and Jamaica 
especially, had been classified as narco-economies.  On the heels of the artistic and 
‘hippie’ movements of the 1960s, the region became a mass exporter of marijuana and as 
the decade progressed, cocaine. The involvement of the US in regional affairs at the time 
is blamed for the proliferation of narcotics and crime syndicates in the territory today.  It 
is posited that US anti-drug policies implemented in the early 1970s to eradicate the drug 
problems in Jamaica, Peru and Bolivia under the Nixon Administration, actually pushed 
the drug industry to migrate to Colombia where it seems to have become deeply rooted.  
Escobar has pointed out that First World involvement usually comes couched in terms of 
salvation or humanitarianism,79 a notion which is reiterated by critics who posit that the 
US anti-drug efforts while proposing to magnanimously re-legitimize the affected 
economies, worked hand in hand with their Cold War politics of the time, to ensure that 
their presence in the newly independent Caribbean states enforced the ideals of 
democracy and dissuaded the spread of Communism. 
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The ties forged between the US and the southern part of the region were 
intensified with a dramatic re-declaration the ‘war on drugs’ by Reagan in the early 1980s 
which was again expressed through initiatives involving significant US intervention.80 
The proposed remedies involved substantial US presence in the territory as a means of 
controlling and limiting the actions of narco-traffickers.  The US strategies however, have 
been constantly criticized and viewed with suspicion since the programs implemented 
have involved very limited financial and development assistance and rather a strong 
military presence in many countries, namely Jamaica and Colombia in this time period.81  
The Reagan administration in particular was harshly criticized for only dealing with the 
supply-side of the drug problem leading to the establishment of the Omnibus Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act in 1988.  The legislature was geared towards reducing the addicted population 
in the US but with it came intensified supply-side efforts such as crop eradication and 
crop substitution. The 1988 Omnibus Anti-Drug Law passed by Congress noted the 
demand dimension of the drug problem, but also went on to stipulate death penalty for 
traffickers.  The law seems like an anachronistic way of treating demand, since it is still a 
supply side effort.  It raises the question of why there is such a disconnect between 
rhetoric and action within policy especially policy surrounding the drug issue in the 
hemisphere 
                                                          
80 Bruce Bagley, “After San Antonio” in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 
3 (Autumn, 1992). 
 
81 “Struggle,” a Jamaican newsletter, which ran from May 1976 to September 1978 suggests that there was 
a heavy CIA presence in the island meant to assist with regional security efforts, which instead both 
destabilized the economy to serve the “imperial” purposes of the US, and stymied the progressive political 
development on the nation. 
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The first Bush administration’s decision to increase the militarization of the war 
on drugs has also been interpreted as a way to gain military access to the countries as a 
means of furthering US objectives for its own hemispheric and international security.  
The perceived motive is largely because of the difference in the interpretation of the drug 
trade as an international problem from the demand-side and the supply-side. Production 
and transit nations tend to interpret the drug problem as foreign, blaming the demand 
coming from the north as the reason for its existence. They assert that their smallness and 
powerlessness against transnational criminal organizations should primarily be addressed 
through capacity-building and economic development assistance before military 
exchanges and cooperation. The demand-country interpretation however, is that the flow 
of illicit goods is the main problem which needs to be addressed prior to their infiltration 
into their own borders. The difference in viewing the problem of illegal drugs thus yields 
differing policy objectives on each side, leading to the interpretation of US policies as 
one-sided and imperialistic. The disparate perceptions of the drug problem on either side 
have not been helped by the naming of some counter-drug operations in the region, which 
unintentionally highlight the process of ‘othering’ that permeates the policy creation – for 
example, Operation Conquistador and Operation Creole Storm. 
Eric Nadelmann, founder and head of the Drug Policy Alliance organization has 
asserted that this ‘war on drugs’ has failed. He goes further to criticize its “moral and 
ideological bankruptcy” and claims that it is a policy driven by rhetoric more than reason 
and practicality.82 The rhetoric he is referring to is the framing of the illegal drug issue as 
a security problem rather than one of public health (for example), which in turn justifies a 
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greater deal of collateral damage or higher level of military involvement and violence. 
Nadelmann provides comprehensive criticisms of the flaws of drug policies both on the 
domestic and international fronts. However, his proffered solution to find the “zone” 
where illegal production causes the least problems and somehow confine it there, is not 
very realistic.83 Problematizing the issue as a “war” has also been detrimental for the US 
in coming up with effective policy solutions, since essentially, the rest of the hemisphere 
must adapt to being “at war” with the US, even though the term war applies to the issue 
of illegal drugs and not the countries involved. The framing of the problem with the US 
in the role of the policing state has also meant that it is looked upon to also be the largest 
financier of counter-drug efforts, even though there is discontent with the way in which it 
chooses to allocate these funds. 
The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) established in 2009 under the 
Obama administration has taken small steps towards changing the tune of the war on 
drugs. It is meant to help the US partner with the regional leaders to create joint solutions 
for regional security. Additionally, along with the traditional efforts of law enforcement 
and military cooperation, the CBSI has put development assistance and economic support 
on the same level as objectives of the policy strategy. These two latter elements represent 
an alignment of US drug policies with those of the rest of the Caribbean region and 
suggest an important shift in the shape of its policies. 
Within the US, the prohibitionist regime, established through domestic drug 
policy means that certain harm reduction strategies such as rehabilitation clinics are 
                                                          
83 He notes this as a potentially bad solution also and possibly puts it forward to add shock value before 
introducing his idea of legalization as the real solution to the illegal drug problem since it would effectively 
allow legitimate actors to wrest control of the commodities market for illegal drugs and also bring the issue 
of addiction further into the realm of public health and further away from punitive domestic measures. 
  55
generally not accessible to the wider addicted population, nor are there enough 
mainstream harm reduction facilities like methadone clinics. Only those non-
marginalized persons, belonging to a certain income bracket can afford a stay at a rehab 
facility, which has fueled a great deal of criticism of the domestic approach to illegal 
drugs as well. Thus the general public’s clamoring for a change in domestic drug policies 
has seemingly reached a critical mass resulting in legalization and decriminalization in 
some states. The state-level changes within the US allude to an eventual federal-level 
relaxation of the prohibitionist policies, at least surrounding marijuana. The main issue 
that will emerge as a result of these changes however, is – in what way will they be 
reflected at the foreign policy level. 
 
Trinidad & Tobago 
According to international reports from the UN and the US Department of State, 
the illegal drug trade operating in Trinidad bears no significant impact on the global 
illegal drug market.84 Yet, national reports reveal a completely different picture. While in 
international reports Trinidad is mentioned in passing as one of the many transshipment 
points for illegal drugs moving into the US and Europe, these reports do not consider the 
severe impact the trade has on the nation. As such, there is very limited detailed study of 
the illegal drug trade actually in Trinidad. It is likely the result of what Van Schendel has 
referred to as ‘arrow disease’ – the tendency to focus on cause and effect at the source 
and destination points on the map of drug routes rather than the happenings at each stop 
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Reports, 1998 to 2010, http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/index.htm.  
 
  56
along the way.85 There is scant consideration about what happens from the time illegal 
drugs enter a nation until they leave for another destination.  However, the illegal drug 
trade has indeed had a significant impact on Trinidad development. According to 
Thoumi, the structure of the illegal drug industry becomes most concentrated at the 
smuggling level before opening once again in the retail distribution stage.86 Therefore, 
Trinidad enters the trade at the pinnacle of its functioning and where the most is at stake. 
In light of factors such as its small size, its proximity to the source and target 
countries, and the relative youth of the nation, which only gained independence in 1962, 
the illegal drug trade has been able to affect Trinidad and Tobago security at the social, 
institutional and economic levels. Coupled with this, is the way in which globalization 
and technological advancement has afforded transnational crime many more spaces to 
operate. For Trinidad and Tobago, the most visible effect of illegal drugs has been the 
drastic increase in violent crimes, especially those involving guns.  Deosaran points out a 
366% increase in the homicide rate from 2000 to 2008, 87 while successive Ministers of 
National Security have labeled the trafficking of illegal drugs as the main motivator of 
violent crimes and as responsible for the number of illegal weapons present in the nation.  
Thus it is easy to surmise that the elevated crime rate is highly representative of the 
extent to which the illegal drug trade operates in the nation. It is necessary to conduct a 
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deeper examination of the trade within Trinidad in order to explain why it has produced 
such shocking results. Indeed, the illegal drug trade seems to be the largest issue 
threatening the nation’s stability. In the broader Caribbean context, Trinidad is an 
important supplier of petroleum and petrochemicals as well as many other products, for 
its Caribbean neighbors and is also lobbying to host the headquarters for the proposed 
FTAA. The illegal drug trade is a rogue element, which if unchecked, has the power to 
damage the nation’s role in the region and derail its long-term policy objectives.88 
While Trinidad is not a significant grower or producer of drugs, it has become the 
perfect middleman in the illegal trade since its petrochemical industry produces many of 
the precursor chemicals necessary to refine cocaine. The INCSR has stated that precursor 
chemicals originating in Trinidad and Tobago have in fact been found in drug labs in 
Colombia. In 1999, the INCSR stated that Trinidad and Tobago supplied approximately 
one third of the precursor chemicals to the Colombian drug trafficking organizations.89  
As such, the trade moves in both directions with Trinidad and Tobago acting as a possible 
supplier of precursor chemicals and receiver of finished products for northward 
transshipment. It is estimated that 85% of the drugs that come into Trinidad and Tobago 
come from Venezuela while the remaining 15% comes from Guyana. 90 These drugs are 
mostly cocaine and marijuana but there is also some heroin. Seizure figures convey that 
                                                          
88 For example, the INCSR 2014 states that in Jamaica 1.23 metric tons of cocaine and 30.9 metric tons of 
cannabis were seized, while in Trinidad cocaine seizures were 110.6 kg, and cannabis seizures were 3.7 
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these countries. 
 
89 U.S. Department of State, “Volume I,” INCSR (1999). 
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heroin is shipped in considerably smaller amounts than cocaine, most likely because the 
market value for heroin is much higher.  Also, as the INCSRs state, Trinidad and Tobago 
is more popular as a point for transshipment to Europe, whose heroin market is more 
readily satisfied by the Golden Crescent and the Golden Triangle.91 The Venezuelan 
Tucupita cartel purportedly has the strongest linkage to criminal organizations in 
Trinidad and Tobago and acts as the liaison for Colombian suppliers. 
 The core objectives of Trinidadian drug policy reflect that there is a greater 
emphasis on domestic harm reduction than in stemming the flow. The focus on harm 
reduction is because the country has noted that its smallness prevents it from fully 
addressing that dimension of the illegal drug problem without considerable assistance 
from the developed nations. The report on its drug policy plan states that instead, illegal 
drugs are recognized “as a major developmental and public health threat to the nation, 
and has economic, social and political implications.”92 In fact, the overall plan includes 
not only the Ministry of National Security, but also the Ministries of the Attorney 
General, Social Development, Finance, and Health, showing that even though there is the 
acknowledgement that illegal drugs have caused a considerable upsurge in violence, the 
problem is primarily a social one (see Figure 1 for an organizational chart showing the 
branches of government partnering in Trinidad’s Anti-Drug Initiative). Thus, at the head 
of the policy priorities for the Trinidadian drug plan is Institutional Strengthening, geared 
at increasing the individual efficiency of the branches of government involved in the plan 
                                                          
91 Ibid. 
 
92 National Anti-Drug Plan of Trinidad and Tobago 2008-2012, p. 45 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/eng/National%20Plans/Trinidad%20and%20Tobag
o%202008-2012.pdf 
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as well as, their levels of cooperation. Statements contained within the plan assert that it 
is meant to be available to the public and subject to its scrutiny however, it is unclear if 
there has been sufficient advertisement of the availability of the Plan to make the general 
public aware that is exists for public review.
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Figure 1: Organizational Chart of Trinidad and Tobago’s Anti-Drug Initiative 
 
Source: National Anti-Drug Plan of Trinidad and Tobago 2008-2012, p. 43 
http://www.cicad.oas.org/fortalecimiento_institucional/eng/National%20Plans/Trinidad%20and%20Tobago%202008-2012.pdf  
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Jamaica 
 Thorburn and Morris posit that Jamaica is “fundamentally and utterly 
disadvantaged by the international system, and that much of what happens, especially 
with regard to our economic performance, can be explained as having happened to (their 
emphasis) us because of system forces which overshadow national level efforts, are 
beyond our control, and which inevitably work to the disadvantage of small, less 
developed, post colonial economies. In this context one can readily understand the 
sentiment behind Georges Fauriol's infamous statement that "small states do not have a 
foreign policy, they merely have a policy of existence.””93 The preceding quote implies 
that the sense of smallness is a pervasive quality of Jamaica’s foreign policy. With this in 
mind, Jamaica’s national security policy statement has outlined its understanding of its 
role in the illegal drug trade as the connecting point between South American suppliers 
and North American consumers of illegal drugs. Thus its emphasis is on reducing its 
attractiveness as a transportation hub for transnational criminal organizations rather than 
on stemming marijuana production or use in the island. Though these are noted as 
secondary concerns, the general interpretation of the problem as one in which the 
middleman becomes a pawn at the hands of two larger players highlights two major 
points – the ever-present perception of smallness and the externalization of the drug issue 
which is in itself a form of distancing itself from the ‘US other.’ Moreover, the national 
security policy statement assert that the country attributes its high levels of violence and 
homicides to political tribalism and drug/gang related conflicts, which upset the social 
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order and that the operation of transnational criminal networks of drug traffickers directly 
challenge the survival of the state.94 
 Jamaica has become one of the key trafficking routes between South America and 
the United States because of its convenient geographic location. Both air trafficking 
utilizing prop planes and making sea drops as well as “go-fast” boats (powerboats) are 
popular methods used by traffickers in the territorial space of the island. There is also the 
vulnerability of large container ships and cruise ships docking at Jamaican ports which 
are capable of bringing a much larger quantity of products into the country. The gang 
problem in Jamaica is closely associated with the issue of illegal drugs. Linkages have 
been noted between ‘dons’ and major transnational criminal organizations and drug 
cartels, primarily Colombian cartels. Additionally, it is surmised that gangs finance their 
local operations mainly by smuggling illegal drugs and extorting individuals complicit in 
their operations. Unlike Trinidad, it is clear that Jamaica has framed the issue of illegal 
drugs as primarily one of security rather than a mainly social and developmental issue 
that results in security problems. Jamaica’s framing is more aligned to the way in which 
the US frames the issues, but perhaps because both countries are so focused on their own 
relative security, this is why they have had a somewhat contentious drug policy 
relationship (discussed later in Jamaica case chapter). 
 Successive INCSRs have reported that Jamaica is both a major production and 
transit country. In the early 1990s, these reports generally pointed out the problems with 
Jamaican drug enforcement efforts, stating that they should be more closely aligned with 
                                                          
94 Jamaica’s National Security Policy, Ministry of National Security website: 
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the regional policies guided by the US in order to achieve better results. However, in 
1998, after the country finally signed on to the Jamaica-US bilateral maritime agreement 
proposed in 1995 (the Shiprider Agreement), there is a difference in the tone use to 
describe Jamaica’s counter-drug efforts, coupled with praise for its valuable contribution 
to regional anti-drug activities, like assuming operational control and headquartering the 
Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement Training Center (REDTRAC).95  In 1998, 
precursor chemicals are also first noted as a growing dimension of the country’s illegal 
drug trade, as well as the shift from airborne to sea transport, which made the US air 
surveillance endeavor, Operation Prop Lock, a failure in that year. 
 The 2011 INCSR notes that Jamaica’s usually prompt execution of extradition 
requests was not upheld in the extradition issue of Christopher “Dudus” Coke, a situation 
which became a major local issue as well a sore point in the history of US-Jamaica drug 
policy relations. Coke’s extradition was processed in May 2010, nine months after the 
request was made. In the following reports however, there is once again praise for 
Jamaica’s alignment to the regional policy efforts, but acknowledgement that the level of 
violence has led to a dangerous breakdown in the public trust for the government which 
may eventually lead to unwanted forms of vigilante justice that threaten the general 
stability of the island.96 
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96 U.S. Department of State, “Volume I,” INCSR (2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
 The guiding idea of the current study is that there even though foreign policy has 
been linked to nationalism in the causal direction of a country’s nationalism shaping its 
own foreign policy, there is an under-examined relationship between policy influences 
coming from the outside impact nationalisms of country and the power relations involved 
that may make the impact on nationalism stronger or weaker. For this reason it was 
important in this chapter to examine the breadth of nationalism literature and locate the 
Anglophone Caribbean in this body of knowledge, as well as highlight the linkages that 
have already been made between policy and nationalism relating to the countries under 
examination. From this point, the hypothesized relationship of US drug policy affecting 
nationalism will be added to the widely accepted notion that nationalism informs policy 
to create a more complete picture of the circular nature of the policy and nationalism 
relationship when it is played out on the bilateral level between a hegemonic and small 
state. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 My research proceeds from the notion that small-state nationalism is affected by 
strong policy influence from a hegemonic state. The present chapter seeks to explain the 
process of interrogating that claim through the small-n country comparison conducted 
using Trinidad’s, and Jamaica’s nationalism as juxtaposed with U.S. drug policies in the 
region. The first task of this project was to find the views on collective membership that 
exist in each case country and then trace the fluctuations in this notion against policy 
influences to find a progression or evolution of each country’s nationalism as a direct 
response to policy. Cases were selected on the basis of the most similar systems design 
following Przeworski and Teune,97 to control for variables outside of US drug policy that 
may also affect nationalism, given that there are other known influencers on nationalism 
such as collective history, political system, culture and language. Ethnic composition has 
also been deemed a factor which can impact nationalism based on explanations of nation 
formation given discussed in Chapter 2; but in this case since ethnic composition has not 
been the basis for the formation of post-colonial nations and given the variety of 
ethnicities present in both nations (though in different proportions), ethnic composition is 
taken as an already given factor for nationalist expression which cannot be divorced from 
the overall discussion. Thus the important [independent] variable (or difference) between 
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the countries to examine is their attitudes to US drug policies and the subsequent impact 
on nationalism. US drug policy for the purpose of the study is defined as those policies 
constructed by the US which directly pertain to counter-drug strategies in each country 
and its ambit. Examples of such are the Shiprider Agreement, Extradition treaties, mutual 
legal assistance treaties and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. Many of these bi- 
and multi-lateral agreements have been expressly created with the acknowledgement that 
illegal drug trafficking has become the biggest security threat for the small states of the 
Anglophone Caribbean. The dependent variable, nationalism, is broken into three 
categories – self-perception, self-projection and perception of the other. In defining 
nationalism as having a fluid quality of being both process and practice, it means that 
these components of can be measured and their development tracked over time from the 
path to nationhood and immediate post-independence era through its development to its 
present incarnation. 
The present chapter will therefore explain the rationale as well as the process of 
data collection and the method of detecting the patterns within the data which were used 
to formulate the conclusions of the project. 
 
DATA COLLECTION  
The primary research approaches guiding this study are Content Analysis and 
Process Tracing98 as a techniques of matching wherein the collected data is examined to 
find the patterns which emerge to support or refute the hypothesis over the period from 
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independence (1962) to present day.99 Content Analysis here can be understood as a 
method of identifying important aspects of the data in order to build support for the 
hypothesis. According to Berg, Content Analysis is useful for making oral data from 
interviews and text-based data such as newspaper articles systematically comparable.100 
The sequence of analytic activities that make up Content Analysis have been employed 
here; through, the transcribing of recorded data to make all data text-based, the creation 
of themes and the sorting of the data into these themes, and the isolation of meaningful 
patterns which relate to the research question. The patterns here have then been studied 
among the breadth of existing literature surrounding the research questions to come up 
with the conclusions of the project.  
Collier explains process tracing as “the systematic examination of diagnostic 
evidence selected and analyzed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by 
the investigator.”101 Thus indicating that there is a particular lens through which the data 
are examined, meaning that the themes are pre-decided and the data are engaged in a way 
which organizes it into these themes. These themes are the three previously mentioned 
components of nationalism – self-perception, perception of the other, and self-projection. 
Process Tracing as an analytical tool is meant to assist in the formulation of causal 
inferences. Primarily, it involves the examination and description of events over time as a 
means of achieving this. The events examined in this thesis are the path to, and 
                                                          
99 Present day means up to the time that the data was collected in Fall 2012. 
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independence of Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago; the Shiprider Agreement and the 
resulting official and public reactions; and instances of major upheaval deriving from the 
issues related to the illegal drug trade (e.g., The Christopher “Dudus” Coke Affair in 
Jamaica discussed in Chapter 4). These particular events show the relationship to the 
hegemon from the inception of the nation up to the present. In the current project, process 
tracing and content analysis were meant to occur in a fluid manner as soon as data came 
in, with additional detail being added as it became available. The method was meant to 
maximize the findings and level of detail that could be applied to the subject under 
examination. 
The study takes its units of analysis at the group level within the general 
population (focus groups) and at the expert level (Delphi group) with four focus groups 
and one Delphi study being conducted in each country. Coupled with this elite-ordinary 
binary, there is also the use of archival data from the national newspapers, past speeches 
from government officials and previously conducted opinion polls and survey data where 
available. The aim of utilizing these sources was to gather a multi-layered span of 
information from which to compare the perceptions at the levels of the general 
population, experts in the field – considered the organic intellectuals responsible for the 
creation and implementation of the local policies. Sampling from these two levels would 
also add multiple dimensions to the notion of identification that makes up the foundation 
of nationalism. Archival data such as newspapers and speeches are meant to fill the gaps 
that might exist in the general population and official data actually collected given the 
limitations of the researcher to conduct a larger number of focus groups in both countries.  
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 The varied data sources allowed for access to personnel working with national 
ministries who are responsible for the construction and implementation of local counter-
drug policies, academics who have promoted strong political views on the topic, and 
members of the general population with varying levels of knowledge and perceptions of 
the illegal drug situation. The interaction with these subjects provided a partial picture of 
the present day. Furthermore the archival data collected builds upon these three levels 
and provides important information on past events pertaining to the issues of illegal drug 
policy, nationalism, and relations with the hegemon.  
 
Archival Data 
 Archival data for this study span the period leading up to independence (as far 
back as the 1930s where necessary) to September 2012 when the data collection period 
ended. The path to independence, which occurred in 1962 for both case countries, is an 
important spotlight on the formation of a strong political nationalism which provided the 
thrust for the local populations to clamor for independence from their British colonial 
leaders. As chapter one indicates, this was a crucial time for the nations and given the 
global Cold War context, it was an ideal time for them to assert independence, as it 
ensured that every new nation would become an important cog in maintaining the 
ideological balance of power. Newspaper articles, speeches of past leaders and writings 
of intellectuals on the subject of nationalism at this time are therefore pivotal in gaining a 
complete picture of the initial incarnation of nationalism, and its evolution for both small 
states. Archival sources were the following: 
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Newspapers  
 Newspapers are an important source of historical and factual information. 
Additionally they can provide an account of both elite and public perceptions, reveal 
important notes on social context, and show linguistic markers which can be used to 
explain the general mood of the population at a frozen point in time.102 The main 
nationally circulated newspapers in the case countries were used in this study: in 
Trinidad, The Guardian, The Express, and the Trinidad Newsday; and in Jamaica, The 
Observer and The Gleaner. Apart from Newsday and The Observer, both of which were 
launched in 1993, the other newspapers in this sample go back several decades, and are 
staples in the daily-circulated news scene for their respective countries. The Gleaner is 
the oldest of the lot, having been established in 1834, The Guardian in 1917, and The 
Express in 1967. 
Searches of the online databases of these newspapers were conducted using the 
keywords “nationalism,” “drug policy,” and “illegal drugs”103 in order to retrieve articles 
relating to the subject under study. Additionally, these newspaper websites also allow for 
community comments on the posted articles, so the comments sections of relevant 
articles were also useful in providing information on the perceptions of the general 
public, albeit only those with internet access. From these sources, the wording of the 
articles provided clues as to the perception of the hegemon and the public perceptions 
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relating to the scope of the illegal drug problem in the country and the role which the 
country played in the drug trade.  
 
Speeches and Policy Papers 
 As far as possible, speeches from notable past leaders such as Eric Williams, 
Norman and Michael Manley, and Alexander Bustamante were accessed using the Digital 
Library of the Caribbean and printed collections of speeches or excerpts of such. These 
were useful in tracing the level of nationalism expressed at the official level as well as 
examining the way in which leaders communicated with the general public. They further 
show the perception of the other(s), in this case the outgoing British hegemon and the 
perceived potential new hegemon, the US. These leaders were the main figures in the 
independence movement for the case countries and as such were able to sway public 
perceptions (of self and other) in an important way.  
 Policy papers released by the Ministries of National Security and Foreign Affairs 
in the case countries were collected, as well as reports pertaining to the drug and crime 
situation. Additionally, these were cross-referenced with reports from the UNODC, the 
US State Department’s INCSRs, CICAD, CARICOM and the OAS. These reports 
showed the level of assistance from the US given to each case country based on their 
individual proposals for local drug policy. They further indicate how deep the level of 
cooperation and compliance is in each country with the policy objectives of the US 
towards the region. 
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Focus Groups 
 Another data source was the focus groups conducted in each country consisting of 
subjects from the general population. Focus groups can be defined as an assembly of 
individuals meant to – using their personal experience and not expert knowledge – 
discuss amongst one another, the topic under research.104 These were included in the 
research design to add a dimension other than text-based data – which would gauge not 
only the personal responses on the topic, but also the revelations about the topic that 
could only come from the interaction of the subjects.  This is the main idea behind the 
usefulness of focus groups in social research, that the interaction among subjects in a 
focus group provides a deeper level of insight than the classic interview method. Subjects 
are encouraged to clarify their opinions by their peer group as opposed to the 
investigator, to whom they may feel somewhat inferior due to the lack of topic-specific 
knowledge. Therefore, the potentiality of subjects being more self-deprecating and not 
answering fully for fear of being ‘wrong’ can be avoided through using this method. The 
design called for finding a small numbers of people (6-8 persons) who would agree to 
participate in a group setting and talk about the illegal drug situation in their country and 
their perceptions on nationalism and the US resulting from that. Respondents were 
chosen on the basis of their willingness and availability to participate, and with a degree 
of variability (meaning that they were different ages, ethnicities, levels of education, 
professions and socio-economic levels). It was hoped that the variability would reflect the 
differences in perceptions, social contexts and experiences that would lead to rich 
discussions in the group sessions. Respondents were gathered by using the investigator’s 
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social connections in Trinidad who would publicize the need for participants at their 
various places of work and social settings. This yielded a selection of adults ranging from 
the 18-25, to the 65+ age categories, with varying professions, ethnicities, social 
backgrounds and levels of education.  
 
Figure 1: Focus Group Participants 
Country Male Female 
Age 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 55-65 65+ 
Trinidad 12 11 2 9 6 2 3 1 
Jamaica 12 18 15 3 2 5 4 1 
 
In Trinidad, the common assumption is that alignment to one political party or the 
other is determined by ethnicity, therefore it was important that this be representative in 
groups as this was a main tension within the population. This tension would also result in 
a subject perceiving government action as favorable or unfavorable depending on 
whether or not their political party was in power. The levels of education and/or 
professions cannot necessarily be divorced from these positions since this ethnic 
alignment to politics has become an inherent part of the socialization process in the 
country (young adults tend to vote for the same party that their parents vote for regardless 
of political ideology). 
In Jamaica, the respondents were collected in much the same way as in Trinidad, 
using social connections to bring in willing participants. Respondents were recruited from 
Kingston, the capital city. Given that most of the investigator’s social connections were 
very religious, many respondents came from church youth groups and bible study 
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classes,105 but again managed to span the age groups, social backgrounds and education 
levels. However, the religious characteristics of my hosts did not skew the study overall 
by resulting in the recruitment of solely deeply religious participants. Kingston 
purportedly has one church per square mile, and church is not only used as a religious 
meeting place, but also as a site for coming together as a community for various 
activities. From observations of Kingston life, it seemed that going to church on Sunday 
morning was, by rote, the accepted thing to do. Had all participants in the study been very 
religious, this would raise the question of whether people are more likely to have a strong 
sense of nationalism if they are religious, but there was not enough information to 
address this question in the present research. In Jamaica, ethnic diversity was not as 
major a factor in societal tension as in Trinidad. One focus group was conducted at the 
University of the West Indies Mona Campus again using social connections and word of 
mouth (the draw of food as compensation was a key factor in attracting students to 
participate). In this group the age range was more or less the same, but it was possible to 
gain opinions from persons who came from parts of the island other than Kingston.  
Respondents were first given consent forms, followed by a questionnaire which asked 
specifically along what lines the individual identified themselves (ethnicity, religion, 
nationality). The questionnaire was meant to get them thinking about where they fit in the 
spectrum of national identification. The last two questions asked about prior knowledge, 
first of the drug trade as it exists in the country, and also the policies implemented to 
combat the trade. These final questions would get participants to start thinking about the 
topic and formulating their perspectives but without being provided any substantive 
                                                          
105 Attendance at church seemed to be an integral part of Jamaican culture. 
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information about the topic. People are not likely to think about drug policy regularly 
with any specificity, so these questions served as a form of framing in order to usher 
them more smoothly into the discussion. 
An unintended consequence of this part of the research design was that 
respondents tended to look to the investigator for verbal cues, agreement, or disagreement 
with their points of view. These instances were handled, with the researcher reassuring 
the respondent that their contribution was valued, but also reminding them, that as per the 
statement in the consent form, the investigator was not meant to participate in the 
discussion. Many respondents asked for the personal views of the investigator, but this 
always occurred after the conclusion of the discussion so it did not affect the session. 
 
Delphi Studies 
An additional data source were the two Delphi studies, one conducted in each 
case country. According to Turoff (2002)106, the original intention of a Delphi study was 
to seek consensus on an issue from a group of experts. His idea of a Delphi study 
however, and the method applied in the present thesis, was to gather the strongest 
possible opposing views on the issue in order to gain the richest and most well-rounded 
understanding of the problem. Thus consensus was not the aim of gathering the group of 
experts in the field of drug policies and the drug trade in the case countries. For this 
reason, subjects were recruited from different government ministries as well as the 
University of the West Indies to avoid homogeneity in the group. Recruitment of persons 
from these organizations was added to the research design to bolster the input deriving 
                                                          
106 Murray Turoff, “The Policy Delphi,” in Murray Turoff and Harold A. Linstone, The Delphi Method: 
Techniques and Applications, (London: Addison-Wesley, 1975). 
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from live interactions. It was also meant to add to the component of expert knowledge, 
which would otherwise only be available in text-based formats. Subjects were asked to 
discuss the questions based on their personal opinion and deep understanding of the 
issues. As a result it was interesting to see how the balance between personal opinion and 
the desire to reflect the stance of their respective government bodies or institutions played 
out at the conference table. 
 There are many Delphi methods which utilize an iterative process in which 
subjects are asked to respond to a questionnaire, followed by a meeting in which a 
moderator asks guided questions for group discussion. On the basis of the outcomes of 
the initial meeting, participants were asked to again answer a questionnaire following up 
on the first meeting and use the guided discussion process multiple times to satisfy data 
collection. These styles were impractical for use in the current project given the limited 
window in which all subjects were available at the same time (since they were ministry 
officials or university professors). Thus the approach used here was a conference style 
Delphi in which respondents were asked to engage in a long guided discussion process.  
 All respondents were approached through email or phone call directly to the 
Ministries of National Security and Foreign Affairs, and the International Relations 
Departments at the University of the West Indies St. Augustine (Trinidad) and Mona 
(Jamaica) Campuses. In Trinidad unfortunately, there was no response from the St. 
Augustine Campus, but the investigator was able to gather participants from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, National Security and the Special Division of the Police Force which 
dealt with narcotics. These participants were able to comment on both the construction 
and implementation of drug policies and the level of cooperation with the hegemon. 
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Respondents were recruited in the same way in Jamaica, this time with the participation 
of representatives from the Mona Campus, the Ministry of National Security and the 
Jamaica Constabulary Force. These respondents were also able to discuss the finer points 
of the construction and implementation of policies and the level of cooperation with the 
US. 
 An obstacle encountered in this component of the research design was during the 
recruitment period, the subjects contacted, requested further information on the project in 
order to decide if they would participate. The investigator handled this by sending a 
shortened version of the proposal to these participants in order to convince them of the 
value of the project. Sharing the document was generally enough to generate the subjects’ 
willingness to participate in the project as they were happy to input their views after the 
investigator showed willingness to share information given that a main concern was how 
the information would be used and in what light they would be painted. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 Upon collection, data from the focus groups and Delphi sessions were transcribed 
and examined by the investigator to find elements which fit into the three previously 
mentioned themes. For example, comments on the magnitude of Trinidad’s role in the 
illegal drug trade, were sorted into the self-perception theme since this directly relates to 
the issue of conceptualizing the country’s identity.  Utilizing these themes as the starting 
point for analysis of the focus group and Delphi data allowed for the general picture to 
take shape, but also led to the generation of additional themes which related to them. 
Some of examples of these themes are, Corruption and Distrust of Government, 
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Idealization or Denigration of Foreign Solutions and Disconnection Between 
Government and General Public. Upon establishing these themes and sub-themes, it was 
possible to go back through the focus group and Delphi data and consolidate the 
conceptual picture of the hypothesized relationship between nationalism and US drug 
policy. Additionally, these themes were applied to the other data sources (newspapers and 
speeches) to complete the conceptual pattern. This type of analysis utilizes an approach 
which moves top-down with the data, first categorizing data into the broad themes, then 
moving on to the narrower themes in order to generate the “big picture.” The process 
itself happened in several rounds as all data were compared and related multiple times to 
ensure that the themes were well-developed and finely tuned. During the analysis, the 
temporal context was consistently taken into account, to explain for example, the nature 
and evolution of the aforementioned disconnect between government and general public 
over the years under study.   
The data collected for this project have attempted to combine insight from various 
qualitative sources. The main analytical steps followed here have been those relating to 
Content Analysis and Process Tracing which involved a long process of engaging with 
data in order to sort the data into the pre-set themes and also to establish new sub-themes 
from which the key explanatory patterns of the proposed causal relationship could be 
identified. In this case, the causal relationship is that US drug policy has had some impact 
on nationalism in the case countries. Thus the ultimate endeavor here is a descriptive 
process to explain this relationship and its directionality. In this sense, the research did set 
out with the pre-conceived notion that the causal relationship existed but there was no 
formal conceptualization of how nationalism was affected in each country. Thus it was 
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the aim of my investigation to uncover how nationalism might be re-affirmed, re-defined 
or eroded by the pressures emanating from the unequal power relations. However, 
through not allowing the data to be examined in the limited sense of the three initially 
determined themes, and allowing it to ‘speak’ for itself and generating additional themes, 
a more detailed picture emerged from the analysis.  
A second feature of the analysis was the comparative task of documenting how 
the relationship between US drug policy and nationalism was the same or different in 
each case country and what in particular yielded these outcomes. The objective was to 
show the variation between perceptions in each case country which led to nationalism 
being expressed more strongly in order vis-à-vis the other, and the rationale behind this 
difference in expression. For example, a main pattern that emerged in the present thesis 
was that the relationship between government and civil society was a factor in the 
projection of a cohesive nationalism. The finding that this pattern differed across case 
countries thereby making the ultimate notion of collective membership to the national 
fold strong for one but weak in the other, then was indicative of why US drug policy 
influence could have a greater impact on nationalism in one case but not the other.   
 
Conceptual Patterns/Themes 
 The analytical process began by categorizing data first into the three pre-
determined themes, and then identifying additional themes that arose along the way. The 
current section will offer some clarification and discussion of these themes.  
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Self-Perception 
This conceptual category comes from the definition of nationalism discussed in 
Chapter One. The notion of self-perception is an important part of the construction of a 
national identity. The term refers to the way in which citizens of the respective case 
countries, as represented by the sampled population in this project, view themselves in 
the collective sense.  
 
Self-Projection 
This term refers to the way in which the case countries promote their image to the 
world. Again this is completely a social construction which directly indicates the way in 
which the country wants to be perceived.  
 
Perception of the Other 
This theme relates to the way in which the subjects in the case countries 
characterize the US, and the way in which the US affects their quality of life. Perceptions 
of the Other are an important way of affirming identity according to Samuel Huntington, 
who argues that it is only through knowing the other, that one can determine what he is or 
is not.107 
 
Corruption and Distrust of Government 
In the course of conducting the focus groups in both countries, this theme became 
clear. Respondents acknowledged or perceived a high level of corruption at the official 
                                                          
107 See Samuel Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2004). 
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levels which in turn led to a distrust of the police forces and the government to really 
handle serious security issues. This meant that a chasm existed between the official levels 
and the wider society which has a direct impact on the notions of collective membership 
which make for a cohesive form of nationalism. 
 
 Idealization or Denigration of Foreign Solutions 
This theme came through and relates directly to the category of Perception of the 
Other. The data reflected that there was both a desire for and a sense of trepidation at the 
general public level, related to assistance from outside sources, especially the US. The 
balancing act that people have to inwardly achieve became a major part of the way they 
discussed their perceptions of what stake the US had in their nation’s drug policy and 
what involvement they had in the island, whether it was an overt physical presence or 
merely providing economic assistance. 
  
Disconnection Between Government and General Public 
This emerged as a theme throughout the breadth of data analysis from both 
interactive and text-based data sources. In particular however, was the focus group data 
that revealed not only a lack of knowledge about drug policy plans implemented by the 
government and their results, but also the impression that the government either did not 
care or did not want the general public to know what these plans were. People 
commented on the lack of accountability that resulted since without the information, 
there was no way to know if there had been any successes. They also implied feelings of 
distrust of media reports celebrating big drug confiscations or destruction of large local 
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marijuana plantations since they believe that even these purported successes might not be 
to the scale that authorities would have them believe and that they are merely publicity 
stunts to keep the masses satisfied. 
 
Division 
This theme refers to the societal tensions within the populations of each case 
country. As discussed in the data chapters, these divisions made a strong impact on 
collective identification and hindered nationalism in its strongest sense. This particular 
theme however, must be broken down into two sections since the source of division was 
different in each case – Ethnicity in Trinidad and Class/Social Stratification in Jamaica. 
Ethnicity 
Trinidad being a multicultural society has a great mix of ethnicities – Whites 
(persons of British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch descent), Black, East Indian, 
Chinese, Syrian and Lebanese. This melting pot as it is often called, can sometimes boil 
over in that there is not always smooth mixing along the boundary lines of these 
ethnicities. The large majorities of the population are Black or East Indian, and this is 
reflected in the composition of the two major political parties in the island. Division 
along ethnic lines has led to individuals or portions of certain ethnic groups feeling a 
closer affinity or trying to build an affinity with their “motherland” populations and 
privileging this identity over the national identity. As a result, this makes the foundation 
of nationalism already weak and shows that there is already a pattern of its erosion by 
influences from the outside. 
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Class/Social Stratification 
 Division in Jamaica derives from the class separation that has become a pervasive 
part of society. For example, Kingston is the most densely populated city on the island 
and because of this anyone living outside of Kingston is attributed the label “country,” to 
signify rural or non-city dweller. Conversely, those residing in Kingston are considered 
“uptown,” and inherently possess some level of social superiority over their “country” 
counterparts. The further divisions within Kingston itself such as “garrison” and “gully” 
further designate boundaries within the population which have bled into, both literally 
and figuratively, the politics of the nation. As a result, party affiliation has become a 
matter of life and death among certain lesser-privileged groups in the society and this can 
ultimately tie back into the notions of self-perception and projection. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
The major limitations to the study were the timing of the research (which was 
conducted in the July-September 2012 time period) and the size of the sample. With 
greater funding for the time frame spent in each country, more focus groups could have 
been conducted which would have increased the sample size. Upon reaching to Jamaica, 
travel to Montego Bay to conduct focus groups as originally planned was very difficult 
given its distance from the metropolitan are of Kingston and the researcher’s lack of 
connections to that area. However, 25% of Jamaica’s population is concentrated in the 
sampled Kingston/St. Andrew area while the remaining 75% is spread across the 
remainder of the island meaning that there is no such other densely populated city center.  
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With regard to timing of the research, these months were during and directly following 
the 2012 Summer Olympics at which athletes from both countries earned medals. 
Trinidad’s Keshorn Walcott earned the country’s first ever Olympic gold medal in a field 
event (javelin) making him an instant national hero (even worthy of a huge welcome 
home reception inside the airport as counter-security policy as that seems).108 Similarly, 
Usain Bolt and his teammates secured medals for Jamaica, which was expected, but again 
left the country on a “national” high. The Olympic successes brought out a surge of 
nationalistic sentiment and pride, which is not characteristic of daily life in either 
country.  
Another obstacle came from the desire to avoid spurious conclusions – wherein 
key variables are omitted which may instead account for the outcomes in place of the 
impact of US drug policy specifically. The problem became looking specifically at US 
drug policy and isolating its effect on nationalism as opposed to the effect of other 
variables on nationalism. The good thing is that those influencers that sum up nation 
formation such as ethnicity and collective identity are already firmly established in each 
country, so these things can be taken as given influencers on the evolution of their 
nationalisms. With regard to this, the study narrowed focus to asking questions in groups 
that specifically related to the drug situation and drug policy and steered away from 
questions that would focus on other variables. 
Establishing equivalence was also another potential problem in the study in that 
nationalism in each country is directly affected by in-group/out-group classifications 
                                                          
108 Ironically many people remarked that if you wanted to smuggle drugs into or out of the country, that 
would’ve been the best day to do so given the enormous crowd gathered inside the airport welcome area 
and the obvious security oversights. 
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which shape the collective identification at the national level. It turns out that two 
different variables are the basis for societal division in each country – ethnicity in 
Trinidad and class/social stratification in Jamaica. However, these two variables proved 
functionally equivalent thus still allowing meaningful comparison. The big questions 
posed in establishing this functional equivalence therefore could still be answered: 
Does nationalism in Jamaica mean the same thing as in Trinidad? 
 Do the countries have same/similar self-perceptions? 
 Do the countries have same/similar self-projections? 
 Do they have same/similar perceptions of the other? 
 Does drug policy mean the same thing to both countries? 
 
REPRESENTATION OF DATA 
Before proceeding, it is necessary to explain how the shape that the following data 
chapters will take in terms of the patterns discussed above. The data chapters begin with a 
historical and theoretical discussion meant to set the context within which the findings 
must be understood and interpreted. The findings from focus groups and the Delphi for 
that country are then reported and related to the themes and patterns, and the text-based 
sources incorporated to provide additional validity and robustness to these themes. This 
does not mean that the collected data from focus groups and Delphi studies are viewed as 
having greater conceptual weight than text-based sources, but they do manage to 
articulate the objectives of the thesis more directly since the questions posed to the 
groups were created by the researcher exactly for the purpose of this thesis. Additionally, 
important events (like Shiprider) are discussed, once again within the conceptual frame of 
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these themes to show their application as more than an abstraction. By using the group 
data as the main focus of these chapters, it ensures that the framework of the thesis is 
adhered to and brings greater the focus of the work.  
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CHAPTER 4 
TRINIDAD & TOBAGO: LAND OF STEELBAND, CALYPSO AND DRUGS? 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter the Trinidadian case will be examined. To interrogate the 
components of nationalism previously identified in this study – self-perception, self-
projection, and perception of the other – four focus groups and one Delphi study were 
conducted in the country and these data were coupled with secondary data such as 
speeches and newspapers articles, and policy documents where possible. 
The guiding questions for the Trinidad case study were: 
• Has there been a deepening of inter-ethnic tensions in Trinidad in response to US 
drug policy actions? 
• Have anti-US sentiments increased in response to these policy actions? 
• Have government statements emphasized each country’s cooperation and 
complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there been an assertion 
(or exaltation) of independent policy formation? 
The objective was to create a complete contextual picture of Trinidad from the 
path to nationhood to present as a way of understanding the relationship with the 
hegemon, how the illegal drug trade emerged as a problem, and how the policies that 
have built up to combat drug trafficking have affected the country’s nationalism. The 
chapter first sets the historical context showing the emergence of nationalist thought and 
how this fed into the thrust for independence from the British Monarchy. It goes on to 
show where the illegal drug trade fits into this context, and provides an overview of the 
  88
US-Trinidadian relationship. Finally it details the findings from the focus groups and 
Delphi study by grouping the data into the main conceptual patterns which formed in the 
Trinidadian case.  
 
BACKGROUND 
Path to Nationhood 
Sutton (1987) finds that small states will generally be more passive and reactive 
especially when nationalism is weak.109 Nationalism in Trinidad grew out of the labor 
movement dating back to the mid-1920s when Arthur Andrew Cipriani who served as a 
mayor for Port-of-Spain (Trinidad’s capital city), member of the Legislative Council, and 
also headed the Trinidad Workingmen’s Association (later the Trinidad Labour Party). 
Cipriani was a white man of French and Corsican descent, yet he championed the rights 
of the colored Trinidadian workforce and was able to foster unity amongst the middle 
class. According to Eric Williams, the first Prime Minister of Trinidad, another 
prominent figure in Trinidad’s path to nationhood, Cipriani is “the pioneer of the 
nationalist movement in Trinidad and Tobago.”110 At this stage of history, even though 
there was a certain level of distrust between the Indian and black communities, both were 
willing to follow Cipriani, so this created a unity of purpose (at least for legislative 
representation).  
                                                          
109 Paul Sutton, “Political Aspects,” Politics, Security, and Development In Small States, Eds. Colin Clarke 
and Tony Payne, (London: Allen And Unwin, 1987), 20. 
 
110 Michael Anthony, Historical Dictionary of Trinidad and Tobago, (London: The Scarecrow Press, 1997), 
134. 
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Another prominent figure in the path towards Trinidadian nationhood was Tubal 
Uriah “Buzz” Butler. By 1934, Cipriani’s efforts had lost momentum because he had 
trouble uniting workers across the major industries in Trinidad: sugar and petroleum. 
Even though he had managed to create a desire for greater legislative representation of 
the working class, these sentiments were not as strong outside of the capital city. Butler 
served under Cipriani in the British West Indian Regiment as one of his chief lieutenants. 
Even though he was originally from Grenada, he moved to Trinidad after World War I 
because the petroleum industry in the country promised higher wages. By 1935 he felt 
that Cipriani’s efforts were too restrained. He became a ‘man of action,’111 leading a 60-
mile march from the oil industry area to the capital city in the same year to bring 
attention to worker’s demands. In the next year, he left the Trinidad Labour Party and 
struck out on his own. With his charisma he was able to gather significant support from 
both the Indian and Black communities, primarily those working in the petroleum sector. 
In 1937 he organized a sit-in to bring attention to petroleum workers rights. Even though 
it started off as a peaceful strike, the police tried to arrest Butler which led to a riot. 
Butler was imprisoned for two years. The riot was the advent of the labor movement in 
Trinidad in which middle class non-whites voiced their demands for increased wages and 
better conditions. The movement acted as a launching point for this class to have a 
greater political voice in general and is arguably the pivotal event which accelerated 
Trinidad on its path to nationhood. Personalities such as Cipriani, Butler and Williams 
were the drivers of political nationalism and proved instrumental in bringing Trinidad to 
nationhood  
                                                          
111 Michael Anthony, Historical Dictionary of Trinidad and Tobago (1997). 
  90
Eric Williams was exceptional in giving ‘the Trinidadian’ a voice. Williams was a 
renowned Caribbean scholar, having earned his doctorate in History at Oxford University 
in the UK and later going on to become a full professor at Howard University in the US. 
He began his political career in 1944 by serving on the Anglo-American Caribbean 
Commission,112 however, his strong anti-colonial opinions led to the non-renewal of his 
contract with them in 1955. By the next year he established the People’s National 
Movement (PNM), the political party under which he would usher Trinidad into 
independence.  Williams provided the first real version of the other from which the 
Trinidadian could distinguish and therefore discover himself. This came through his 
description of Massa: “This was Massa – the owner of a West Indian sugar plantation, 
frequently an absentee, deliberately stunting all the economic potential of the society, 
dominating his defenseless workers by the threat of punishment or imprisonment, using 
his political power for the most selfish private ends, an uncultured man with an illiberal 
outlook.”113 The way he characterized the colonial hegemon remains an integral part of 
the way in which hegemony is perceived, thus, it has also become an integral part of the 
Trinidadian sense of self in that they must understand themselves as a contrast to the 
above description. 
 What has become most evident from this research endeavor is that Trinidadian 
nationalism is a reactionary phenomenon. In one sense the reactionary bent is an 
                                                          
112 The Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was formed in 1942 to deal with the social and economic 
challenges that faced the region. After WWII it was tasked with studying the future of the region in the 
post-war era. 
 
113 “Massa Day Done” in Forged From the Love of Liberty: Selected Speeches of Dr. Eric Williams, 
compiled by Paul K. Sutton, (Port-of-Spain: Longman Caribbean, 1981), 214. 
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evolution of the nationalism which existed around the time of independence. If we take 
Hearn’s explanation of the distinction between political and cultural nationalism,114 the 
former being the type necessary for nation formation while the latter is more socially 
embedded and more geared towards the longevity of the nation; then we can surmise that 
Trinidadian nationalism has indeed evolved away from the political stage. However, once 
the nation was established and now 50 years later, nationalism has given way from the 
political to the second order cultural nationalism. 
 
Plurality in Trinidadian Culture & Society 
Premdas argues that the plural Trinidadian society has basically been forged by 
the superimposition of a British veneer on imported non-western people.115 However, I 
would argue that it is more a case of the whole becoming greater than the sum of its parts. 
Merely having a British or westernized veneer (to use his phrasing), implies that there 
would be no cross-cultural seepage. That would then be unable to explain phenomena 
like the shouter Baptist religion which he discusses later in his book, or the numerous 
Hindi words that have become commonplace in the everyday Trinidadian creole. 
He points out that in the path to independence, the ethnic community which had 
by that time, been able to most closely adopt the British colonial ways would be the 
obvious choice for leadership of the country after their departure.116 The winner of this 
losing battle (in that it required a loss of one’s original culture), were clearly the African 
                                                          
114 Jonathan Hearn, Rethinking Nationalism, p. 6 
 
115 Ralph Premdas, Ethnicity In Trinidad And Tobago, p. 75 
 
116 Premdas, p. 80 
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descended Trinidadians. They had been there the longest, had the largest community, and 
had been subject to the harshest cultural stripping (ritual passage). Granted the East 
Indians also endured a form of ritual passage, but in keeping to the rural areas and 
isolating themselves in their communities, they were more able to recreate some 
semblance of their mother culture. From the very first election under universal adult 
suffrage in 1946, bribery and race were used to mobilize the masses in Trinidad.  
Ryan calls this event, “the event [emphasis added] which did more than anything 
else to crystallize the divisions in society.”117 To this day, Trinidadian politics has not 
been able to move past these divisions and it is here that ethnic tension is most overtly 
expressed. During election campaigning, the dominant political parties, the PNM (Afro-
Trinidadian centric party) and the United National Congress (UNC – Indo-Trinidadian 
centric party),118 select a mixture of ethnicities to run for different constituencies. Yet 
despite parading this multicultural front, more than 50% of each party belongs to one 
particular group or the other. Moreover, it is blatantly practiced that for certain seats, the 
running candidate will be of the predominant ethnic background for that constituency. 
Only in a stronghold seat would a political party dare to place a candidate that is not of 
the predominant ethnic background. Examining ethnic division in relation to the issue of 
illegal drugs has showed that certain roles (trafficker, distributor, addict) are ascribed to 
particular ethnic groups. This not only comes from the perceptions of how the illegal 
                                                          
117 Selwyn D. Ryan, Race and Nationalism in Trinidad and Tobago: a study of decolonization in a 
multiracial society, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 115. 
 
118 The UNC is currently combined with the Congress Of The People (COP) to constitute the sitting 
coalition government called the People’s Partnership (PP). The COP consists of many former UNC 
members who broke away in 2006 due to an internal UNC party dispute. 
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drug trade operates, but the way it is handled by the local authorities, in that lower level 
offences with the majority of perpetrators coming from a particular ethnic group seem to 
be pursued over more large scale attempts at dismantling illegal drug organizations. This 
shows that there an element of ethnic boundary formation and affirmation at work with 
regard to both the illegal drug trade and the policies used to address it. 
 In speaking of the ethnic division in Trinidad, some authors use words like strife 
or even conflict (meaning non-violent conflict). However, I would argue that these words 
are now too strong to truly describe inter-race relations in today’s Trinidad. While there 
is still the element which cleaves to the deep divisions among the ethnic groups, the 
larger consensus shows that there is a sense of overall tolerance. Though it does not mean 
that the races live together as one, it harkens back to M. G. Smith’s descriptions of plural 
society as a form of happy cohabitation and interaction for commercial purposes. The 
interaction has since evolved into the ‘liming’119 society that currently exists, and there 
are still tensions but these tensions are more and less apparent in light of situational 
factors, such as, if it is close to election time (where division will be more apparent), or if 
it is close to the nation’s carnival celebration (where division is less apparent).  
We can be certain that at least the current working class generation in Trinidad 
has moved past the days, for example, of clubs having ‘dhal night’ or ‘golliwog’ night.120 
To some extent this is an illustration of the seepage of US culture and the subsequent 
                                                          
119 The Trinidadian word synonymous with ‘hanging out.’ 
 
120 A particular nightclub in the mid-90s would host parties on different nights of the weekend geared 
towards only a certain ethnic group. These nights were colloquially referred to as dhal night in reference to 
indo-Trinidadians as dhal is a popular Indian dish, and golliwog night in reference to afro-Trinidadians. 
Both were used as derogatory categorizations. 
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adaptation of Trinidadian culture. The country has in a sense imported the foreign taboos 
surrounding race and owned them. In the past, cultural art forms such as calypso were 
dominated by Afro-Trinidadians. Some of these calypsos contained verses that would 
ridicule Indian communities or customs, yet this was not viewed as antagonistic. Later 
on, when the Indo-Trinidadian community became more involved in carnival 
celebrations, they formed their own response to this through their pichikaree 
performances. Each community could take the picong.121 However, with the introduction 
of US television programs and cable companies in the early 1990s, Trinidadians became 
attuned to the idea that racial stereotyping was morally wrong. Thus the sensitization took 
hold and the nation imported this taboo. It has even led to the re-designation of ethnic 
groups as Afro-Trinidadian and Indo-Trinidadian to mimic the term African-American. 
Therefore the influence from US culture has led to the problematization of difference 
such that, at the end result it has eliminated the level to which racial and ethnic difference 
was embedded in Trinidadian society. This sparks the idea that the country looks to the 
US as not only a political and economic hegemon in the region, but also as a moral 
hegemon.  
 
CONTEXT 
Trinidad as a recognized sovereign nation can be taken as a given in the global 
make up (i.e., there is no doubt of its existence, nor is there a threat to its survival as a 
political construct). A distinctive nationalism on the other hand cannot be taken for 
                                                          
121 A creolized derivative of the word ‘piquant,’ referring to comical banter at the expense of another 
person or group. 
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granted, despite the 2010 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) report on 
political culture finding that 76% of respondents felt that national pride was “very strong” 
among the citizenry.122 Here, second-order cultural nationalism comes in. Trinidadian 
nationalism seems very muted in this sense and instead is reactionary if there is a 
particular event or reason (such as a questionnaire asking focused questions on national 
pride, Keshorn Walcott’s recent Olympic win,123 the Shiprider Agreement, or the recent 
Section 34 controversy – which arguably is a very recent addition to what mobilizes a 
national reaction). In setting the context for the Trinidadian case, the following two 
illustrations are relevant for introducing some themes that emerged in the analysis of 
focus group and Delphi group data. 
 
Section 34 Controversy 
Section 34 refers to an amendment made (and subsequently repealed) to the 
Administration of Justice (Indictable Proceedings) Act. Then Minister of Justice, Herbert 
Volney124, approached Cabinet in August 2012, seeking an early decision on amendments 
to the Act, among them the Section 34 clause which would reduce the statute of 
limitations to 10 years for certain offenses (excluding rape, drug trafficking, murder, 
                                                          
122 Mark Kirton, Marlon Anatol and Niki Braithwaite, “The Political Culture of Democracy in Trinidad & 
Tobago 2010: Democracy In Action,” The University of the West Indies Institute of International 
Relations, (Latin American Public Opinion Project, 2010), 12. 
 
123 Javelinist Keshorn Walcott earned Trinidad and Tobago’s first ever gold medal in a field event at the 
2012 Summer Olympics and instantly became a national hero. This event coincided with the timing of my 
research and elevated the feelings of national pride for the short period of time that I was there. The 
government even threw Walcott a welcome home party inside the Piarco International Airport, posing an 
obvious security dilemma. This outpouring of national pride was atypical to everyday Trinidadian life. 
 
124 Volney has since been forced to resign his position and declared himself “independent,” or without party 
affiliation.  
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treason and arms/ammunition possession). The timing of the tabling of this change was 
highly suspicious since it would mean that former UNC financiers Ishwar Galbaransingh 
and Steve Ferguson would no longer be eligible for prosecution. They were about to face 
charges for fraud relating to the billion-dollar construction contract for the Piarco 
International Airport which were brought in 1995. The amendment took effect on August 
31 2012, the 50th anniversary of Trinidadian independence, which antagonists saw as a 
figurative blow to the ideals of a democratic, independent nation. 
The US government had sought the extradition of these individuals in 2006 to 
face money laundering and fraud charges related to the Airport scandal. However, 
Trinidadian courts ruled that the jurisdiction for these crimes lay within the country and 
as such they would be tried locally. What was seen as blatant corruption on the part of the 
UNC officials and by extension the PP sparked protest from the general population to 
immediately repeal the amendment and have the persons involved resign from office – 
the Attorney General, the Minister of National Security, and the Minister of Justice. The 
US embassy in Trinidad expressed displeasure with the passing of the Section 34 
amendment, which seemingly influenced the decision to repeal.125 The day after the US 
Embassy’s press release, the Prime Minister convened an emergency Cabinet meeting to 
begin the repeal proceedings.126 By September 14 2012, the amendment had been 
repealed. Yet four days later, citizens finally organized a march in the capital city in 
protest of Section 34. One participant in the march, Rhoda Bharath, lecturer at the 
                                                          
125 Trinidad Guardian, “US Embassy Issues Statement On Ish And Steve,” September 11, 2012, 
Https://Guardian.Co.Tt/News/2012-09-11/Us-Embassy-Issues-Statement-Ish-And-Steve 
 
126 Ria Taitt, “Section 34 Steals The Spotlight,” Trinidad Express, December 22, 2012, 
Http://Www.Trinidadexpress.Com/News/Section_34_Steals_The_Spotlight-184577461.Html 
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University of the West Indies, poignantly writes about the purpose of the march in her 
blog: 
“Another argument is that this March today is about causing political 
destabilisation…uhhh…YES…we don’t trust the Government. No electorate 
should have to be saddled with a Government it doesn’t trust, and to argue that we 
must put up with an untrustworthy government for five years is to play smart with 
foolishness. That’s why it’s called a democracy…we have the right to show our 
displeasure and I am going to show it.”127 
The Section 34 debacle highlights two major themes that make up the Trinidadian case – 
the distrust of and lack of faith in the government, and a trend of acquiescence to the 
influence from the US. 
 
Shiprider Agreement 
The Shiprider Agreement is another apt illustration of acquiescence by the smaller 
nation in the US-Trinidadian relationship, in that Trinidad was one of the first countries 
to sign this US-proposed agreement without negotiation despite the opposition from the 
general public. The archipelagic states of the Caribbean were give a Model Shiprider 
Agreement proposal, which would become a bilateral treaty between the US and the 
signing Caribbean country. All states signed the model with the exceptions of Jamaica 
and Barbados. Thus Trinidad immediately became signatory to the Agreement Between 
the Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago and the Government of the 
                                                          
127 Rhoda Bharath blog, “I On The Road: Section 34 Style!” Eternal Pantomime, 
http://eternalpantomime.com/2012/11/02/I-Out-On-De-Road-Section-34-Style/ 
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United States of America concerning Counter-Drug Operations. The vagueness of this 
name stands in contrast to the specificity of the formal name for the Jamaican version, the 
Agreement Between the Government of Jamaica and the Government of the United 
States of America concerning Cooperation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug 
Trafficking.  
Watson calls the agreement a display of “the reality of unequal power between the 
US and Trinidad”128 given that the model proposal not only required the Caribbean state 
to enforce its laws within its territorial sea, but also required it to assist the US in 
enforcing its laws outside of US territorial waters. The Agreement would essentially give 
the US primary maritime jurisdiction over the region as a whole. The main issue for 
Jamaica and Barbados was the lack of reciprocity in the terms of the agreement, meaning 
that while the US would have the right to continue hot pursuit and maintain jurisdiction 
over the vessel being chased, there was no clause allowing for the reverse situation if it 
ever occurred (i.e., if Jamaica or Barbados Coast Guard were to pursue a suspicious 
vessel into US territorial waters). 
There was no initially a public outcry because of then Prime Minister Basdeo 
Panday’s decision to sign the model agreement. In fact, there seemed to be an overall 
lack of awareness about the proposal. It was only after the Jamaican and Barbados 
governments refused to sign that the media houses in Trinidad took notice, and the 
opposition leader, Patrick Manning, took the opportunity to criticize the sitting 
                                                          
128 Hilbourne Watson, “The ‘Shiprider Solution’ and Post-Cold War Imperialism: Beyond Ontologies Of 
State Sovereignty in The Caribbean,” In Living At The Borderlines: Issues in Caribbean Sovereignty and 
Development, Eds. Cynthia Barrow-Giles and Don D. Marshall, (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2003), 
232 
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government’s decision to sign.129 Panday suffered a blow to his popularity as a result, but 
discounted the criticism and defended his decision by saying: “We cant even guard the 
North coast, but they (his detractors) want the right to chase traffickers into Key West. 
Great. Great…And if the Americans are chasing drug runners, on reaching the 12 mile 
limit with Trinidad waters I imagine that must pull brakes, stop, take the phone and ring 
to get permission to come in.”130  Once again in this illustration, Trinidadian public 
opinion was behind government action, however, in the trade-off between public opinion 
and cooperation with the regional hegemon, systemic-level interests won, and the 
government did not attempt to contest its signing. The Shiprider illustration thus further 
indicates trend for Trinidadian administrations to prioritize the relationship with the US 
over national opinions.  
 
ILLEGAL DRUG POLICIES & US-TRINIDAD COOPERATION 
The mid 1990s were a period of high drug traffic for the Caribbean. Dent posits 
that drug trafficking really became problematic for Trinidad in 1996 in response to a 
declining US aid to Caribbean nations (90% drop from the mid-1980s to 1996). He 
suggests that drug traffickers filled this economic gap.131 By 1996, the US government 
was celebrating that it had disrupted many preferred trafficking routes. At the same time, 
they acknowledged that this success had forced traffickers to use longer routes through 
                                                          
129 Manning emphasized that Panday signed the agreement without honoring the foreign policy consultation 
provision in the Treaty Of Chaguaramas (which established CARICOM). (See Viarruel, 1997; and 
Sheppard, 1997). 
 
130 Alva Viarruel, “Panday: Shiprider A Vital Tool In Drug Fight,” Trinidad Express, (June 17, 1997), 7. 
 
131 David W. Dent, The Legacy Of The Monroe Doctrine: A Reference Guide To U.S. Involvement In Latin 
America And The Caribbean, (Wesport: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999), 340. 
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the Eastern Caribbean, beginning with the southernmost island, Trinidad – and that this 
required the reinforcing of measures in the eastern part of the region so it did not become 
“the drug trade’s dominant theater of operations.”132 Trinidad has since then participated 
in Operation Tradewinds which was a training exercise conducted by the US coast guard 
as well as Operation Blue Skies which is modeled after OPBAT. While it is noted that 
Trinidad is a major transshipment point given its proximity to the South American 
mainland, it is not considered a major point for shipment to the US. Instead, drugs 
passing through the island tend to move along the island chain, and across to the UK and 
West Africa.  
In 1996 the country signed three major agreements with the US: the mutual legal 
assistance treaty; an extradition treaty; and, the Shiprider agreement. As previously 
mentioned, the agreement contained articles allowing for pursuit and entry meaning that 
US coast guard or other law enforcement could continue pursuit of suspected traffickers 
into Trinidadian airspace and territorial waters. It must be noted that Trinidad was the 
first country to sign all three agreements and is the only country to have allowed US over 
flights. Arguably the decision to sign all three agreements was a concession that Trinidad 
granted in the hopes that it would be chosen to headquarter the FTAA which was being 
negotiated at the time.133 With this agreement now more or less defunct, it is unclear 
whether or not the country desires or even has the power to alter these terms. Also in the 
                                                          
132 INCSR 1996 
 
133 The Third Session Of The Eighth Parliament Of The Republic Of Trinidad And Tobago Which Opened 
On October 17, 2002, Parliamentary Debates Official Report, Session 2004-2005, Volume 10 
http://www.ttparliament.org/hansards/hs20050705.pdf 
It is noted in these proceedings that Trinidad had been making complementary policy decisions to make the 
country more attractive as the headquarters for the FTAA. 
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mid-90s, the US assisted the country in updating its laws regarding the persecution of 
drug traffickers which led to the amendment of its Indictable Offense Act, the 
amendment of the Jury Act and the Supreme Court Judiciary Amendment. These last two 
amendments were deemed necessary to deal specifically with the issues of jury tampering 
and witness security, which have been noted as significant problems with the Trinidadian 
justice system. The witness security program is a region wide effort to which Trinidad 
belongs and through which it also receives outside assistance.  
In 1996 Trinidad received equipment for six radar installations which were 
supposed to become fully operational in the beginning of the following year. These radar 
installations were meant to monitor the waters along the south-east coast of the island in 
order to intercept drugs coming from South America. The radar installations have, 
however, become somewhat of a national joke since many years later it was noted in the 
local news, that funds were needed to repair the radars which had been sitting inactive for 
a number of years. The general public expressed humor rather than outrage to the idea 
that the machinery to intercept illegal drugs (which was already being bandied as the 
main reason for high levels of violent crime) had been sitting there non-operational for 
such a long period of time with no previous efforts to repair them. 
According to the 2013 INCSR US organizations such as the Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) all maintain a presence on the island. No such note was made for 
Jamaica, again attesting to not only the level of cooperation between the US and 
Trinidad, but the way in which the Trinidadian government has opened itself to host these 
outside agencies. Linkages have been made in marijuana trafficking to Trinidad from 
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Jamaica for repackaging and reshipping through mules to the US. This is likely because 
tourist visas for the US are more easily obtained in Trinidad than in Jamaica. 
Trinidad has now become a port of pre-security for the US. Along with the 
scanning of the container ships, South Americans who have layovers in Trinidad en route 
to the US, must deplane and go through Trinidadian scans and checkpoints before 
continuing on to the US since it is the last point prior to entry into the US for those 
passengers. This is likely a trade-off agreed upon by the Trinidadian government since all 
of the scanning equipment at the sea- and air- ports has been funded by the US. But due 
to this high level of cooperation with destination countries, particularly the US, there are 
offers coming in for further assistance. This illustrates that compliance breeds benefits for 
the country in terms of training, technical assistance and continued funding. Therefore in 
the interest of upholding its own security goals it is best to shape drug policies which are 
complementary to those of the US as well as comply with requests such as the pre-
screening of South American individuals prior to their entry into the US. This is a 
paradox that Trinidad has had to deal with since in giving up that one aspect of their 
autonomy, they are being better equipped to deal with the non-state actors within its 
borders that would subvert its sovereignty and security. In this sense, the trade-off is not 
difficult or unexpected since on one side there is cooperation with a more powerful and 
legitimate state actor, while on the other it is the frequently violent non-state actors which 
make up the transnational criminal organizations that operate in the country. 
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Linking Illegal drugs and Nationalism 
Recalling the three elements of nationalism – self-perception, self-projection and 
the perception of the other, the general population seems to perceive the country’s role in 
the illegal drug trade as much larger than has been reported by international reports such 
as the INCSRs or the UN World Drug Reports, speaking to the notion of self-perception. 
The 2012 INCSR reports that the declaration of the 2011 state of emergency (SOE) was 
due to the spike in murders as a result of international drug trafficking linkages. 
However, it goes further to state that while this was the official statement, these 
allegations were never actually proven. This does not take away though from the 
effectiveness of the SOE as it resulted in a drastic reduction in homicides and disrupted 
drug trafficking networks across the island during its time. Hey has noted a habit of over-
estimating a position is a common tendency for small states,134 however, it may also be 
explained by the fact that local reports and statements from government officials have 
repeatedly blamed illegal drugs for the hikes in violent crime over the past decade. This 
may not necessarily be the actual cause for the rampant criminal activity in the country. 
However, using the illegal drugs trade as the basis for crime in a sense externalizes the 
Trinidadian crime problem and to a certain degree, displaces the blame from the 
government. Granted, the general public does not truly believe this, but the way in which 
the illegal drugs problem in perceived, illustrates that the basis of Trinidadian crime is 
purportedly, not wholly internal. The illegal drugs trade is viewed mostly as an external 
problem in that most people do not believe that a large amount of drugs are intended to 
                                                          
134 Jeanne A. K. Hey, “Introducing Small State Foreign Policy,” Small States in World Politics: Explaining 
Foreign Policy Behavior, ed. Jeanne A. K. Hey, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4. 
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stay in the country. Instead, the drugs leave and move north to the US and the UK. What 
does stay behind is the guns and ammunition, which has armed the criminal element of 
the country more efficiently than its own police force.  
The element of self-projection is not as clearly explained. Townsend’s article in 
Foreign Policy Magazine does attest to a certain projected image of the nation, however, 
this image is limited to an audience who will concern themselves with international 
affairs. The layman will not really glean this same image of Trinidad and Tobago, nor 
may he even know where the country is located. The most popular image projected by the 
country still remains its carnival and calypso music, and possibly its more renowned 
sportsmen like Brian Lara and Dwight Yorke. More recently, the reality television 
celebrity of former national beauty queen Anya Ayoung Chee135 has spread the country’s 
image abroad as an idyllic island nation rather than a main point of drug transshipment. 
In this way, Trinidad has unintentionally exerted some level of soft power through 
cultural exchange. Thus there is once again a disconnect between the official and general 
levels but this time on a larger scale. While travel advisories against Trinidad have been 
issued by both the US and UK governments, at various points in the last five years, the 
average person is unaware of these concerns. 
As for the perception of the other, among the general population there is a both a 
desire for a more Americanized lifestyle, yet there is suspicion of US (or any foreign) 
presence in the country for official reasons. The idealization of the American lifestyle or 
the desire for American products has played a role in fueling organized crime, gang 
violence and consequently the drug trade in the country. According to former PM Basdeo 
                                                          
135 Ayoung Chee was the Project Runway Season 9 winner and is currently a co-host for TV show Project 
Runway: Under the Gunn. 
  105
Panday, it is a problem with the creative imagination in the region as a whole in that the 
abilities of the human capital remains untapped and bombarded by foreign elements. He 
states:  
“Let us look at the extraordinary paradox in which a region endowed with such 
immeasurable creative intelligence, such genius, is regarded as the region of the 
world most dominated by imported cultural product. Television programming 
consumed in the Caribbean region is said to have a higher imported content than 
all other countries, somewhere around 95 per cent. In essence, the Caribbean has 
been recolonized by the hegemony of American media, much of it delivering a 
surfeit of gratuitous violence. Much of that programming also contributes to the 
identity crises afflicting many of our young people.”136 (Hall and Benn, 5) 
  
The increased crime rate and the perception that drugs are more prevalent in the 
country comes directly out of the economic struggles of the everyday person and an 
acceptance of the flouting of certain laws as ok, such as illegal vending, driving illegal 
taxis,137 selling pirated movies and music, as well as selling drugs. The opinions 
surrounding marijuana differ to the opinions on harder drugs such as cocaine, and heroin 
use seems to be more or less non-existent in the country except in those persons who 
have been exposed to it abroad and returned home with a desire for it. This illegal activity 
and the underground economy which builds up around it, gives these persons additional 
                                                          
136 Basdeo Panday, “Reconfiguring the Matrix of Caribbean Development,” in Contending With Destiny: 
The Caribbean in the 21st Century, eds. Kenneth Hall and Denis Benn, (Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 
2000). 
 
137 Locally referred to as driving PH or “Pulling Bull” 
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income with which they can afford to purchase the latest fashions, electronics and go to 
parties. This lifestyle, which in itself is heavily influenced by what is broadcast in the 
media as the things to do, serves to fuel the illegal drug trade in some measure, since 
participation in this section of the illegal economy generates the highest and fastest 
returns. This is interesting because through the perception of the other, the true strength 
of nationalism can really be demonstrated. While the US fashions and media are indeed 
very popular138 and an influence to the entire population, members of the general 
population both recognize the way in which it can potentially influence the criminal 
elements, yet would not react favorably should they have to curb their own consumption. 
Additionally, they distance themselves from those who would be so negatively influenced 
by insinuating that they absorb different messages from the same media which makes 
them want to ‘get rich quick.’ It is with this picture of the illegal drug trade in Trinidad 
and the policy dynamics involved that the primary data from Focus Groups and the 
Delphi Study were collected. 
 
FINDINGS 
In Trinidad, four Focus Groups and one Delphi Study were conducted. There 
were twelve male and eleven female members of the general population recruited for the 
focus groups. Focus Groups 1, 2, and 4 were conducted at a private residence in the south 
of the island, while Focus Group 3 was conducted at a private residence in the north. 
Despite these locations, participants in each group were not necessarily from the south or 
the north, but found that location convenient to get to on the scheduled day. The Delphi 
                                                          
138 In fact, there is a small social media group advocating for more airtime to go to local music and 
programming since the majority of material broadcasted on the radio and television is from the US. 
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group consisted of one member of the Ministry of National Security and two members 
from the Special Narcotics Arm of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service.  
Focus group participants were first asked to fill out a questionnaire (see Appendix 
I), which asked age and ethnicity along with questions intended to make them think about 
their awareness of both their perceptions of self and perceptions of the illegal drug trade. 
Most focus group subjects estimated that they are somewhat aware about the methods 
used to address the illegal drug trade in the country. Those who selected very aware fell 
into the older age groupings (36-45 and above). As for the perception of their awareness 
of the illegal drug situation in the country, many subjects felt they were very aware (10 of 
the 23 subjects, across all age categories except the 46-55 year grouping). 
In Focus Group 3 many of the participants found a problem with the question: 
How do you self identify (see Table 1 on Focus Group participants’ self-identification). 
This group consisted of five young adults in the 26-35 age category and one in the 36-45 
category. Most of these participants found that there was not an option on the 
questionnaire that described how they would self identify. Participants in other focus 
groups did not have this problem and the majority of respondents checked “by 
nationality” without hesitation.  
The problem for the members of Focus Group 3 however, seemed to be that they 
self-identified at much more individualistic level than the respondents from other groups; 
many of them mentioned that they would faster self identify according to gender or 
family name rather than any of the options listed on the questionnaire. This indicates that 
in the younger age range making up Focus Group 3, there may be somewhat of a 
movement away from macro identification like to an ethnic group. Should further 
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investigation find a general movement away from fragmented forms of identification 
such as ethnicity however, this may prove to be a good thing since it may lead to a 
rebalancing of the political situation which is very ethnically polarized. While the 
participants who fell into the younger age category (18-25) did not voice the same sense 
of discomfort with this question, one entered “name” in the other category. It is likely 
that, since both participants in the 18-25 year category participated in Focus Group 2, in 
which other respondents were senior to them, they may have felt more inhibited in 
expressing their concerns where no one else was. 
The problem of self-identification was an unexpected occurrence in Trinidad. 
Going into the research, the assumption was that respondents would choose ethnicity as 
their form of self-identification. However given that ethnic division is a tense point in 
social relations, subjects may have avoided selecting that option because they were in a 
group setting. The fact that (at least within the 26-35 age category) some respondents had 
an issue with this question is also indicative that they did not consider nationalism as a 
primary form of self-identification. 
The questionnaire was followed by an approximately hour-long guided discussion 
session (see Appendix II for Focus Group discussion questions). Respondents were asked 
their opinions on government actions to combat the illegal drug problem, their perception 
on US involvement in these efforts, and how they felt that the situation in general 
affected the country’s image. The title of this chapter summarizes the main impression of 
the country’s projected image. It comes from a female respondent in Focus Group 1, who 
asserted that the national cultural elements such as steel pan, Carnival and Calypso music 
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outshone the image of Trinidad as a purported narco-state. This sentiment was reiterated 
by respondents in all four focus groups and speaks to the theme of self-projection. 
 
Table 1: Self-Identifiers for Focus Group Participants in Trinidad 
  Age Group 
Self-
Identifiers 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+ 
Focus Group 1 
8/9/2012 
6 participants 
(2 male, 4 
female) 
Nationality - - 3 1 2 - 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - - - - - - 
Other - - - - - - 
No Answer - - - - - - 
Focus Group 2 
8/15/2012 
6 participants 
(3 male, 3 
female) 
Nationality 1 - - 1 - 1 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - - 1 - - - 
Other 1* - - - - - 
No Answer - - - - 1 - 
Focus Group 3 
8/17/2012 
6 participants 
(5 male, 1 
female) 
Nationality - 1 - - - - 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - - - - - - 
Other - 3** - - - - 
No Answer - 1 1 - - - 
Focus Group 4 Nationality - 4 - - - - 
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8/23/2012 
5 participants 
(2 male, 3 
female) 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - - 1 - - - 
Other - - - - - - 
No Answer - - - - - - 
*This person entered “name” as their primary identifier 
**In this group, one person entered “as a person,” the second person left it blank, and the 
third entered “all of the above” 
 
In the following sections, focus group data is discussed according to the major themes 
which emerged in data analysis. The Delphi Group is discussed separately since the in-
depth knowledge of drug policies in the country in relation to the US added different 
dimensions to the themes coming out of the focus group data. 
From the focus group data, three characteristics of national sentiment have 
emerged – distrust of authorities and foreign assistance, cultural inertia, and latent fear 
for individual safety. This has led to an endemic bystander effect amongst the general 
Trinidadian population wherein witnesses to illegal acts will remain silent for fear that 
speaking up will put themselves or their loved ones in danger.139 
 
Corruption, Distrust, and Fear 
In focus groups conducted in the country, members of the general population have 
alluded to knowing the individuals at the top of the organized crime hierarchy, aptly 
labeled Mr. Big or Big Fish, yet there has been no consistent public outcry or demand for 
                                                          
139 Various INCSRs have noted that witness safety is an ongoing problem in Trinidad and Tobago. This 
will also serve to influence the perpetuation of the bystander effect. 
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the apprehension of these individuals due to the aforementioned elements of national 
sentiment. According to one participant (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35): 
“There is a dealership in central Trinidad and everybody knows, this is a big 
dealership, and everybody knows that the dude is involved in drugs, everybody 
knows it...The man pays cash for everything that he buys. Where he getting that 
from? Cash! Cash for everything that he buys… [and] the thing about it is, is that 
the amount of police that this guy is involved with. He is the sponsor of crime 
watch ok?” 
Another respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 36-45) adds: 
“You have in the past where politicians got up in the parliament and said that they 
know who Mr. Big is. Yet five years later nobody have an idea who Mr. Big is 
[referring to the fact that there has not been any public statement from these 
politicians regarding the naming of the so-called Mr. Big]. And if it is that you 
serious about containing this illegal drug trade, and you know who Mr. Big is, 
why not go after him? What are you [officials] afraid of?” 
This shows that despite public suspicion (and sometimes just shy of confirmation) there 
has been no overt action on the part of the general population to clamor for justice in this 
area, nor does there seem to be an organized official effort to either put these public fears 
to rest or deal with the individuals. Another contributor (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35) 
rationalizes that the reason for the lack of outcry is general fear: 
“The ordinary citizen may, if they already know who it is, be too afraid, if they 
don’t have any kinda financial backing or any kinda thing, they will be killed, 
their families will be eradicated.” 
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 In direct response to this, another subject adds (Focus Group 4, Female, 26-35): “People 
just into themselves and their families well-being. It not affecting you directly, so they 
not really have any kinda passion or interest to say like I’m gonna do something about 
this.” 
Therefore this also illustrates the lack of public action when it comes to known 
drug lords operating in their villages. One participant from Focus Group 2 (Female, 46-
55) noted: “Very often the known drug dealers in the community are also the community 
leaders…so you had like Dole Chadee. Dole Chadee did a lot of work in Piparo and did a 
lot for the people in Piparo.” Dole Chadee was perhaps one of the most well-known and 
feared drug lords in Trinidad in the 1990s. He had a large estate in the village, Piparo and 
there are anecdotes of him stopping his car and offering random Piparo residents a ride 
home on occasion. These residents despite knowing his dealings, felt it would be better to 
accept a ride with him rather than act suspicious in his presence by refusing, out of fear 
for their own safety. This is ironic given the fact that they extended their time in his 
presence in order to safeguard themselves. Mark Guerra was another such example. He 
was frequently referred to as ‘a community leader and known drug dealer’ in local 
newspapers. However, his prominence in the community led to his receiving numerous 
government contracts and funds in order to continue assisting in community 
development. 
Similarly the public is quiet regarding past insurrectionist group Jamaat Al 
Muslimeen. Despite this group almost ousting the 1990 NAR administration and 
wounding then PM ANR Robinson, the group was given amnesty from prosecution for 
that event. In later years, there have been numerous crimes allegedly linked to the group 
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including murder, kidnapping, drug running, and bank robbery. There have been 
consistent claims from the authorities that there is insufficient evidence for these crimes 
to be formally attributed to the group, yet there still remains a general public fear of the 
group and its associates. 
 
Disconnect between Government and General Public 
The fact that respondents in all focus groups seemed unaware of the nature of 
cooperation with the US regarding issues of illegal drugs and the level of suspicion 
expressed for the motives of such cooperation demonstrate the disconnect between the 
government and local authorities, and the civil society. One respondent (Focus Group 1, 
Male, 36-45) states: “There was a recent statement by the new minister of National 
Security, Jack Warner that he's not going to talk about his policies. And I think that that 
kind of thing is unsettling. I mean he just chooses to not talk about it for “reasons”, we 
don't know if they're political...,” displaying his own sense of how he felt the 
disconnection between himself as part of the citizenry and the government in their 
decision making. Following from his statement, another participant (Focus Group 1, 
Female, 36-45) says: “The government is supposed to be releasing information on the 
policies they have. A lot of the information we are getting is from the media. This TV 
station say that, and this newspaper say that. But if the government wants us to feel 
secure, they need to release something that we could see comes from the Office of the 
PM.” Rounding off this conversation, another participant (Focus Group 1, Female, 36-45) 
says: “Citizens need to be aware of what the policies are, and there is no communication 
between the government and the citizens where drug policy is concerned. It is just 
  114
something that you know, that they are trying to curb the drugs that are coming into the 
Caribbean and into Trinidad and Tobago, and especially because we are in such a 
strategic point for the exchange of drugs. But as a citizen look at us here, we have no idea 
at all. And we read the newspaper everyday and we look at the news everyday, but we are 
still not aware.” The conversation from Focus Group 1 aptly demonstrates a sense of 
alienation between the official and general level. While the same point about then 
security minister, Jack Warner’s, statement that he would not discuss his policies was 
also mentioned by participants in other focus groups, here the continuity of this 
conversation succinctly showed that these average persons (participating in the group) 
did not feel as though the government made the effort to share information that would 
make them feel safer or build up their faith in its actions. 
Without a strong linkage between the official and general level, strong 
nationalism cannot exist. As such, there has been a fragmentation in the Trinidadian 
identity wherein foreign ideals (read: the American Dream) are glorified in one breath 
and reviled in another. Moreover, this idea of the American Dream has been distorted by 
the notion of little effort with large payouts touted by the illegal drug trade. There seems 
to be a division within the Trinidadian society with regards to the perception of 
“American-ness.” On the one hand there is the idea that foreign things (products, foods, 
media) are better in quality than the local versions, yet on the other, there is the idea that 
the glorification of an American lifestyle is what motivates criminals. The belief seems to 
be that the “get rich quick” attitude is a derivative of American culture and one which is 
promoted through popular American music and programming. In that respect, a nuanced 
opinion emerges in that Trinidadians can hold both beliefs simultaneously, and while 
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they consume or aspire to consume American products, they try to distance themselves 
from those involved in gangs or organized crimes with the latter as their reasoning for 
their criminal actions. This speaks to a necessity for otherness that stills underpins the 
Trinidadian identity in that the average Trinidadian needs to justify criminal actions as 
foreign to the Trinidadian culture. 
 
Attitude to US Drug Policy 
In my focus groups, participants generally seemed to have a good understanding 
of the way in which the global drug trade works. Some were able to comment on the 
transportation routes with specificity, others were able to speak about the economic 
aspect, and yet others were able to talk about the linkages between drug trafficking in the 
region and the influx of guns and gun-related crimes. But what does this understanding 
ultimately mean? In describing the nation as one in which the problem of illegal drug 
trafficking has become endemic, it seems to suggest that it is inherently thought of as part 
of the nation’s identity. However, there is some level of alienation in this association, 
since although it is accepted as part of the islands’ dynamics, the interviewees felt the 
need to affirm their own distance from this illegal industry. In Trinidad, unlike Jamaica, 
there is no distinction (Van Schendel-type) between illicit and illegal. All drugs from 
marijuana, to cocaine, to heroine are viewed negatively. There is no doubt that a large 
number of youths, mostly between the ages of 15-30 partake in marijuana usage. 
However, the use of it in public is not done, in glaring distinction to Jamaica, where 
people would smoke marijuana on the streets of Kingston, even near police officers, 
without punishment. 
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There seems to be anecdotal awareness of a consistent US presence in the 
country, based on statements made by focus groups subjects who have either heard about 
training program exchanges or seen them conducting drills at one of the less populous 
beaches on the island. The particular witness of the latter, expressed faith in US forces 
training local personnel and swayed the members of that group to a similar opinion. 
However, the group made the distinction between this type of training exchange and 
more overt roles for foreign personnel, citing the assigning of non-Trinidadians to the 
positions of former Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of police as (in hindsight) 
grave mistakes on the part of the PP coalition government. There is the belief that even 
though there is some level of inter-agency exchange with the US (and other countries), 
Trinidadian personnel should ultimately spearhead any drug interdiction/counter-drug 
security programs. However, even in that belief, there is the underlying collective faith 
that foreign individuals who have been brought in will make a significant impact on the 
drug and crime situation and a collective deep disappointment and almost anger when 
these individuals fail to deliver. 
Merely from conducting the focus groups it was possible to see the way in which 
inertia operates in the country. From the first question on US assistance and involvement, 
respondents were adamantly against outside influence even resulting in the expression of 
suspicion towards the real motives US assistance, for example, “Trinidadians will never 
accept an intervention from the US,” to “they are really using the radar stations to 
monitor Chavez.” However, as the hour-long session progressed and the subjects began 
to get into issues of local corruption, the idea that foreign assistance or strategies crept 
back in as a desirable maneuver. One respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 36-45) states: 
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“I think we need to have a plan to follow. There must be some plan in another country 
that has worked for them and maybe we can pattern our approach to dealing with the 
problem like that, and that can only come from a foreign country.” 
Contrasts in personal opinions arose from asking about US involvement or policy 
relationships with the country immediately conjured the image of overt US intervention 
for respondents. This type of intervention is perceived as unwelcome and generally bad. 
However, respondents in Focus Groups 1 and 4 asserted that though the type of 
assistance needed to be carefully examined to ensure that the sovereignty of the country 
is respected, outside assistance definitely brings hope for some resolution to the crime 
situation (which is seen as being fueled by the illegal drugs trade). One respondent 
(Focus Group 4, Male, 26-35) expressed initial faith in the Canadian police commissioner 
and deputy police commissioner who at the time of this research had just tendered their 
resignations and left the country:  
“I also think that they [Trinidadian authorities] don’t have the correct expertise for 
this, for example when the government got in to power they brought in foreigners 
for the police commissioners, the police commissioner and the deputy 
commissioner, but we didn’t see anything done by these guys. Initially I thought, 
my feelings about that were ok, maybe if we have some foreign help, that you 
know these guys are experts in this area, the crime is going to reduce 
significantly…”  
This respondent however, went on to say, “…but that in itself is a problem. You bring in 
foreign people, they don’t know the culture here; they don’t know the crime culture here 
so how are they supposed to combat it?” 
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Therefore the average Trinidadian views the promise of foreign assistance in somewhat 
of a contradictory manner. While there is the initial hope that foreign personnel will 
impact the crime situation, there is also almost a gleeful sense of ‘I expected it’ when 
these personnel fail. Yet this is still coupled with the idea that local authorities are 
incapable of overcoming the corruption within their ranks to put forth any large-scale 
organized effort against crime. 
 
Self-Perception 
There seems to be a perception that while there are certain government members 
and officials are corrupt – these persons being the higher up actors in the drug trade – 
corruption within the ranks of the police is more prevalent. Therefore, there seems to be a 
greater distrust for the police than the government, possibly due to the fact that there is 
more direct interaction between the police and the general population than the 
government and the general population. 
There is a perception of Trinidad playing a greater role in the drug trade than US 
reports or global statistics have indicated. According to participants, the country is highly 
involved in drug transshipment, which they have directly linked to the presence of guns 
and gangs in the country. However, it is possible that given the research topic, 
participants assumed the country to be playing a greater role than they had previously 
realized and tailored their answers to suit this perception. This fits into the reactionary 
attitude that sometimes arises in Trinidadian society. Further questioning illustrated that 
these segments of the general population perceived themselves as significantly distanced 
from the drug activities (despite having seen suspicious activity at some point, or 
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knowing someone who uses illegal drugs), and generally do think about it as directly 
affecting their daily lives. 
Focus Group participants in general seemed openly aware that the radar stations 
in the south of the island meant to monitor the coastline are frequently/mostly non-
functional, therefore, it is not difficult to conclude that drug traffickers in the country or 
with ties to the country, will also know this and therefore take advantage of it. 
 
Societal Division 
When it comes to the subject of privilege or victimization of certain segments or 
ethnic groups in the country, every group was able to draw the same conclusion – that 
while certain groups, such as Syrians and Whites, rich private business owners and 
government personnel with high positions were allowed to skirt the law when it came to 
their purported drug trafficking activities, the small distributors selling on ‘blocks’ 
nationwide, who are mainly black male youths between 15-35 years old, tended to be 
targeted and imprisoned by authorities with frenetic frequency.  
The perception of drug involvement among the business elite seems to be 
commonly held as there was some allusion to this in all focus groups. There seems to be 
particular zeroing in on the Syrian ethnic group as the source of the large shipments of 
drugs entering the islands, as one respondent (Focus Group 4, Male, 26-35) puts it, “you 
ask anybody who is at the head of the drug trade in Trinidad and Tobago, you think they 
gonna say the people in Laventille and Morvant? They not gonna say that. They goin’ to 
say the Syrians.” In fact, a certain family of business elites was named in Focus Group 
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1140 as one of the top groups responsible for bringing drugs into the country. The mention 
of this name caused visible discomfort for the rest of participants, yet one subject 
(Female, 36-45) added that, “these names are the most respected and reputable names in 
our business community. And they have built a lot of businesses in Trinidad and Tobago, 
and they are flourishing businesses and all of us partake of whatever is in their stores and 
shops and so on.” Subjects went on to further link the actions of this business elite class 
to the ethnically divided political parties in the country: “If you’re talking about the you 
know, Afro-Trinidadian/Indo-Trinidadian politics, I think both political parties are 
supported by the business elite” (Focus Group 1, Male, 36-45). This rationalizes the 
perceived special treatment afforded to this sector despite their possible involvement in 
illegal drug importation. The view here is that a patron-client relationship has developed 
wherein the political parties find them necessary sources of funding. However, subjects 
don’t see there being faith to one party or the other. Instead, ties are formed with both 
sides in order for “business” to carry on as usual regardless of the party (or ethnicity) in 
power. 
In comparing the opinions from the focus groups, there was disagreement over the 
rationale for apprehending small time drug distributors (who are usually males falling 
into the 15-35 age range). While Focus Group 4 thought it was simply because the 
division of labor of the drug trade as it operates in the country predisposed these small-
fries to being easy pickings so the authorities could claim they are tough on drugs, Focus 
Groups 1, 2 and 3 saw a deeper, more nefarious reason for the victimization of this 
segment of the population. They felt that not only in an effort to look good, but in an 
                                                          
140 And will not be named here in order to avoid making unproven defamatory claims.  
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effort to cover up sloppy police work or allegations of unfairness in their activities, police 
officials would pin drug charges on all persons fitting the demographic. This speaks to 
the perception of corruption within the ranks of the police force and the distrust with 
which they are viewed. These focus groups took place shortly after a young man had 
been shot by police and afterwards been labeled a drug dealer, so this made their opinion 
and the expression of this opinion much sharper than other groups. 
 
Unofficial Solutions 
Some subjects seemed to place some level of faith in crime stopping elements 
outside of the official channels, particularly Ian Alleyne, the charismatic host of a 
television show named Crime Watch. This show encourages people to record crimes in 
progress and send in the footage or call in and give anecdotal evidence about crimes after 
which the host and his cohorts (along with police) proceed with their own investigations 
of these crimes. He claims to “fight for the rights of the citizens” of Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, this form of quasi-vigilantism has won over some individuals in the country 
and has further eroded the faith that is placed in the police service. One respondent 
(Focus Group 2, Female, 65+) believes that, “a lot of the drugs that they find are through 
him. I dunno if people have confidence in the police service,” with another adding the 
opinion that a lot of crimes have been solved through him. However, another respondent 
stated that the television show and its undertakings are “quite superficial and just 
publicity” which actually seeks to paint the police service in a negative light due to pay 
offs to steer public opinion in that direction. Regardless of the motives of this personality, 
one respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 56-65) very succinctly sums up the usefulness of 
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this program for the general public: “I think that people get a sense of satisfaction from 
seeing things happen and that is it. He’s a showman.” This statement reaches the heart of 
the public’s opinions and perception of the way in which the illegal drug trade is handled 
by local and US authorities. Due to the lack of visibility of the methods and effects of the 
operations carried out jointly or independently, the general public resorts to a negative 
impression of the handling of the drug situation and the motives of the US in its 
involvement in the country.  
 
Delphi Group 
The Delphi Group consisted of one female participant coming from the Ministry 
of National Security (MNS), and two male participants from the Organized Crime, 
Narcotics, and Firearms Unit (OCNFU) of the police service. According to the two police 
service participants, there is a significant foreign presence in the country to assist in 
issues of illegal drugs. One respondent (OCNFU) lists: “I think in developing our drug – 
and of course the relationship that we have with the US government and other interested 
developed countries in the region, the British have a presence here, the Canadians, the 
French, the German, the Dutch and whatever interests they may have in the region would 
also impact upon whatever policy we develop.” In 1998, Trinidad had requested that a 
DEA office be opened in its capital, Port-of-Spain. This high level of foreign presence 
and the request for it is not something which the general public seems aware of. In fact, 
in comparison with the responses to the Focus Group questions, it is unlikely that these 
outside influences would be very popular if the public were made aware of their 
presence. 
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This expert group as a whole felt that in spite of the presence of foreign personnel, 
the main issue that is prioritized in formulating drug policy was the impact on the local 
population. Specifically the nexus between illegal drugs and crime and issues of drug 
abuse which may also influence crime. From this, maritime interdiction was mentioned 
by one respondent as one of the first priorities of constructing local drug policy since this 
is the first logical step in safeguarding citizens. It is also felt that there is not a large 
market for drug consumption in the country, and that the drugs coming in a really 
destined for the US and Europe, and even the Far East and South. Drugs that have 
transited Trinidad have been tracked as far as South Africa in recent surveys and mapping 
of transshipment routes.   
Since the drug situation in the country is understood as one of mainly 
transshipment with very little cocaine and heroin remaining in the country, it is explained 
by the experts in this group that the main consumption market in developed countries is 
so much larger, that it is just expected that they would have a strong influence on the 
policies formed in transshipment zones to prevent the drugs from reaching their shores. 
There is also the tacit acknowledgement that the country by itself does not have the 
capacity to really impact the trade and traffic of illegal drugs and therefore the foreign 
presence is necessary since it provides much needed funding, training and equipment.  
Along with foreign country presences, however, there is also the presence and 
influence of international organizations such as the OAS and the UN which seek to 
influence policy directions. 9/11 was mentioned in the session as a prime example of how 
Trinidadian policy as well as nationalism is influenced by the US. In the post 9/11 
atmosphere there was more pressure to maintain complementary policies in order to 
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maintain the relationship between the states. One example in particular is that large ships 
carrying containers of goods are now subject to x-rays when they were not in the past. If 
cargo ships from Trinidad do not have documentation showing that they were scanned 
prior to leaving, they will not be allowed into US ports. This has encouraged Trinidad to 
procure the proper equipment to conduct these scans so that legitimate trade would not be 
disrupted by this new requirement. Thus Trinidadian trade policy has altered as a result of 
US drug policy requirements.  
One respondent (OCNFU) in the expert group states that “we mustn’t lose sight of 
the fact that the US is holding the big stick and you need to do this or else.” Therefore, 
this official held the impression of at least quasi-imperialism from the US. We must 
understand that the views expressed by this respondent are personal rather than the 
official views of the state which has historically cooperated fully with US drug policy 
influences and certification requirements, even at the cost of the popularity of the 
government administration in so doing. However, this respondent unlike those from the 
general population focus groups is more aware of not only the illegal drug situation as it 
operates in the country, but the policies of the nation to deal with it and what goes into 
the construction of these policies – that is, the outside influences/international pressures. 
So this response is highly emblematic of the way in which the policy relationship is 
perceived. Another opinion coming out of this expert group is that developed countries 
are not doing enough to stem demand and that in general they have a greater 
responsibility to establish demand reduction programs to shrink the market in their own 
countries.  
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The Caribbean Basin Security Initiative is one of the large funding projects run by 
the US to deal with the issue of illegal drugs in the region. According to one expert 
(MNS), this Initiative has been reinvigorated in recent years in response to the success of 
other US strategic programs in other areas, namely the Merida Initiative and Plan 
Colombia. The renewed effort with the CBSI was a means of placating Caribbean leaders 
since the success of extra-regional plans purportedly shifted trafficking routes back to the 
mid-90s routes through the Caribbean Basin. The expert acknowledged that there was a 
lack of empirical data to suggest that there was in fact an increase in the volume of illegal 
drugs moving through the region, but it is noted that the purported increase in traffic 
coincided with a dramatic increase in violent crimes throughout the region once again 
concretizing the illegal drugs-small arms linkage. 
The expert group estimates that the image that Trinidad has acquired actually acts 
as a deterrent for potential mules and couriers coming from the mainland since they know 
that detection is so stringent in the country. They surmise that the dominance of 
Caribbean Airlines throughout the region oftentimes does not give them the choice to 
avoid Trinidad when trying to smuggle drugs especially to the UK. Some may end up 
trying to go through Brazil, which is mentioned as another major transportation hub but 
this route is more costly for traffickers and therefore less desirable. The Trinidadian 
image is further seen as affecting the drug situation for the smaller states in the Eastern 
Caribbean since traffickers trying to avoid Trinidadian security checkpoints altogether, 
will instead stop off further north before continuing to their final destination. While being 
a longer route, this poses less risk to traffickers since the smaller islands do not have the 
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same technology and security capacity as the larger Trinidad, thus, Trinidad’s image of 
being more secure negatively affects the security of the neighboring smaller islands. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the introductory chapter, a quote from the former ambassador to Colombia was 
mentioned – specifically, it stated that for US drug policy efforts to be successful, it was 
necessary to provide alternatives to criminal livelihoods, build clinics and roads and 
generally things that would build up poor communities and give people an 
impetus/incentive not to participate in the illegal drug trade. This generalized statement 
does not fit for Trinidad. Yes, there is an underprivileged group within society. However, 
building clinics and roads will do very little to change any illegal behavior emanating out 
of these communities. Aside from road conditions at various points between elections, 
that area of Trinidadian infrastructure is fairly well developed. Additionally, the public 
health amenities available to the average citizen are arguably better than in the US, given 
its medical insurance situation. This is not the solution for Trinidad. Capacity building 
must be taken on at a different level, one, which will seriously be viewed as an 
infringement of sovereignty if it were to be mandated or undertaken with overt US 
influence or as a result of US pressure. It is that Trinidad requires a certain level of police 
and judicial reform that will restore the integrity of its justice system. Simply increasing 
the legitimate economic opportunities for the underprivileged groups is not enough. A 
stronger fear of impunity must be embedded into the society at all levels in order to 
redirect society away from lawless behavior. 
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One question that arose out of conducting all focus groups was, why were 
participants so inured to the illegal drug problem when they perceive it as such a rampant 
and thriving societal ill? One respondent (Focus Group 1, Male, 36-45) summed it up by 
saying; “I think we've gotten used to the drug issue being around. I think you kind of get 
numb to it. The numbness that you need to stay sane has set in.” Additionally, the 
government involvement in this seeming patron-client relationship with the “big fish” is 
also tolerated, despite the criticism it receives in casual settings. This was summed up to 
a mixture of the aforementioned cultural inertia and fear, as well as a feeling of distance 
from the illegal drug problem. 
It was interesting to compare the views of the Delphi group to the those of the 
focus groups regarding the image of the country as a result of the way it deals with the 
illegal drug issue. The average Trinidadian was not aware of the high level of cooperation 
with the US and mainly interprets the image regarding illegal drugs as negative 
(especially since there have been travel advisories issue against the country in the past). 
However, since the expert group was privy to the level of cooperation and have probably 
been made aware of the accolades it has received in US state department reports (like the 
INCSRs), they believed that the country’s image was more favorable. This contrast 
shows that in not disseminating information about national drug policies more clearly, the 
general population segments participating in the focus groups have “assumed the worst.”  
Delving further into the issue of self-perception and perception of the other, there 
is the view that the US has displayed some level of hypocrisy when it comes to its 
domestic drug enforcement. While Trinidad (and presumably other Caribbean countries) 
have been encouraged to enforce a zero-tolerance policy when it comes to possession of 
  128
illegal drugs,141 in certain states of the US there is the tolerance of possession below a 
certain cap. This disequilibrium and lack of uniformity across states is viewed as an 
unfair luxury which the US has as the bigger power in constructing the drug policy tone 
for the hemisphere. 
While there seems to be a distinctive cleavage amongst the general population and at 
the elite level to some concept of being Trinidadian, the distinctions still remain clear in 
the perceived ethnic divisions of labor within the drug trade – i.e. that “small-man” being 
the black youth and the “big fish” being white or Syrian – as well as in national politics – 
which are still generally acted between black and indian communities. In response to 
illegal drug policy coming from the US therefore, while the feelings of discomfort and 
suspicion are there, the nationalist reaction is very weak because of the idealization of 
American culture and products that has become to pervasive within the country.  
Therefore influence from the US regarding local illegal drug policy construction is 
mostly 1) not visible enough and 2) not important enough to warrant a national reaction. 
Therefore Trinidad can and has historically (and continually) displayed an extremely high 
level of cooperation with the US in matters of drug policy because there is no hindrance 
from either the popular, elite or intellectual level. 
Thus even though in focus groups with members of the general population, they 
expressed the need for the US influence in Trinidadian drug policy, it seemed important 
to them that Trinidad remain autonomous in its decision-making. They also seemed to 
situate the illegal drug problem that Trinidad faces as primarily a US problem that affects 
the country due to its location as a convenient transshipment point. This serves to create 
                                                          
141 Worth mentioning INCSR 1997 praising Trinidad for increasing sentencing for possession and making 
more stringent rules about possession within a certain radius of schools. 
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further distance between the average Trinidadian and illegal drugs. However, similar 
distancing is undertaken by the US in describing the problems of illegal drugs being the 
supply and weak or disorganized security efforts in southern states of the western 
hemisphere.  
The lack of transparency about cooperation efforts is perceived as US-mandated 
and results in distrust over the true motives of the hegemon in its assistance. It has even 
been suggested that the reason for the presence of certain technologies, like the radar 
stations on the south coast are actually for the US to monitor Venezuela rather than to 
assist Trinidad in its fight against illegal drug trafficking. 
It is possible to say that US drug policy influence creates a reactionary effect on 
nationalism in Trinidad but to say that this effect is lasting or has strengthened or 
weakened the Trinidadian identity, would be going too far. The high level of cultural 
inertia makes isolated instances in which US policy influence is really visible (like the 
Shiprider Agreement, or the issuing of the travel advisory) elicit an immediate surge in 
nationalist sentiment from the general population. However, these sentiments tend to die 
down with the passage of time and the status quo maintains. While the issue of the illegal 
drug trade seems to have permanently affected the population’s self-perception of the 
magnitude of its role, there is not any overt expression of this in daily life.  
Increasingly gruesome crimes, like a severed head being placed on a table top at 
an outdoor bar and a 21 year old’s dismembered corpse being dumped in a river are 
leading citizens to draw comparisons between Trinidad and countries which have 
experienced glaring illegal drug violence such as Mexico and Colombia. These 
comparisons have been made despite these incidents not being reported as drug-related in 
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local media. Therefore, it shows that the average Trinidadian does in fact place the 
country in the same category as countries known for illegal drug operations. This speaks 
to the idea of self-perception of the general population. Moreover, the consistent calls for 
snap elections (not only with the current coalition government, but with the previous 
administrations as well) from critical segments of the population and the derogatory 
moniker of minister of national (disgrace and) insecurity given to Jack Warner142 (the 
minister of national security)143 shows that there is a lack of faith in the handling of these 
security issues at the official level. The lack of faith in the government further illustrates 
the disconnect between the general and official levels within the country. However there 
is no evidence to show that there is faith in the opposition, which leaves the question of 
where are Trinidadians hoping to turn for solutions or to whom? 
At the Caricom Intersessional meeting in Haiti in February 2013, PM Persad-
Bissessar stated that crime in the country was creating a loss of $200 million per year in 
tourism revenues. Given that she (and previous leaders) have specifically linked crime to 
the illegal drug trade means that this is directly impacting legitimate national earnings. 
The fact that Section 34 was repealed upon the issuance of a statement against it 
by the US embassy, shows that at the official level there is the desire to acquiesce to US 
                                                          
142 He was labeled the “Man Of Action” and subsequently “Action Jack” by PM Kamla Persad-Bissessar 
upon his induction into office as the minister of national security.  
At the end of April 2013, Jack Warner tendered his resignation from his post as Minister of National 
Security due to the publication of 113-page report from CONCACAF regarding his misappropriation and 
possible embezzlement of funds to the tune of $15 million in his capacity as CONCACAF President and 
FIFA Executive Member. While these allegations were not new when he assumed the position, the 
publication of the report compounded the suspicions of his corrupt nature necessitating his ceding of the 
position. After resigning, Mr. Warner advised the PM that there is a disconnect between the government 
and the general population as government ministers in her administration had become too self-serving 
(Trinidad Express, “Sweet Talk For Kamla,” May 5 2013). 
 
143 User comments on Susan Mohammed, “Headless Horror,” Trinidad Express, February 21, 2013 
(graphic photo). http://www.trinidadexpress.com/news/HEADLESS_HORROR-192409821.html 
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ideals. It was not until the input from the US came through, that action was taken by the 
government to reverse the law and allay the situation. The reaction time of the 
Trinidadian government shows a type of pandering to the US that truly demonstrates the 
asymmetry of the power relations. It also demonstrates that the citizenry is fairly 
powerless in bringing about change (the protests against the passage of the Section 34 bill 
were not sufficiently large or organized, and came after the government had already 
repealed the amendment) at the official level internally again showing that there is a lack 
of cohesion between official and general channels. Another example of the Trinidadian 
government taking cues from the US is in the recent establishment of drug courts to 
reduce the clogging in the already slow justice system. The 2011 INCSR highlighted that 
Trinidad required a dedicated drug court to assist in the prosecution of drug related 
crimes in a timelier manner. Despite having local complaints about the inefficiency of the 
justice system going unheard for many years, the current coalition government instituted 
a new drug court in August 2012 for the first time. From this, it can be determined that 
nationalism is not sufficiently engrained in the population to bridge the gap between the 
civil society and the government, which is why the power asymmetry is so incredibly 
glaring.  
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CHAPTER 5 
  JAMAICA: NO PROBLEM? 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 This chapter presents the case study of Jamaica in the exploration of how US drug 
policies affect small state nationalism. Recalling and utilizing the primary components of 
nationalism explained in Chapter One – self-perception, perception of the other, and self-
projection – the case study will explain the conceptual pattern that emerged through the 
data collection and discuss the major themes that became clear during analysis. In the 
Jamaican case, I am particularly exploring the following questions:  
 Has there been a deepening of inter-class or community tensions in Jamaica in 
response to US drug policy actions 
 Have anti-US sentiments increased in the country in response to these actions 
 Do government statements emphasize the country’s cooperation and 
complimentary drug policies with the US, or instead has there been an assertion 
(or exaltation) of independent policy formation? 
The information for this chapter draws from four focus groups conducted in Kingston, 
Jamaica which sampled from members of the general population, and the four-member 
Delphi Study conducted with experts coming from the Jamaican Ministry of National 
Security, the University of the West Indies, and the Jamaica Constabulary Force; along 
with secondary data found in the local newspapers, policy documents and speeches. 
 The rest of this section explains the lead up to independence in Jamaica and the 
important leaders who fostered the initial sense of Jamaican nationalism which allowed 
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the country to move from colony to independent state. It also opens the discussion on 
how the society became open to the illegal drug trade. The following section provides 
further context on the Jamaica case before leading into the findings collected from the 
focus groups and Delphi Study. The findings are further discussed in relation to two key 
illustrations of the interaction between US drug policy and Jamaican nationalism, the 
Shiprider Agreement, a US-proposed bilateral maritime security treaty, and the 
extradition to the US of Jamaican drug don Christopher “Dudus” Coke.  
 
Nationhood 
Jamaica’s path to nationhood grew out of a labor movement in the late 1930s, 
beginning with sugar workers, moving on to dock workers and then ultimately on to the 
city workers, for nationwide strike and protest. This was the lower working class segment 
of the Jamaican population.  The middle class could also empathize with the concerns of 
diminishing wages and standards of living. Enter Norman Manley, a British educated 
lawyer, who crossed class lines to take up the plight of the sugar workers and help them 
in their rally for a better wage. Manley’s attempt to unify these two classes to form a 
cohesive anti-colonial movement, however, was not completely successful as his middle 
class followers were not ready to follow him across those class lines.144  
This is where the charismatic Alexander “Busta” Bustamante comes in. Though 
he was Manley’s cousin and initially worked with him within the same party, they 
eventually became the diametrically opposed voices leading the People’s National Party 
                                                          
144 Colin Clarke, “Politics, Violence and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica,” Bulletin of Latin American 
Research, (Vol. 25, No. 3, 2006: 420-440), 421 
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(PNP) and the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP). Under the PNP, Bustamante created the 
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union (BITU), which brought together the sugar, banana, 
and port workers. Unionizing these masses had the effect of creating a multi-class 
supported institution, and later this became the platform through which Bustamante broke 
away from the PNP to form the JLP.145  
 Manley fell short in that he did not have the same multi-class support until later 
on in 1952 when he created the National Workers’ Union (NWU) and employed his son 
Michael to lead it and really reach the working class. This is why after universal suffrage 
was passed in Jamaica in 1944, Busta’s JLP won the election. It was not until Manley had 
successfully achieved his multi-class coalition through the NWU, that the PNP was able 
to defeat the JLP at the polls (in 1955 and again in 1959). At this stage, even though the 
political parties were both established and recognizable entities, it was really the 
personalities of Manley and Bustamante that fostered loyalty from party followers. 
Manley moved the middle class to political consciousness, while Bustamante involved 
himself in the 1938 workers uprising and due to his dedication (to the point of 
imprisonment), he became known as ‘the people’s champion.’ These two men brought 
the path to nationhood to life in Jamaica. 
By independence in 1962, the two political parties were healthy representations of 
the entire post-colonial population of Jamaica. What developed in the fight for the polls 
however, was what Clarke refers to as a habit of “partisan-political violence.”146 The poor 
ghettoized areas of Kingston became regions of high political tension between 
                                                          
145 Colin Clarke, “Politics, Violence, and Drugs in Kingston, Jamaica,” (2006), 422. 
 
146 Colin Clarke (2006), 422. 
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communities as political leaders from each side granted concessions to one community or 
the other in an attempt to secure votes or intimidate their opponents.  
This involved a large-scale gerrymandering scheme in which housing projects 
were undertaken in Kingston’s working-class constituencies which transplanted voters 
for one party or the other into that area as a means of securing that area in the polls. 
Political leaders therefore began arming residents of these areas so they could either 
defend themselves against residents from the opposing party or so they could disrupt 
party gatherings of the opponents in that area and intimidate voters on election day. This 
clientelistic relationship evolved in the post-independence years and it is here where the 
issue of illegal drugs crept into the national dynamics of the country. The provision of 
weapons by political leaders, not only helped to secure votes, but also encouraged a wider 
range of illegal activities.147  
As the habit of violence became passed onto newer generations and the political 
role as supplier of weapons rescinded, these groups found new ways to arms themselves. 
The now organized gangs – the Shower Posse (JLP) and the Spanglers (PNP) – with the 
help of some transnational ties in the US, gained the power and used their political 
protection to engage in marijuana trafficking to the US.148  
 
Garrison Communities 
Figueroa and Sives (2002) characterize garrison communities as “a totalitarian 
social space in which the options of residents are largely controlled.” In the period 
                                                          
147 Clarke (2006), Bogues (2002), Gunst (1995). 
 
148 Laurie Gunst, Born Fi’ Dead: A Journey Through the Jamaican Posse Underworld, (New York: Henry 
Holt and Company, 1995). 
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leading up to and directly after independence these areas were controlled by the 
politicians. For example, Edward Seaga (former Prime Minister of Jamaica from JLP), 
was responsible for converting Back o’ Wall into Tivoli Gardens in 1962. This 
conversion was at the time a modern, government sponsored housing project which was 
subsequently filled with JLP supporters. Likewise Wilton Gardens, named for former 
Minister of Housing Wilton Hill, was created in the Trench Town area (also a JLP 
stronghold). Arnett Gardens (also called Concrete Jungle) was a similar project 
undertaken by the PNP. Politicians created, delineated and populated these areas, and 
proceeded to protect them at the polls by arming its residents. This cemented a linkage 
between political violence and clientelism in the garrison communities of Jamaica.  
Violence became not only a form of political expression and support, but also an 
expression of Jamaican masculinity as a sub-culture of the poor developed which 
distorted the (national) self-perception among males in this community. Gunst explains 
that these young men, influenced by the violence of their neighborhoods and the 
idealization of the US “gangster movie culture” which had become popular at the time, 
aimed to become “tropical bad guys acting out fantasies from the spaghetti westerns, 
Kung Fu kick flicks, Rambo sequels and Godfather spin-offs that play nightly in 
Kingston’s funky movie palaces and flicker constantly behind young men’s eyes.”149 This 
identification with the national collective based in violence therefore, does not fragment 
the underprivileged population in a way that alienates them from a larger national identity 
since the strong party affiliations upon which it is based ensures that there is still a 
nationalistic quality even to the distorted self-perception. 
                                                          
149 Gunst, Born Fi’ Dead, 1995, xv. 
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According to Sives (2002) the high level of political violence emanating out of 
the garrisons was connected to the need of these “newly enfranchised” populations to 
develop a political identity that gave them a sense of belonging (to the state).150 In their 
eyes, they were protecting their party, by protecting their territory and acting out against 
the other.  
In 1972 Michael Manley began using the Rastafarian symbols such as the rod of 
correction and reggae music which once again brought legitimacy to a marginalized 
population. Granted, in this same time period, there were many other social and religious 
movements which were more marginalized, but Rastafarianism was the most socially 
digestible of them and it gave Manley the power to push a more radical political 
agenda.151 
 Additionally, the ideological division between the JLP and PNP became imported 
from the wider context of the Cold War. The JLP became the ‘protector of democracy’ 
while Manley’s PNP followed a ‘third path.’ This deepened inter-party notions of 
difference and fomented the political violence which very soon after worsened due to 
economic hardships. While Manley is generally charged with introducing democratic 
socialism to the country, Lewin argues that Manley’s third path platform was not really a 
socialist experiment but rather more rooted in self-reliance but his ideological ambiguity 
made it easy for the JLP to spin his words in a direction which they knew would gain US 
attention and secure their return to power.  
                                                          
150 Sives “Changing Patrons, from Politician to Drug Don: Clientelism in Downtown Kingston, Jamaica,” 
Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 29 No. 5 (Sep. 2002), 74 
 
151 Sives “Changing Patrons” (2002). 
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Regardless of individual intention, this added a new dynamic to the political 
identity of the average Jamaican in that the JLP became the capitalists, against the 
socialist PNP. It also served as a linkage between the projection of a national identity and 
Pastor’s characterization of cyclical foreign policy between the US and these developing 
regions. By projecting this third path image, and through the JLP’s emphasis on the 
socialist nature of Manley’s political platform, Jamaica was able to gain more attention 
from the US. Granted, this attention may not have been positive in the Cold War setting, 
but it is emblematic of the important role which identity projection plays in Jamaica’s 
foreign policy relations with the US.152  
 
CONTEXT & BACKGROUND 
Thoumi (2002) has theorized that certain competitive advantages must exist 
within a country for the drug trade to take hold.153 In looking at the potential for Jamaica 
to become a major player then, we can see that there are three rationales which support 
the health of the illegal drug trade: the receding of the local patron-client relationship 
leading to the rise of drug dons/community leaders; the international patron-client 
relationship with the US that somewhat precipitated that internal power shift; and, the 
already prevalent local use and acceptance of marijuana which served as the gateway for 
the illegal drug trade to grow. 
                                                          
152 Carlene J. Edie (1986) notes the cutbacks in US private investments in bauxite during the Manley 
Administration which resulted in a slow down in economic growth and an increase in inflation, while Carl 
Stone (1986) notes the dramatic difference in aid given to the Manley Administration and the Seaga 
Administration which directly followed it. 
 
153 Fracisco Thoumi, “Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis” in The 
Annals of the American Academy, No. 582.  July 2002. 
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Local Patron-Client Relationship 
Gunst explains that the nature of the drug trade in Jamaica has its origination in 
that relationship between the government and the posses. Posses have become the 
reference for the political gangs in the country, a term which in itself is a reflection of the 
cultural seepage from US media (those previously mentioned spaghetti westerns). She 
describes the members of these gangs as almost tribal in their affiliation to either the JLP 
or PNP and as such brings to life the warring metaphor that characterized the 1980s 
election process. She describes the explosion of drug trafficking through the island as a 
direct result of a patron-client relationship between the government and the posses gone 
horribly wrong.154  
This relationship was purportedly so strong in the early post-independence years 
that Gunst refers to two such posses, the JLP Phoenix and the PNP Vikings155 as though 
they could be some type of sports teams playing out violence in the streets of Kingston. 
In the late 1970s, an exodus of gang members to the US had already begun and ties were 
being forged with Colombian and Cuban drug runners. However, after the 1980 
election156 especially, the relationship between the politicians and the gangs changed and 
the politicians viewed their ‘mercenaries’ as becoming too big a threat.  
                                                          
154 Laurie Gunst, Born Fi’ Dead, xv 
 
155 Gunst, (1995), 82 
 
156 The 1980 election in Jamaica is considered one of the most violent electoral periods in the country’s 
history, with a record of 844 politically motivated murders. This election ended the Michael Manley 
Administration which had become unpopular with the US for its socialist ideological bent. It ushered in the 
decade long term of Edward Seaga. (H. G. Helps, “The bloody general election that changed Jamaica,” 
Jamaica Observer, October 30, 2012, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/The-bloody-general-election-
that-changed-Jamaica). 
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This led to police raids in these garrison communities which essentially fomented 
the exodus of gang members to the US and strengthened the ties with the transnational 
organized crime syndicates. The complexity of the relationship between the government, 
posses and the garrison communities is of particular note since the government still 
maintains a somewhat symbiotic relationship with the posses in order to secure voter 
support. The posses play an integral middleman role in garnering and holding political 
support for whichever party they are affiliated with. However, the funds from illegal drug 
trafficking has empowered posses in a way that has allowed them to replace the state in 
the social contract, in terms of providing security for residents of their communities or 
even loans for educational pursuits, toys, books and clothing for children.  
This leads to an increasing distance between residents of the community and the 
national institutions such as the police. Reactions to the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF) 
entering the garrisons during the Tivoli debacle157 for example show the lack of faith and 
trust awarded to the state appointed security forces. Their manner of dealing with the 
Dudus stand-off is viewed by residents of Tivoli Gardens as a traumatic event and a stain 
on their community’s history, with which they are still grappling to come to terms.158 
 
International Patron-Client Relationship 
While marijuana, cocaine and crack transshipment became a big business in the 
mid-70s, in the early 1980s, heroin finally entered into the mix for the Jamaican drug 
                                                          
157 Referring to the 2010 stand-off between Jamaican armed forces and police, and the residents of Tivoli 
Gardens over the extradition of drug don Christopher ‘Dudus’ Coke. 
 
158 Karyl Walker, “Tivoli Still Hurting,” Jamaica Observer, May 24 2013, 
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trade pioneered by Eric “Chinaman” Vassell, an East Kingston posse leader who 
migrated to New York. Thus the 1980s marked a dramatic change in the structure of the 
garrison communities as dons no longer drew their power from the protection of the state. 
Instead, the higher profits from the drug trade allowed dons to get out from under the 
reins of the political parties and instead they became entities of their own. Garrisons have 
been referred to as “states within a state”159 due to the fact that the garrison leaders (dons) 
manage these areas almost autonomously. Even though they still serve their original 
purpose of garnering votes and voter intimidation, they no longer require funding, 
contracts or weapons from the political leaders as now they can provide themselves with 
these things due to drug profits. This does not mean that they no longer receive boons 
from the government, since dons now receive other incentives such as construction 
contracts as a way of assuring their continued closeness with the political party.  
Structural adjustment programs from the IMF in 1980s came with conditionalities 
to end government spending on housing subsidies for the poor. Thus the IMF limited the 
politician’s ability to smoothly continue the patron-client relationship which could be part 
of the rationale for why illegal drug trafficking was able to so easily fill that void. Not 
only had its debt relationship with these institutions changed, its relationship with 
creditor nations also changed.160 It further explains why cocaine trafficking was able to so 
easily transfer the power away from political leaders and to the dons, since the constraints 
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from the international arena curtailed alternative actions that politicians may have taken 
to secure the continued relationship.  
Since the rollback of this relationship, the JCF and JDF have purportedly moved 
in to fill this vacuum, with reports of police brutality and harassment, and levying of 
“taxes”161 against garrison residents and other citizens for no reason. This has opened up 
these institutions to allegations of considerable high-level corruption, though it is unclear 
if they (the JCF and JDF) are acting independently or as proxies for the politicians in 
dealing with the dons given that international bodies have criticized and somewhat 
curtailed the relationships of political-patronage that have historically characterized these 
garrison communities. 
Most recently notorious don, Christopher Coke maintained a legitimate 
relationship with the state as a businessman alongside his illegal activities.162 Dons have 
also begun providing for the residents of the garrisons under their rule as noted by Gunst 
in her explanation of the “treat” provided by a particular posse leader residing in the US 
to his garrison back home. 
 
Prevalence and Acceptance of Marijuana 
Culturally marijuana in Jamaica was not just used for smoking. As discussed later, 
marijuana had many uses outside of “drug culture.” Yet the country’s reputation as a 
producer built and concretized during the rise in drug use in the 1970s as the demand for 
                                                          
161 While conducting fieldwork, I was instructed by my guide to always keep an extra JA$1000 in my 
pocket in case the police stopped me. This was called “write or left” according to what those corrupt police 
officers would say; “either mi write yuh a ticket or you lef’ mi a money.” People are allegedly charged for 
random offences like this, at the whim of some corrupt police officer(s). 
 
162 Coke assumed leadership of the Shower Posse in 1990 following the death of his father Lester Coke. 
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marijuana in the US increased. Thus in the following decade when cocaine trafficking 
was introduced, Jamaica’s attempt at filling US demand for marijuana had already 
established transshipment routes and criminal linkages which the South American cartels 
could easily piggyback on to move cocaine. Gunst estimates that while marijuana has a 
long history of use in Jamaica, transshipment and cocaine traffic first became apparent as 
a problem in the period leading up to the 1980 election. She blames this on JLP-
sponsored posses who moved the drugs through the Newport West ports of Kingston with 
the main destinations being Miami and New York – the areas in which the largest 
numbers of the Jamaican diasporic community had settled.163 
Cocaine use is also blamed in part for the explosion of violence for that 1980 
election as it emboldened the garrison gunmen, arguably “[creating] monsters [their 
politician sponsors] could no longer control.”164 Along with shipments of drugs, of course 
there were also guns coming in to the country.165 The guns tended to stay behind as per 
usual in the drug trafficking industry.166 For Jamaica, these guns were leftover vestiges of 
Cold War weaponry, such as Uzis (for which a gang member was nicknamed), M1s and 
M16s. These high powered weapons had basically taken over the small arms scene in 
Jamaica by the 1980s.   
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165 According to a respondent in Gunst’s research, guns began entering Jamaica in the 1960s, around the 
time of independence and this fomented the political rivalry that already existed between the PNP and the 
JLP. The sometimes violent tensions which already existed between the two groups (via throwing bricks at 
one party’s meetings to break them up), took a more dangerous turn. 
 
166 Bigo Agozino, Ben Bowling an Elizabeth Ward and Godfrey St. Bernard.  “Guns, crime and social order 
in the West Indies.” Criminology and Criminal Justice 9, No. 3 (2009): 287-305. 
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OBSERVATIONS IN JAMAICA 
The cultural atmosphere of Jamaica is decidedly more formal than Trinidad’s. The 
attachment to titles and the emphasis on church going is pointedly juxtaposed to the 
violent crimes that seem to be plaguing the society. While there news reports of a violent 
incident against a family of women rocked through Kingston and likely the rest of the 
island, becoming a top story. 167 It was even brought up at a local church service which I 
attended, wherein the worship leader, a man, began to cry during the call to worship 
prayer. This is a striking contrast between the machismo often associated with Jamaican 
men and the sensitivity to violence expressed in the church. It revealed a nuance of 
Jamaican society, wherein there is the perception of both a strong sense of religion and 
morality in the community (there being one church per square mile in Kingston, and 
Jamaica purportedly having the highest number of churches per capita in the world) and 
at the same time a perceived problem of gang and drug-related violence.  
Prior to my travel to the island, I had been given multiple warnings of Jamaica 
being a “hard” place. To date, I have not been able to fully comprehend this 
categorization. There seems to be a certain level of silence or perhaps collective shame 
and derision when it comes to the violence in the country. For example, in a tour of 
Kingston, I was able to visit Tivoli Gardens now infamous for the 2010 police stand-off 
which led to the extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke. However, there were no street 
signs indicating that this was in fact Tivoli Gardens. Instead, there were signs directing 
traffic to New Kingston and the Kingston Market. So this supposedly dangerous area was 
without a city-planning label, while the exit was clearly marked. It is unknown if this 
                                                          
167 Given its extensive media coverage. 
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omission was intentional or simply overlooked but it insinuates that the “shame” for this 
area that seems to be felt at the official level.  
 This is not the first instance of official-level attempts to reform the identity of 
this area. It was previously called ‘Back o’ Wall’ and was renamed in the 1960s when 
former PM Edward Seaga168 developed the community. Moreover, from speaking to 
members of the general population, I learned that while Tivoli Gardens has been renamed 
officially, the residents of this area cleave to their own designations, so some may live in 
Tivoli while others may reside in “Jungle,” an unofficial name for a certain area behind 
Tivoli Gardens.  
This shows that there is a sense of alienation from the macro level of 
identification for these Jamaicans. While these residents will primarily self-identify as 
Jamaicans, they have not gone along with the official naming of the area, showing that 
the power of the state in this area is not sufficiently socially embedded to warrant the 
acceptance of a new name, if given by an opposing political party. In looking at the 
relationship between Christopher Coke and these residents, we can understand why this is 
so. Anecdotal evidence shows that he has helped the community by paying for students to 
go to school, assisting with the purchase of schoolbooks, offering transport and security 
                                                          
168 Edward Seaga has been a charismatic figure in Jamaican politics with deep ties to the Tivoli Gardens 
area and purported relationships to the Shower Posse (of which Christopher “Dudus” Coke was said to be 
the leader). He was the PM for the entire decade of the 1980s and served as the head of the JLP from 1974 
to 2005. He was the last bridge between the pre-independence/path to nationhood Jamaica and the 
Jamaican politics which exist today. He is also a music producer and started a profitable record company 
called West India Records Limited, now known as Dynamic Sounds. He used his position of political 
power to push Jamaican culture (through music) and as such built up a significant following among the 
population. He still remains a highly respected individual in Jamaican society, especially in Tivoli Gardens. 
There have been more ominous undertones to Seaga’s politics, however, as his ties to Shower Posse hinted 
of corruption and support for their brand of political violence – he walked in front of the funeral procession 
for Lester Coke (Dudus’ father and previous leader of Shower Posse), which some took to mean a public 
declaration of his ties to the criminal organization, though it was classified as paying respects to a popular 
member of his beloved constituency.  
  146
for these residents. Therefore, Coke replaced the state in the social contract for this 
community, so even though these people can identify with a macro version of being 
Jamaican, this does not translate to their relationship to the government machinery as it 
did prior to the 1980s before the patron-client power shift occurred. This fits with 
Premdas’ views  on the development of sub-national identities, yet not in the way he 
describes, since he focuses on ethno-national identification. Instead, we can see here that 
the community level identity replaces ethnicity in Premdas’ argument as the sub-national 
factor which so heavily influences the expression of the macro-level nationalism. 
There is a contradiction in the official acceptance of Tivoli Gardens at this face 
value (regarding its labeling) and its significance in general elections. The Tivoli seat is 
an important seat for the legitimacy of any government administration. In the past, Seaga 
(JLP) had close links to the community and groomed his protégé to assume the 
constituency after him. Only if the ‘community leader’ in the area accepted the successor, 
would they be successful in their tenure with that constituency and this success could 
make or break a political career.  
The culture of violence juxtaposes the ideals and prevalence of the Jamaican 
religious community. Violence has become a given in the society, insofar as popular 
dancehall songs not only advocate it – violence against homosexuals, gun shot/gun 
cocking sounds etc. – but they also demonstrate the normative reactions to this violence – 
hitting the ground upon hearing gunshots, or running. In the local movie made to 
celebrate Jamaican track athletes, the titular question is posed to many segments of the 
population – “Why do Jamaicans run so fast?” It then becomes poignant when dancehall 
artiste, Elephant Man, responds that this is because they have become so accustomed to 
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hearing and running from gunfire, that when the starting gun at the Olympics is fired, 
they are engrained with the flight response in order to survive. While these are merely 
observations from touring the city and attempting to find an appropriate context in which 
to fit the researcher’s own perceptions of the country, the focus groups and Delphi Study 
discussed in the following section directly addressed the question of how the state’s 
nationalism was affected by US drug policy. 
 
FINDINGS 
In the four focus groups conducted in Kingston, Jamaica, there were 30 adult 
participants in total – 18 female and 12 male.  The groups were conducted at three 
locations: a local church, a private residence, and on the University of the West Indies 
Mona Campus. Participants were first given a questionnaire (see Appendix I) to collect 
the following basic information: age, ethnicity, self-identification, awareness of the 
illegal drug problem in the country, and awareness of the methods to address the illegal 
drug problem in the country (see Table 1 for a breakdown of the self-identification and 
age distribution in each group). Each focus group was then asked to discuss a series of six 
questions (see Appendix II) to determine their awareness of and feelings toward their 
government’s methods of dealing illegal drugs, as well as their feelings about the 
involvement of the US and perceptions of its role in creating solutions for the illegal drug 
problem in the country. The focus groups were also asked if they thought that the way in 
which the country had dealt with illegal drug issues had affected the image of their 
country abroad. These questions were meant to bring out the perspectives relating to self-
perception, perception of the other and self-projection.  
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It was expected that participants would express an aversion to US involvement in 
matters relating to illegal drug policy, even if they were unaware of what the policies 
were. It was discovered that the participants were more knowledgeable about the drug 
situation in their country, more so than those in Trinidad, which right away hinted that 
the illegal drug problem played a role in their self-perception. 
 
Table 1: Breakdown of Self-Identification in Focus Group Participants 
  Age Group 
Self-
Identifiers 
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65 65+ 
Focus Group 1 
9/21/2012 
7 participants 
(3 male, 4 female) 
Nationality 5 - - 1 - - 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion 1 - - - - - 
Other - - - - - - 
No Answer - - - - - - 
Focus Group 2 
9/23/2012 
8 participants 
(2 male, 6 female) 
Nationality - 1 1 3 1 - 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - 1 - - - - 
Other - - - - - - 
No Answer - 1 - - - - 
Focus Group 3 
9/26/2012 
7 participants 
Nationality 6 - - - - - 
Ethnic 
Group 
1 - - - - - 
Religion - - - - - - 
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(4 male, 3 female) Other - - - - - - 
No Answer - - - - - - 
Focus Group 4 
9/26/2012 
8 participants 
(3 male, 5 female) 
Nationality - 1 1 1 3 1 
Ethnic 
Group 
- - - - - - 
Religion - - - - - - 
Other - 1* - - - - 
No Answer - - - - - - 
*This respondent wrote in “Name” as their primary self-identifier. 
Younger persons seemed more interested in participating in the study, while older 
subjects asked for more explanation about the research. and many of those approached 
seemed hesitant to get involved despite assurances that they would not be asked to 
directly speak about persons involved in gangs and/or the drug trade. Respondents fell 
into the Black (21) and Mixed (7) ethnic categories. One person provided “no answer;” 
for the ethnicity question and another chose “other,” entering “Jamaican” as their 
ethnicity thus attributing a quasi-biological quality to the idea of self-perception in the 
national construct. This question was intended to spark thought of cultural division 
amongst respondents in order to bolster responses to group questions.  
The homogenization of the answers however, suggests that ethnicity may not play 
as great a role in societal division here as it seemed to in Trinidad. In Jamaica, division is 
founded not upon racial and ethnic lines as in Trinidad, but along class and political party 
lines. During the focus groups, many respondents distinguished between themselves and 
the supposed corrupt politicians by saying that those people lived “uptown,” or the gangs 
and drug dons as ‘from the garrison.’ Thus distinctions here center on party affiliation or 
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whether you live uptown, country, garrison or gully. Uptown refers to those upper and 
upper-middle class residents of the Kingston and St. Andrew parish while country seems 
to refer to anything outside of Kingston and St. Andrew. Garrison as previously 
mentioned are those urban housing schemes set up by one political party or the other, and 
gully as has been conveyed through media and music, refers to those living in the poorest 
or most violence prone urban areas. What emerges however, is the idea that even the 
societal division at its very base has some nationalistic origins in that party affiliation is 
very closely associated to where one lives and that the political party followed is 
ultimately the best one for Jamaica’s continued well being and future. 
The following sections discuss the general themes that were visible in all four 
focus groups. The Delphi group is discussed separately since it provides counterpoints to 
some of the views expressed in the focus groups, namely the idea that the government is 
very actively trying to stem the flow of illegal drugs and its effects not as a follower of 
US policies, but as a collaborating partner. 
 
Self-Perception and Attitudes to Ganja 
From the focus groups sampled from the general population, their understanding 
of the US-Jamaican relations with regards to illegal drugs is very apparent. Through the 
spread of age groups, participants understood the nature of policy relations entailed the 
constant threat of decertification and that aid for different endeavors such as healthcare 
was dependent on the formation of complementary drug policies. There was also mention 
of the idea that local official level perceptions of marijuana have forcibly changed due to 
the pressure from the US to create and uphold complementary policies. One respondent 
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(Focus Group 1, Male, 46-55) suggests that marijuana is only illegal in Jamaica now due 
to the influence from the war on drugs, noting that when he was a young man it was 
considered just another herb in his neighborhood which people used regularly to make tea 
or season meats.169  
The cultural acceptance of marijuana and the opinion that it was not necessarily 
something that required US policy attention was not a major revelation in the general 
focus groups. While the participants themselves chose to distance themselves from 
marijuana users, they also did not see it as a big problem: “We doh have that problem like 
in America where you see people on the road doing it [referring to cocaine]. Most people 
do ganja. People who smoke ganja, is normal to smoke and chill. But dem stink up the 
place sometimes man. And now there are some youngsters that are literally going senile 
because of it. I know one in particular” (Focus Group 3, Female, 18-25). 
When asked questions about drugs, they generally took this to mean marijuana 
alone which is indicative of the image of Jamaica held by not only outsiders, but also the 
average citizen. Therefore the perception of Jamaica as a ‘ganja’ nation is not merely a 
projected image, but also one that has seemed to permeate the society and the way that 
they self-identify. Subjects did express displeasure with the lack of enforcement of 
marijuana use and one respondent (Focus Group 3, Male, 18-25) pointed out that there is 
a certain level of ‘ganja tourism’ in that foreigners will visit the island for the purpose of 
buying and smoking weed with impunity. He further cited his experience on a trip to the 
                                                          
169 With the emergence of the Rastafarian movement, marijuana use became more associated with the 
marginalized groups, but the past cultural uses were not forgotten, so its cultivation and use was still not 
viewed as problematic by the wider society. This shows that there is a public acquiescence to marijuana use 
as it is deemed a cultural norm, even though its use may not have been admitted directly by any of the 
participants, it is viewed as a commonality and as such enforcement regarding usage is difficult to uphold. 
  152
US, where people assumed that he would naturally partake in smoking weed simply 
because he came from Jamaica.  
A trip to New Kingston confirmed that lack of enforcement, as people were able 
to smoke on the main streets in close proximity to the police without consequence. My 
guide later informed me that while marijuana use is tolerated and more or less considered 
licit, to use Van Schendel and Abraham’s distinction between licit and legal.170 I was told 
also, that if a person were openly holding a very large amount, the police would take 
action.  
One respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 18-25) believed that the reason 
government rhetoric against marijuana has remained unchanged despite reports which 
itemize the benefits of legalization, is due to the influence of the US. The US being the 
major market has a vested interest in stemming the flow of marijuana through its borders. 
However, the general public acceptance of marijuana in Jamaica means that there is not a 
similar drive to quell cultivation and use locally.  
Despite Jamaica no longer being a major exporter of marijuana to the US since 
the grade is generally lower than US-grown marijuana, there is still policy pressure from 
the US on controlling supply. This is a vestige of the war on drugs/drug policies towards 
the Caribbean Basin as they were in the late 1980s-mid 1990s which has not changed. 
Therefore, the drug policies towards the region or at least Jamaica have stagnated in such 
a way that there is pressure on the country to create policies that do not necessarily match 
the current social climate. This means that there will be unnecessary defense 
spending/funding and policing in this regard on the part of the US coupled with 
                                                          
170 Willem Van Schendel and Itty Abraham, Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the 
Other Side of Globalization,” (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005). 
  153
inordinate pressure on Jamaica to uphold policies against marijuana which are 
contradictory to its general public opinion and also not necessary given the evolved 
nature of the marijuana supply chain. Marijuana consumed within the US now comes 
mainly from local producers or Mexican sources.  
This is generally preferred to Caribbean strains of marijuana since the growing 
methods used locally (in the US) such as indoor hydroponics result in a faster maturation 
and higher tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) content which makes these strains more desirable 
for the average consumer. According to the UNODC World Drug Report (2009), while 
the cannabis plant can grow in a variety of terrains and climates, conditions such as light, 
humidity, temperature and soil acidity can affect the potency of the final product. 171 Thus 
with outdoor growth which is typical in Jamaica, the THC levels can vary from harvest to 
harvest while controlled indoor environments will yield plants with consistently high 
THC levels. Additionally, there has been the evolution of these locally produced crops to 
mimic flavors such as blueberry, peanut butter, grape, and cheese (to name a few), which 
hold a greater allure than the original “herb on the hill” produced in the Caribbean. 
 
US-Jamaica Relations and Drug Policy  
Some focus group participants showed a lack of understanding of the meaning of 
cooperation with the US regarding the drug issue, despite showing an understanding of 
the general nature of the policy relationship and the operation of the drug trade. When 
asked whether or not the US should play a greater role in assisting Jamaica with regards 
                                                          
171 UNODC World Drug Report 2009, “Why Does Cannabis Potency Matter?” p. 97. 
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to the illegal drug trade, one respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 18-25) exclaimed that 
“anytime the US helps, Jamaica plummets into further debt, so No!”  
Additionally, there seemed to be a lack of awareness of if there was already a US 
presence in the country to deal with the current drug situation and this lack of awareness 
was blamed on the Jamaican government not reporting this information. Moreover, some 
respondents thought that even though there may be snippets in the local news reporting 
the current situation, that these reports are vastly overshadowed by the reporting of the 
prevalence of violence in the country instead. This was deemed not only the fault of 
media houses but also the fact that the general public is less interested in these features 
and more interested in the violence occurring in the country. Respondents, however, were 
able to link the endemic violence to the drug trade in noting that the guns which 
accompany drug shipments remain and are the root cause for escalations of violence. The 
participants seemed less inclined to blame drug trafficking for crime, than for the 
increasing levels of violence associated with certain crimes.  
They made (probably unintentionally) a separation between the levels of violence 
and the acts of crime.172 This is likely due to the fact that prior to drug trafficking being 
noted as a serious problem for the country, Jamaica was already accustomed to a high 
level of political violence as each political party unofficially enlisted gang leaders in 
garrison communities to go out and secure votes. One respondent (Focus Group 3, Male, 
18-25) claimed that the effect of drugs moving from Jamaica to the US was less than the 
effect of the guns which stay in the country. 
                                                          
172 Unlike in Trinidad where this separation does not factor into the understanding or the linkage between 
drugs and crime 
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There also was a high level of suspicion with which the regional hegemon is 
viewed. This suspicion was mixed in with a perception of rampant corruption among the 
ranks of local law enforcement and politicians. The distrust of the local government 
seems to be tied to the suspicion about the level of US involvement in the country. One 
respondent (Focus Group 2, Male, 45-55) stated:  
“I have a cousin of mine, he’s in charge of the Caribbean Immigration services in 
NY, so he has links with the DEA and them. A lot of things is happen in this 
country that people don’t know because the American government, they have 
certain people here who are sifting through even these politicians’ bank accounts. 
So a lot of arrests will take place shortly. So the policy and implementation of 
systems to deal with the policies, they are here.”  
This shows that this segment of the population perceived an intense level of complicity 
between government and organized crimes syndicates which move drugs between 
Jamaica and the US. Moreover, it indicates the perception of the depth of political 
corruption as well as the penetration of the US into Jamaican affairs, along with the 
premonition of a nationwide scandal brewing on the horizon. 
 Coupled with the suspicion when characterizing the other, was also a sense of 
blame attached to the perceptions of US-assisted solutions to illegal drug issues:  
“They want us to fix the US problem. They really have no addressed it from their 
end. They look towards Colombia and all these countries that traffic to fix it but 
they, as people they have not, and they can’t, because again it’s political. Their 
whole democracy, they can’t touch it so they have allowed it to become bigger 
than they can manage and because America is so pro-democracy, there really is 
  156
little that they can do that won’t infringe on somebody’s rights. So they dunno 
what to do. They dunno how to fix it. But they are the ones that created it” (Focus 
Group 4, Female, 36-45). 
 
Corruption/Distrust of the Government 
Across all groups, this picture of a high level of perceived complicity between 
drug dons and politicians emerged. This is a quality already discussed in existing 
literature on the patron-client relationship that built up during the early stages of 
independence for the country. It is clear that the general consensus coming out of the 
groups is that corruption which facilitates the illegal drug trade is a big problem for the 
island. 
A respondent from Focus Group 3 (Male, 18-25) stated, “I think the [Jamaican] 
government have too much of a stake in it [the illegal drug trade], so they don’t try to 
close it down. Well as in, when you hear it on the news that this politician is a friend with 
like the criminal or something, I don’t think they would readily just shut down 
operations.”  
Respondents from Focus Group 4 (Male 55-65, and Female 36-45, respectively) 
discussed this at length: “I think really we [Jamaica in general] don’t mind it [illegal 
drugs] going through because we can benefit from it, we want the money. As I said there 
is a drug fund in the government system. The tax office!” In agreement, she responds:  
“The drug scene has created a sort of economy which we can’t deny. They…it’s 
in every area. There is cash. Most of these apartment complexes that you see are 
put up by drug traffickers. They have to invest the money somewhere and so the 
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easiest way to legitimately deal with it in to put up an apartment complex in 
somebody’s name, a cousin’s name, a mother’s name, whatever it is. And so it 
creates this unnatural boom because it is not the average Jamaican who is able to 
do this and that sub-economy is…I mean even the banks, they benefit. The banks 
benefit, the money has to go somewhere and so there is benefit. So I don’t know 
that they are gung-ho about stemming anything and one has to say, ‘What’s in it 
for me?’ You know? The age-old question. There is something in it for them and 
so they’re not about to do too much. But I mean you have to have an appearance 
doing something.” 
The preceding quotations show that even across age categories, there is similarity in the 
perceptions of the Jamaican government’s facilitation of the illegal drug trade. This ties 
into the theme of self-perception that has emerged in the study. 
 
Perception of the Other 
When asked about the perception of the US’ goals in Jamaica, one respondent (Focus 
Group 2, Female, 26-35) emphatically stated: 
“Listen carefully, when Spain wanted to be world power, what did Spain do? Go 
out on a ship, send them Christopher Columbus and go, give him a flag and say 
when you land in some place, stick your flag and say this is Spanish colony. 
When England wanted to take over the world, what did they do? Go around, sail 
the world, get a flag and stick it in and this is British colony. Now if Spain did 
own the land before, what did they do in Jamaica? They had a war and they took 
up Jamaica from the Spaniards. It’s the same thing happening to us today. When 
  158
you hear the expression ‘all roads lead to Rome,’ it don’t just mean, oh we just 
make road and have technology, it means that Rome intention was take over 
everything – to conquer everything. So when it’s a world power, it is not staying 
in the US. It’s a modern day effort to colonize this world. But we are more 
intelligent now to fight it off. We are more organized now to fight it off. But what 
do you have? Subtle intention. So if I can’t take your country and call it US 
Jamaica, US Virgin Islands, US whatever-whatever, what do I do? I influence 
your government and your policies. I sneakily come in and make your 
government make decisions that benefit me as US country.” 
This statement supports the idea that the US as an ‘other’ is viewed in the same terms as 
colonizers of the nation’s past. As such, it lends support to the hypothesis of this thesis 
that the stronger the distinction between the self and the other, the stronger the nationalist 
reaction will be. In policy terms, the result is that within the general population, US drug 
policies are viewed with deep suspicion and mistrust. Another participant (Focus Group 
2, Female, 46-55) highlighted the level of mistrust by describing US involvement in 
Jamaica over the Dudus incident:  
“They are more involved that we even know, and it panned out in the Dudus 
matter. The USA was in Jamaica doing all sorts of things whether legal or illegal. 
And that is the problem that I’m having, because they were gathering information 
on Dudus, Christopher Coke, but they were also tapping telephones. I hear that 
they even had some aerial thing, satellite thing watching operations…Some of it 
is done in collusion with our own people, some of it I understand we did not know 
about it, so I think they are very involved…I hear them have politicians and other 
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persons in the police force that they have under scrutiny and they are watching 
because of the same involvement in the Dudus matter…They focus a lot on 
Jamaica in terms of drugs in the Caribbean. In Jamaica it’s a big thing. And some 
of it might be legal and some might even be illegal, maybe we don’t even know 
we are being watched. Because they can pick up any of us house on satellite and 
they can pick up any of us conversation. So my cousin might be a drug don and I 
talking to him and I don’t know I’m implicated. And then I can’t get no visa.” 
This comment is likely in response to fact that CARICOM had earlier in the year, signed 
an agreement with the US allowing the overflight of unmanned aircrafts in order to track 
traffickers and potential terrorist threats. According to the Jamaica Observer, “this policy 
of drones surveillance by Washington…[results] in indiscriminate deaths of innocent 
civilians.” The article goes on to call the use of drones a violation of human rights and 
rule of law which has become part and parcel of relations with the US.173 There have not 
been any reports of deaths caused by drones in the Caribbean region showing that while 
the public does in fact seem informed about the strategies being implemented to combat 
the illegal drug trade, it is paired with a high level of suspicion of “the other” leading to a 
misunderstanding of some of these operations. 
Another subject (Focus Group 2, Female, 46-55) was very adamant that 
cooperating with US on the front of illegal drugs would eventually lead to a tearing of the 
fabric of Jamaican society, particularly with regards to the Buggery Act, which she 
believed should never be repealed for any reason. The notion was expressed with feelings 
of disgust that US drug policy assistance should “happen the right way [rather than with] 
                                                          
173 “Yes to trade and aid: What of rule of law?” Jamaica Observer, June 17 2013. 
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Yes-to-trade-and-aid--What-of-rule-of-law-_14511142 
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them pushing their nastiness on us.” This point was echoed by other participants in that 
particular group, that acceptance of US policy influence could lead to an undue level of 
cultural influence from the country eventually leading to a greater acceptance of 
homosexuality. Obviously this a great leap into a different type of transference, yet it is 
important to note how the US was perceived in that instance as overly liberal and morally 
weak juxtaposed with a conservative and morally upright Jamaica. Focus Group 2 
consisted mainly of churchgoers, who arguably make up a large percentage of the 
Jamaican public, so their view, while skewed, provides a partial basis for the overall 
suspicion with which outside influences are viewed.  
This sentiment is further noted at the official level in the words of the former PM 
Bruce Golding’s remarks that he would never allow a homosexual to occupy a seat in his 
Cabinet. In a 2008 interview, he states, “Jamaica is not going to allow values to be 
imposed on it from the outside.” The perception here of the US hegemon as immoral is in 
direct contrast to the Trinidadian view of the hegemon as a moral beacon which in turn 
implies that the impact on nationalism is weaker for Jamaica since the ‘other’ is 
perceived negatively, and not as an ideal to which they should aspire.  
Tangential to this idea, one subject (Focus Group 2, Female, 26-35) noted the 
general perception that US aid/assistance always comes with a cost: “You know dem not 
just giving to say ‘boy dem a give.’ It comes with a price you know. Eventually then 
likkle by likkle dem come in and tell you how to do this, two twos, dem a tell you say, 
you must take God out of school, two twos, you go hear say, we don’t have no kinda 
thing; the US has taken over.” 
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While the consensus among the focus groups was that the US involvement in 
illegal drug policies in Jamaica was problematic and entailed a significant level of 
pressure, there was also the sense that the US presence was necessary given the level of 
internal corruption. The ideas put forth were that the US authorities were monitoring high 
level persons in the Jamaican government in order to quell the flow of illegal drugs which 
at once shows the perception of the other as an authoritative presence, and the self 
perception of high level complicity between officials and organized crime. A respondent 
(cited above) predicted an imminent large-scale scandal speculating that many high-
ranking officials could be arrested in the near future. 
Expanding on this information, this respondent and others in his group (Group 2) 
felt that the US had the country under intense surveillance. This again ties into the notion 
of perceiving the country as highly important to US interests. The most recent INCSR 
makes the note however that “as a matter of policy, the Jamaican government does not 
encourage or facilitate illegal activity associated with drug trafficking; nor are any senior 
Jamaican officials known to engage in such activity.” While this does not completely 
negate the respondent’s comment, it does give some indication that the US recognizes the 
existence of Jamaica’s anti-corruption rhetoric and may not be conducting the level of 
surveillance estimated by the group. The report further states however, that there is a 
need for greater anti-corruption legislation and that the country has not complied with the 
stipulations of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption to create an Anti-
Corruption Agency. It also notes that there is some level of support for organized crime 
activities at the level of the police force thus confirming multiple statements from focus 
group participants on police corruption. 
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The meeting with the groups of experts also showed that there is somewhat of a 
distrust of an external presence. The representatives from the Ministry of National 
Security, while very friendly and willing to participate, also took their own recording of 
the session without notifying the host or the other members in the room. While they did 
not take this recording covertly, it was also not done in a way that allowed question and 
their participation seemed dependent on their ability to make their own recording.  
 
Self Projection 
It is unclear how much this aspect of nationalism is really created by the self, here 
Jamaica, and how much is the responsibility of the local and international media outlets. 
One respondent (Focus Group 1, Female, 18-25) says that she was out of the country 
during the Dudus affair and from watching the reports through US news, she believed the 
country to be embroiled in an all out civil war. She continued to state that friends and 
family living in the US and also watching the situation unfold in the media, contacted her 
to ask if she needed refuge in the US given the bleak turn of events at home. Other 
respondents in this group who were in the country at the time of the incident explained to 
her that the situation was mostly contained to the Tivoli area, and yes, the entire country 
was on high alert, but outside of Kingston, the violence related to this issue was minimal 
and the situation was generally blown out of proportion. It shows that while respondents 
viewed the Dudus affair as a serious security issue experienced in the country, they did 
not understand in the same way as it was projected to the rest of the world. 
Given the religious culture in Jamaica which lies in stark juxtaposition to the 
violence which has been escalated by drug trafficking activities, it is ironic that Coke was 
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apprehended in his vehicle at a security checkpoint riding along an evangelical preacher, 
who assumedly was accompanying him en route to turn himself in at the US embassy. 
 
Delphi Group 
Among the Delphi group participants, there were two representatives from the 
Ministry of National Security, one from the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), and one 
from the University of the West Indies (UWI). This particular mix of persons was 
fortuitous given that the UWI participant has published much research on the drug 
situation in the country both for academic and political bodies. The inclusion of this 
individual was thought to be a good counterpoint to the presence of those representatives 
from the Ministry of National Security and it was the hope that this would create lively 
discussion of issue areas that were lacking or a source of national pride for the country in 
the eyes of the experts. Though it was expected that there would be potential for 
disagreement between these two parties, it was discussion between the JCF and the 
National Security representatives where the main problem issues in Jamaican security 
policy came to light. The JCF participant noted that the main obstacle for the proper 
functioning of security forces in the country was the lack of comprehensive anti-gang 
legislation which was promised under the rule of the previous government. When asked 
where Jamaican drug policy was most lacking and why this policy direction may not have 
been followed, the respondent stated:  
“We believe that the reluctance of policymakers in enacting such policy is the fact 
that there is a link between the drugs, gangs and politics. We believe that the 
politicians use these gangs in gross ways and an Act that would make it illegal for 
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gangs might in some way appear to be a betrayal of that trust that they have with 
each other. And with that relinquishing of that link, then I think that the 
politicians from pressure and advocacy from civil society would push them in the 
right direction to have anti-gang policy. We know that we have had traps, traps 
that we have been integral in putting together, but we have not seen that push 
from the policymakers to have that…” 
The representative from the Ministry of National Security responded to say that anti-gang 
legislation was a number one priority which had been stalled by an election and the new 
government’s decision to re-examine the terms of the proposal. The main issue to be 
grappled with now seems to be the working definition of “gangs” for the Jamaican 
government and this is what has prevented the enacting of this legislation. The slowness 
of the proceeding of this policy was again commented on coupled with the notion that the 
emphasis on definition was a trivial case of “semantics.” While the UWI representative 
noted the importance of definitions in creating policy, they also believed that drug 
policies have not been adequately implemented due to the lack of this anti-gang 
legislation. This portion of the discussion was summarily put to rest by the Ministry 
representative stating: “You going to get the anti-gang legislation, so don’t worry about it 
at all. So we can move on from here. That’s the good news.” 
In this group (and also noticed in the focus groups), there seemed to be hesitation 
to outrightly say anything negative about either the Jamaican or US governments. 
Particularly with the expert group, rather than use the names of countries or government 
agencies, the term “key stakeholders” was used early on in the discussion and kept 
throughout the session. In further talk on the lacking policy areas, one MNS 
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representative believed that; “Far too little emphasis [is] placed on precursor chemicals 
and a lot of persons in the area right now are just coming up to speed as to why this really 
is. And even some key stakeholders haven’t even, there is no buy-in from them to support 
the efforts, to strengthen our efforts against diversion of precursor chemicals ‘cause we 
right now at the Ministry and other key stakeholders such as NIB174 [and] Customs, we’re 
trying to have implemented the necessary legislation and control mechanisms that are 
needed.” 
There was also hesitation when the group was asked if they believe that there was 
a significant level of pressure from the US to create complementary drug policies. Instead 
the UWI representative preferred the notion that there was “strong advocacy” from the 
US that did not constitute “pressure.”  Later on in the discussion another word choice for 
this was “convergence and divergence of interests.” The MNS representatives referred to 
the policy relationship as “mutually beneficial.” The JCF participant also felt pressure too 
strong a word and while the power inequality was recognized, it was felt that the 
partnership and cooperation between the two countries was not limited in any way. The 
direction of answers to this question led to the notion that due to the lack of resources, 
there is a sense of gratitude for US involvement in the country’s counter-drug affairs 
since important equipment, intelligence and training would have not been available to it 
otherwise. This was a stark contrast to all the focus groups conducted in which the 
answer to how the US role in the country was perceived, was a consensus across groups 
that the US assumed a position of authority over the island and more or less dictated what 
the policies should be. This difference may not necessarily be that the experts chose to 
                                                          
174 NIB refers to the National Intelligence Bureau of Jamaica. 
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wear rose-colored glasses or that they did not accurately describe the relationship in order 
to be politically correct, but instead it might indicate that the only times where the general 
public is included in the discussion of drug policy and US partnership is when the 
government wants to stir public opinion in a way that will elicit a reaction that can be 
used as leverage in the negotiation process, as implied by the details the media acquired 
about the terms of the Shiprider proposal early on or Peter Phillips of the PNP175 
releasing news of the Dudus extradition deal to the public, which previously was unaware 
of its existence.  
 
SHIPRIDER REACTION 
The initial Jamaican reaction to the Jamaica-U.S. Agreement Concerning Co-
operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking (Shiprider Agreement) was 
considerably different to that adopted by the Trinidadian government. In this case, the 
cohesion between that official and general population level was clearly evident. In fact, it 
is alleged that the public outcry against the Agreement was used as a tool by the Jamaican 
government to negotiate for terms of reciprocity to be included.176 According to the 
Jamaica Gleaner the country remembers the initial proposal as “a virtual stand-off 
between the United States of America and this nation over the issue of safeguarding 
national sovereignty.”177 This shows that despite the Shiprider proposal being merely a 
                                                          
175 The JLP was the sitting government at this time. This action may have been less about frustrating the 
negotiation process with the US than sullying the JLP in the eyes of its supporters in Tivoli Gardens, but it 
did indeed have the added effect of slowing the process of successfully extraditing Coke to the US. 
 
176 Anthony Harriott interview, 2012 
 
177 Lloyd Williams “The Shiprider Agreement: No Smooth Sailing” Jamaica Gleaner Online Edition, 
February 8, 2004. 
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maritime interdiction agreement on the part of the US, Jamaica being the smaller state 
felt that the stakes were much higher.  
For the country, this was a matter of sovereignty, not just security. The agreement 
was portrayed in local media as “Uncle Sam being his big, bad, bullying self”178 using the 
threat of decertification to make islands in the Caribbean Sea conform to the standard 
form of the agreement. Jamaica did not sign on to the agreement until 1998, two years 
after most other Caribbean countries. The pressure felt from the US was not necessarily 
just imagined however, since there were tangible “encouragements” from members of the 
US diplomatic core. At the opening of the Caribbean Regional Drug Law Enforcement 
Center in 1997, a join US-UN-Jamaican endeavor tasked with training magistrates, 
police, military and customs officials across the entire region, Patricia Lansbury Hall 
(then Director of the Office of Latin America and Caribbean Programs, Bureau for 
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs) addressed the crowd briefing them 
on the recent developments in international drug trafficking. She then proceeded to say 
“We (the US) urge the Government of Jamaica, which has not yet signed a maritime co-
opertaion agreement with the US to seriously consider the ramifications of remaining 
outside this co-operative effort especially the possibility of becoming a safe-haven to 
traffickers. We further urge Jamaica to enter into similar agreements with other 
Caribbean states and our Canadian and European partners.” This was viewed as a 
vocalized veiled threat from the US government to decertify the island if it continued to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
178 Lloyd Williams, “Shiprider Agreement” (2004). 
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reject the agreement. It is referred to as Landsbury Hall “throwing a punch”179 for her 
country which was definitely the heavyweight in the ring. 
In an interview with one subject matter expert,180 it was revealed that the details 
of the Agreement might have been purposefully leaked to the media at the time as a 
means of incensing the Jamaican public. This maneuver was instrumental since the 
negative public reaction and the visible protests against the initial proposal, gave the 
Jamaican government the leverage it required to refuse to sign even under the threat of 
decertification. It was posited that the obvious possibility of instability that would be 
brought to the administration if they signed, signaled to the US that is was more 
important to negotiate the terms rather than risk national unrest on the island. This shows 
that there is somewhat a symbiotic relationship between the general Jamaican public and 
its officials. Thus in this case the policy proposal elicited a nationalist reaction that was in 
fact able to influence the outcome. Granted this may be considered a moot win since the 
clauses of reciprocity included are more symbolic than pragmatic. The fact is that 
Jamaica does not really possess the resources to take the same level of maritime 
interdiction actions as the US. However, the inclusion of clauses based on the principle of 
reciprocity assuaged the Jamaican public and maintained the faith that they had in their 
government’s ability to uphold the nation’s sovereignty. 
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180 Harriott private conversation, 2012. 
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DUDUS EXTRADITION DEBACLE 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, the extradition of Christopher “Dudus” Coke 
in 2010 caused a crisis in Jamaica, involving the police and army storming Tivoli 
Gardens and engaging in a violent clash with residents, a nationwide manhunt and state 
of emergency, political upheaval and a temporary breakdown in US-Jamaica relations. 
Coke was charged with running a large scale cocaine, marijuana, and firearm smuggling 
operation and was required to face these charges in New York. The request for his 
extradition in August 2009 was not immediately made public information and in 
September 2009 the Jamaican government responded to the request saying that 
insufficient evidence was provided to follow through with Coke’s extradition; further 
stating that wiretapping evidence cited by the US government was illegally obtained 
according to Jamaica’s Interception of Communications Act 2002 which holds that 
wiretapping information can only be gained by local security forces and for such 
information to be shared with a foreign source, there must be an official request.181 The 
JLP then hired the US law firm Manatt, Phelps and Phillips to navigate the legality of the 
extradition request. This is where the issue becomes murky in that the firm was 
seemingly under the impression that they had been contracted as a representative of the 
government, not the party, which appeared a glaring conflict of interest. The lack of 
cooperation with US was mentioned in the 2010 INCSR which states: 
“The [Government of Jamaica’s] GOJ’s unusual handling of the August request 
for the extradition of a high profile Jamaican crime lord with reported ties to the 
ruling Jamaica Labor Party, which currently holds a majority in parliament, on 
                                                          
181 Suzette Haughton, Drugged Out: Globalisation and Jamaica’s Resilience to Drug Trafficking, (Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2011). 
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alleged drug and firearms trafficking charges marked a dramatic change in GOJ’s 
previous cooperation on extradition, including a temporary suspension in the 
processing of all other pending requests and raises serious questions about the 
GOJ’s commitment to combating transnational crime. The high profile suspect 
resides in and essentially controls the Kingston neighborhood known as Tivoli 
Gardens, a key constituency for the Jamaica Labour Party. Jamaica’s processing 
of the extradition request has been subjected to unprecedented delays, 
unexplained disclosure of law enforcement information to the press, and 
unfounded allegations questioning U.S. compliance with the [Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty] MLAT and Jamaican law.” 
Whether or not the response of the Jamaican government was legitimately a concern for 
the upholding of domestic laws throughout the extradition process or stalling effort to 
keep Coke free, given his deep ties to legitimate Jamaican businesses and the JLP became 
a contentious issue within local government, and through Wikileaks communications 
released to the major newspapers and the opposition’s spokesman on National Security 
Peter Phillips’ statements, the public was finally made aware that the plan to extradite 
Coke was in motion. Bringing the public opinion into the matter along with the US 
actions at the same time such as the delayed sending of a new US ambassador to the 
country and the cancellation of US visas for certain Jamaican artistes, put great pressure 
on the government to act quickly to resolve the matter. After nine months the government 
acquiesced to the extradition request in light of US communications regarding the 
concern over the drawing out of the process and the seeming lack of cooperation, but on 
the domestic front, this decision resulted in chaos as the Tivoli residents began violent 
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protests in order to keep police and military search parties out of Coke’s community. This 
was the May 2010 standoff between the JDF and JCF, and the residents of Tivoli, 
resulting in the deaths of 73 civilians. Coke eventually turned himself in and made a 
public apology to the country for the violence that resulted from his manhunt. The sitting 
JLP government however was not so lucky. An enquiry into the hiring of the Manatt, 
Phelps and Phillips law firm was demanded in order to bring to light the true purpose of 
this firm’s counsel.  
The year following the Coke extradition, the Jamaica Gleaner conducted an 
opinion poll in which the general population showed a high level of distrust in the local 
government with 45% responding that they felt (then) PM Golding had been untruthful in 
the Manatt-Dudus Enquiry and 15% responding that they believed he deliberately tried to 
mislead the commission; 48% felt then Justice Minister, Dorothy Lightbourne was 
untruthful, with 15% responding that they believed she had deliberately withheld 
information. Only 12% of respondents thought that Golding was truthful in his 
testimony.182 The tactics used in this instance wherein sensitive information was leaked 
to the public in order to create pressure from public opinion clearly did not have the same 
effect as it did in 1996 with the Shiprider Agreement. In the Dudus case, the tensions rose 
to boiling point domestically but it did not alter the terms put forth by the US. In fact, the 
Jamaican government was instead forced between two immovable forces neither of 
which would compromise. In the end, the US interests won out over domestic interests in 
spite of the violence erupting on the streets of Kingston. This shows that the bargaining 
                                                          
182 “Den of Liars – Jamaicans Say State Officials Were Untruthful at Manatt-Dudus Enquiry,” Jamaica 
Gleaner Online, June 22, 2011. http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20110622/lead/lead1.html 
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position of the country was not the same as it was during the 1990s and that the US does 
not view the nationalist reactions in the country in the same way as in past – there was no 
possibility in this instance of democracy being destabilized in the country for example.  
Following the Dudus affair, the anti-US sentiment from the general public became 
much more apparent through the local media, letters to the editor and comments on the 
online forums for the major newspapers (Jamaica Gleaner and Jamaica Observer).183 
During the crisis however, opinions on the government and security forces followed two 
extremes of either total support for their actions or harsh criticism for not stemming the 
violence (or adding to it).184 Thus the public opinions coming out of the Dudus affair 
demonstrate that not only is Jamaica in a weaker bargaining position with the hegemon, 
but also that in crisis times, the disconnect between the official and general level is more 
visible. 
 
CONCLUSION 
From both the focus groups and the expert group, it was possible to see that all 
three components of nationalism (self-perception, self-projection, and perception of the 
other) are strongly expressed by participants. While the perception of the other seemed to 
favor notions of imperialism on the part of the US, survey data shows that the US is still 
                                                          
183 Article titles, letters to the editor and reader comments repeat the words “imperialism” in reference to 
the US or make mention of its “bullying” of smaller states. 
 
184 Commenters on online article “Tivoli Residents Plead For Help,” Jamaica Gleaner, May 25, 2010: 
“Weed out every one of the last remaining bacterias (in reference to Tivoli residents);” “I hope they will 
sweep Tivoli clean and take on the next garrison after that;” or alternately – “The police force are not as 
innocent as they make out. In no way do I condone violence and criminal activity, but I have to say some of 
the police activity is criminal behaviour. At this point in time they have a large number of people, adults 
and children held up in one house without food or water.” http://jamaica-
gleaner.com/gleaner/20100525/news/news1.html 
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an ideal type for a large portion of the population. Gallup survey data reveals that 
approximately 17% of the Jamaican population would actually like to relocate to the 
US.185  
Other patterns that emerged from analysis of the focus groups were the perceived 
level of corruption within the local government which not only added to the self-
perception of illegal drug dons being a pervasive part of the fabric of Jamaican society 
but also led to ideas that the solutions created internally would not be effective. Thus, 
there was an acknowledgment that policy influences coming from the US were in fact a 
necessary part of coming up with solutions to the illegal drug trade problems, but the 
understanding of the problem itself amongst Jamaicans was that it derives from the US. 
The attribution of blame, therefore, affects the perception of the other and the motivations 
behind the solutions that are US-led or influenced. 
In comparing the responses from the Delphi group and the focus groups, the stark 
contrast in the perception of the relationship between the hegemon and the small state 
emerged. While the focus group consensus seemed to be that there was some level of 
dictating coming from the US, or at the very least linking financial assistance and 
complementary drug policies, the Ministry of National Security, JCF and UWI 
participants who made up the Delphi group felt that this is too strong a sentiment and that 
instead the relationship is better described as a partnership. This difference in perception 
of the problem hints at a disconnection between the official level and the general level. 
However, in Jamaica, this disconnection was not strong enough to alienate the general 
public enough so that they did not still actively utilize their political voice, which 
                                                          
185 John Clifton, “More than 100 Million Worldwide Dream of Life in the U.S.,” Gallup World, March 21, 
2013. http://www.gallup.com/poll/161435/100-million-worldwide-dream-life.aspx 
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evidenced by the Shiprider and Dudus illustrations can be strong enough to impact or 
slow down policy directions.  
Jamaica does not have the same type of political leadership today as it did in the 
1970s and 80s. There is no figure that approaches Michael Manley’s ideals in such a 
powerful way as to once again risk good relations with the US. Despite the fact those 
focus groups’ opinions were generally that the US uses undue diplomatic pressure and 
creates economic hardship for the country, at the official level the feeling is that there is a 
partnership with the US that does not operate on the basis of political pressure. In the 
present day, there is a certain lack of political charisma among the politicians which 
surpasses the inter-party rivalry. This means that the US will not find another Morales or 
Chavez (or Manley or Bustamante or even Seaga) in Jamaica. Yet, this does not indicate 
that the nationalism in the country is weakened. In fact, focus groups and the Delphi 
group sessions revealed these persons to have a strong sense of distinction between the 
self, cohesively as a nation, and the other. In some instances this meant that certain 
limitations were emphasized – geographical limitations through consistent reference to 
Jamaica as “the island” in place of other terms like “the country” – as were perceived 
strengths – the morals of the citizens.  
When looking at the issue of illegal drugs in the country the sense of nationalism 
shows through the way in which participants understood the country’s role in the illegal 
drug trade. Many participants expressed ideas that should Jamaican marijuana production 
become legal, it would pose considerable competition to any US produced marijuana. 
Thus there is even a sense of national pride surrounding the quality of the illegal product 
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despite the personal distance from illegal drugs that participants tried to emphasize in the 
group discussions. 
  In addition, it became clear that with regards to the illegal drug issue, participants 
viewed Jamaica as occupying a much different space in Pastor’s metaphorical whirlpool. 
Despite the diminishing US budget allocations and more extensive media coverage of the 
Mexican side of the illegal drug trade, participants still felt that the quality of Jamaican 
marijuana made it a forceful contender today and a priority for US counter-drug interests. 
This reveals a stark difference in perceptions of the country’s role and stake in the illegal 
drug trade in the eyes of both countries. It also shows that within the focus groups, the 
country was still perceived as a major producer of marijuana rather than a transshipment 
hub for cocaine. While the INCSR does list Jamaica as a major producer of marijuana in 
the region, it also notes that most of this production is for domestic consumption and 
inter-Caribbean export rather than trafficking into the US territories.  
In the mid-90s when Jamaica refused the initial Shiprider agreement and then 
signed only after the reciprocity clauses were added the country was a much more 
significant player in the illegal drug trade. At that time, the cartels were newly dismantled 
and the Caribbean archipelago was still the primary transportation route for illegal drugs 
coming into the US. As power shifts have occurred within the structures of illegal drug 
organizations transferring power away from the South American cartels and to the 
Mexican cartels, the land route through Central America has become more significant. 
Thus, Jamaica today cannot abide the same threat of decertification and choose not to 
sign on to a US proposed agreement should this situation come about again in present 
time even though the national reactions are likely to be the same. The Dudus standoff is 
  176
proof of this since even though there were numerous concerns from within the 
government and opposition that legal channels had not been followed to acquire evidence 
against Christopher Coke, the government eventually proceeded with the decision to 
extradite Coke to the US, despite the predictable uprising in Tivoli Gardens. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Summary of Research Question 
The purpose of the thesis was to uncover whether or not US drug policies towards 
Jamaica and Trinidad had an impact on the nationalism in these countries. The 
assumption from the outset was that it did in fact have an impact due to the asymmetrical 
power relationship between these countries since their independence from colonial rule. 
The sub-questions of the research interrogated the three components of nationalism – 
self-perception, perception of the other (the US), and self-projection. The first question 
was intended to look at the notion of self-perception, particularly whether the influence of 
US drug policy altered the inter-ethnic or inter-class relations, thereby changing the 
overall self-perception of the nation. In both case countries there is evidence that drug 
policy has in fact affected self-perceptions. In Trinidad this comes from the apparent 
division of labor186 that whether real or not, has become pervasively perceived 
throughout the country. This has resulted in members of the Syrian and White 
communities being labeled as the main puppeteers of the drug trafficking and distribution 
(the so-called big fish), while the Indian community is viewed as the source of the 
middlemen who physically bring the products into the country via fishing boats along the 
south Trinidad coastline, and parts of the black community as the small time distributors 
(on the block), enforcers, and largest pool of users. This ethnicity based division of labor 
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also runs along the general lines of social division in Trinidadian society and harkens 
back to the divisions within the population established during the plantation society. Thus 
self-perception in the island has in fact become more fragmented in the sense that ethnic 
unity, though never before concretized in Trinidadian history, has further broken down as 
entire ethnic communities are placed into categories with clear boundary lines according 
to the narrative of the drug trade and the methods used to combat it. 
In Jamaica, the inter-class relations are affected in a similar way, wherein people 
from richer or poorer communities are attributed their own perceived labels or roles in the 
illegal drug trade. Again this perception largely comes from the way in which the 
problem is handled and narrated in the country, for example, which people are sought out 
and arrested in relation to drug crimes and trafficking, and from which communities. 
Therefore, the separations of spaces like garrison community, gully, and uptown become 
salient features of the self-perception landscape, leading to assumptions from individuals 
in the general population such as, “you turn up your car windows when driving down 
Lemon Lane,” or “the person who lives in that big house in Cherry Gardens will never be 
touched by the police.” This symbolizes an internal division in the population based on 
societal stratification. However, the division does not seem to surpass this sub-national 
level preventing a cohesive nationalism from being expressed, which indicates that this 
type of division does not necessarily make up the core of identity formation upon which 
an individual’s understanding of his own national identity is expressed. At the national 
level, there does indeed seem to be a cohesive sense of Jamaican-ness, regardless of class 
which highlights a major difference between nationalism in Trinidad and Jamaica. 
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The second sub-question focused on the perception of the other, mainly 
examining if the perception of the US had changed in response to drug policy initiatives. 
Trinidadian perceptions of the US seem to be mostly positive – given the sampled 
population’s limited knowledge of what the drug policies were – with negative or 
suspicious sentiments coming out only in direct response to highly publicized issues, and 
only for short periods of time. Otherwise, the notion of the US as an idealized lifestyle 
tends to pervade everyday life, from the fashion trends, to product choices, to desired 
travel destinations, education opportunities and immigration options.  
In Jamaica, the negative perception of the US is much stronger, yet more 
Jamaicans that Trinidadians migrate to the US every year.187 Within the country the US is 
seen as the harbinger of economic decline for the island due to harsh tied loan 
arrangements. It is also seen as a consistent infringer on Jamaican sovereignty to which 
Jamaicans have now become inured. As such, public opinion and local media coverage 
tends to paint the hegemon in negative terms and political parties, while expressing the 
high level of partnership with the US, also assert that they will not be dictated to by ‘big 
brother,’ in order to maintain their alignment with civil society. 
Both countries have a history of good relations with the US, with scattered 
instances of strain. The biggest issue for Trinidad came from the lease of land in 
Chaguaramas to the US for the construction of a naval base. This land had been 
contracted as a 99-year Lend-Lease Agreement between the US and UK in 1941, while 
                                                          
187 For example, the US Diversity Lottery (Green Card Lottery) has consistently prevented citizens of 
Jamaica eligibility from applying due to the already high numbers (over 50,000) of Jamaicans who already 
immigrate through other methods. Trinidad however, has consistently maintained eligibility for the 
Diversity Lottery indicating that the number of Trinidadian immigrants to the US is always considerably 
lower. 
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Trinidad was still under British colonial rule. Upon independence, the presence of the US 
was felt to be that of a replacement hegemon. Eric Williams pushed for the termination of 
this land contract to bring ‘full independence’ to the islands. Williams reacted to the 
American comments during the negotiations to end the lease agreement, that the base 
contributed to the economic and political stability of Trinidad by saying that, “It is you 
Americas who fear aggression…You should move Cuba to the Pacific…You can do it, 
you are all powerful...But let Castro mind his business and we will mind ours…We won’t 
tolerate interferences from anybody.”188 To his credit, Williams did initially hold a soft 
stance towards the presence of the naval base and did not begin the proceedings to end 
the lease agreement himself. The issue of Chaguaramas was first taken up by the 
Standing Federation Committee (SFC); a committee within the West Indian Federation 
grouping. These government leaders making up the SFC took the issue to task since 
Chaguaramas was the proposed capital for the West Indian Federation regional 
arrangement. Therefore, the leaders felt that it was necessary that the land be returned. 
However, the PNM had agreed pre-independence that they would honor the terms put in 
place by the colonial government so Williams abstained from voting as it was a clear 
conflict of interest for him and his government. However the motion still passed which 
meant that the SFC would attempt negotiations with the US to end the lease. Williams 
further abstained from becoming involved in these negotiations with the US until he had 
been given assurances (by the US) that he was not in violation with the pre-independence 
agreement. Armed with these assurances, he began to actively participate in the 
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negotiations, which had up to that point been spearheaded by Jamaica’s Norman Manley. 
In response to the US having up to that point been unwilling to negotiate, unmovable and 
described as ‘laying it down,’ Williams finally “broke his angry silence and altered the 
entire tenor of the meeting, shattering the complacency of the American delegation.”189 
Since his leadership, there has never been a more or even equally vocal advocate for the 
maintenance of Trinidadian sovereignty at the head of government.190 
In Jamaica, the most glaring point of breakdown in relations was during Michael 
Manley’s administration. His social democratic experiment came at the time when Cold 
War tensions were still very much a part of inter-state relations. This was in effect, his 
playing the Cuban card and the response of the US was a show of what it would be like 
without assistance from the hegemon. Under the Manley administration US assistance 
declined significantly to $4.6 million. In the Seaga administration immediately following, 
assistance went up to $75 million, an obvious showing of support for democratic 
leadership in Jamaica.191 Of course, the second instance in which we can see a breakdown 
in relations came during the Dudus Affair previously discussed in this dissertation. 
However, as in the case of Trinidad, without the same caliber of leader which a strong 
nationalist voice, this debacle, though descending into violence, eventually worked out 
                                                          
189 Quote from Former Federal Deputy Governor General John Mordecai in Overand Padmore, “Williams 
Stood for Sovereignty,” Trinidad Guardian, April 23, 2006 http://legacy.guardian.co.tt/archives/2006-04-
23/overand_padmore.html 
 
190 In 2012, it was leaked to the public that the Treaty of Chaguaramas (1963) – not to be confused with the 
Treaty of Chaguaramas of 1973 which established CARICOM – which ended this Lend-Lease Agreement, 
also contained a provision that still allowed the US to occupy and use this area should a significant threat to 
their security interests arise in the region. This led to media calls for the cancellation of the uncomfortable 
provision. 
 
191 Carl Stone, Class, State, and Democracy in Jamaica, (New York: Praeger, 1986), vii. 
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favorably for the US with little effort on its part, showing that the small states at the end 
of the day will defer to the hegemon.    
According to Vaughan Lewis, the post Cold-War setting immediately gave way to the 
post-September 11th setting and to a reframing of American interest in the region. During 
and following the Cold War, the interest was in the development of the region itself given 
first the need for the alignment of newly formed countries and second the new markets 
and raw materials sources at the opening up of world trade. In the post-9/11 atmosphere 
however, American interest instantly reframed to everything in security terms and as 
indicated in the Inter-American Dialogue report that he quotes and other policy states 
from the hegemon that he alludes to, this new non-Cold War security context with which 
to address the region became the trafficking of illegal drugs and anything related to this 
trade.192 
With regards to illegal drug policies, the level of cooperation seems to be consistent 
for both countries, with some differences in the way that this cooperation is framed. 
While Jamaica media and public opinion will both reflect the need for assistance along 
with dissatisfaction with US policy guidance, Trinidadians are mostly unaware of US 
influences. More likely, they tend to express the need for the outside assistance and not 
know if/what assistance arrangements already exist. This may indicate that Trinidadians 
are less politically aware than Jamaicans in respect to international politics and policy. 
Both governments note and emphasize a high level of cooperation with the US on matters 
relating to illegal drugs. However, the Jamaican government asserts this as a partnership 
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Global System,” in The Caribbean in the International Arena: The Implications of Global Instability and 
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between ‘equals’ while the Trinidadian officials noted that despite the overall desire to 
cooperate, there was little other option outside of cooperation anyway. 
For this reason, there are more moments in history where Jamaica has reacted against 
a US policy relating to drugs. The examples discussed here were the Shiprider agreement 
and the Dudus extradition debacle. Therefore there is some level of difference when it 
comes to the notions of perception of the other and self-projection for these two 
countries. The notion of self-perception however seems to be more similar across both 
cases.  
 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SIMILARITIES & DIFFERENCES 
 From the findings, it is possible to find lessons from the behavior of these small 
states in the Anglophone Caribbean with regard to their relationships with the US 
hegemonic state. These lessons are premised on the notion that the reaction to policy 
influence or directions originating in the hegemonic state will indicate whether or not 
there is an impact on the small state’s nationalism in response to the particular policy 
influence. This reaction and the corresponding effect on nationalism will have a further 
corresponding impact on the bilateral relationship between said small state and the 
hegemon. Trinidad follows a weak-reactionary style of behavior with no effect on the 
relationship with the hegemon, in which nationalist sentiments are expressed following 
external stimuli but these sentiments are short lived and do not affect the international or 
domestic dynamics which created said stimuli, nor does the base form of nationalism 
strengthen. Additionally its base nationalism tends to be worn down by notions of the 
ideal type represented by the hegemonic state, meaning that the nationalism, which 
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existed in the push towards nationhood for Trinidad, is now vastly changed and veritably 
subdued. Moreover, Trinidad never held such geopolitical importance to the US in the 
drug trade so as to make a shift in its nationalist sentiments noteworthy. Its limited role in 
the drug trade in comparison to rest of the region is paradoxical since at the inception of 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative’s security component, Trinidad’s then PM was tasked with 
handling the security issues brought about by the illegal drug trafficking.193 In fact, 
Trinidad has often pushed to be the poster child of US-Caribbean relations, for example, 
by campaigning to be the headquarters of the FTAA, should it ever be agreed upon. 
Jamaica follows a strong-reactionary style of behavior in that there is fervent 
nationalist response resulting from external stimuli, which has cyclically affected the 
relationship with the hegemon. This external stimuli (case in point, the Dudus affair) can 
even spark such strong sentiments that they result in violence. However, these reactions 
do not significantly affect the strategies of the hegemonic state since the country no 
longer possesses the same geopolitical importance it had during the Cold War and then 
again at the height of the Caribbean maritime drug trafficking time period (late 1980s-
mid 1990s). 
 At the basis of this conclusion is the idea that the impact of US drug 
policy on nationalism rests on the relationship between government and civil society in 
the case countries. According to Post and Rosenblum (2002), civil society can be viewed 
as a source of stability for a government but is necessarily also a challenge to “arbitrary, 
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oppressive, and overweening” actions.194 Thus civil society for them acts as an indicator 
of the strength of the nation, and the symbiosis of the government/civil society 
relationship is an essential part of democracy. The civil society/government relationship 
theme in the present study arose as an intervening variable in the examination of how US 
drug policy affected nationalism. In Jamaica, because the civil society relationship is 
stronger, the nationalist response to drug policies is stronger. However, in Trinidad the 
response is weaker due to a gap between government reactions and civil society voice 
and reactions. Thus, the relationship between civil society and government is 
significantly different in both countries. While the Jamaican government has a tendency 
to use the civil society heuristically, the disconnect between the Trinidadian government 
and the civil society is very apparent. The Trinidadian government thus has difficulty in 
mobilizing/operationalizing public opinion in one way or the other. This is due to the 
high level of internal division along ethnic lines which not only characterizes political 
party composition, but voting patterns as well. Moreover the high level of perceived 
corruption has become somewhat of a running joke in the country making the citizenry 
hard-pressed to truly feel passionate about their political party of choice or the reactions 
of their political party (or government) to outside policy influences. Trinidadian 
nationalism in that sense seems to be more muted than Jamaica’s. 
 This raises the question of why civil society-government relationship in Trinidad 
is so weak, resulting in such limited responses to outside influences. Many possible 
explanations exist – the ethnic divide in politics prevents civil society from having a 
unified voice with which to communicate with the government, the absence of a social-
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democratic experiment in its history of political leaders has meant that the relations with 
the hegemon has never seen the same type of struggle nor warranted a response from the 
public. 
 In light of the heuristic use of civil society by the Jamaican government to get a 
nationalist response to US policies, the question can be raised of whether it is in fact 
government strategy that drives the strong-reactionary behavior of the population. This 
would imply that the promotion of nationalist responses is consciously built in to 
government strategy. The evidence of that seems insufficient however since information 
that has been leaked to the public to generate a nationalist response in the past was leaked 
either by the opposition or anonymous sources (though the speculations abound that the 
sources may have come from within the sitting government body). Further exploration of 
the civil/society government relationship is one avenue to broaden this study. 
 
What these findings mean in terms of broadening drug policy literature 
The findings suggest that US drug policy directions/directives are more likely to 
be accepted and followed in a country that followed the weak-reactionary mode (i.e. 
Trinidad) where nationalism and the responses of civil society do not markedly impact 
decision-making at the official level. Since Caribbean nations are former colonies which 
had many transplanted populations they (by rote) promote a sense of anti-colonialism and 
anti-racialism in their individual foreign policies. But this is voiced at a macro level like 
at the UN or to other countries rather than on the internal or bilateral level.195 Braveboy-
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Wagner notes that Caribbean islands are “small” in every interpretation of “small state” – 
geographical size, population size, economic/political strength – but, some are arguably 
less small than others. Noting Trinidad’s oil resources, for example, which give it some 
level of influence beyond the region. She further points out that it has become a necessity 
for our small states to “carefully balance their interests” with those of the US – the larger, 
more powerful neighbor. This implies that there will be negative side effects for the 
individual nations if this foreign policy avenue is not followed. 
Examining the similarities and differences in each case is the first step in 
understanding the relationship between drug policy and nationalism. In a major way, 
history has determined the relationships that both countries will have with a more 
powerful partner and subsequently how their nationalism is expressed in response to the 
policies of this more powerful nation. This is precisely the reason that the most similar 
case method was applied – to control for factors present in both countries that would 
influence relations with the hegemon so they could be discussed together as a similarity 
but put aside when navigating the nuances of drug policy. In the case of Trinidad and 
Jamaica, they are the larger, more developed countries in the Anglophone Caribbean and 
also the ones which received a significant number of indentured laborers from 
somewhere other than Africa. This makes their ethnic composition, a supposed building 
block of nationalism, more diverse than the average Caribbean nation. Technically, this 
should make their nationalism harder to establish, but from what this research has 
revealed, nationalism in the Caribbean post-slavery time period was a political rather than 
cultural movement, built more on the shared sentiments towards the colonial rulers than 
on the shared characteristics or practices of the people. Even language, Benedict 
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Anderson’s prime nation-building ingredient was not a factor in this context since the 
dominant language was that of the hegemon imposed on the transplanted people. Only in 
modern slices of nationalism can language now become part of the nationalism given that 
accents, slang and vestiges of previous language systems have been incorporated into 
English in order to give each country’s English a particular creolized form. However, 
merely that they spoke English was not truly a unifying factor for these people. Nor was 
there the adherence to one religion a possible unifying factor, since the introduction of 
indentured populations resulted in the observance of multiple religions in both 
countries.196 Especially with regards to Hindus in Trinidad, since Hinduism is a non-
proselytizing religion, this community tended to isolate itself in the rural areas and 
initially tried to create living conditions that mimicked the original Indian homes as 
closely as possible in their new setting. Therefore, when the nationalist drive towards 
independence was occurring as early as with the labor movements in the 1930s, they 
were largely left out of this process and were therefore unable to access that sense of 
collective membership which is necessary for a strong sense of nationalism to be 
established. 
Therefore, nationalism appears stronger in Jamaica than in Trinidad implied by 
the existence of strong relationship between the civil society and the government. This 
relationship allows cohesive nationalist sentiments to emerge, which challenge outside 
influences – in this case US drug policies. Yet, in spite of greater nationalist responses 
against US drug policy influences in Jamaica, the country’s actual capability of opposing 
or resisting the policy influence is very low given its overall geopolitical situation. 
                                                          
196 Though Jamaica is predominantly Christian. 
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Trinidad does not have the capability to resist policy influence either, but it also does not 
have the political will to do so. 
 
US Drug Policy-Nationalism Relationship 
The big question that is raised at the end of this study is why is the impact on 
nationalism an important variable to examine. For these small countries, their political 
power is not so strong that their nationalism can affect happenings in the global arena in 
any truly significant way. So why would their nationalism matter? The answer is simple. 
These countries represent the most developed independent countries in the Anglophone 
Caribbean. They are the in their own right, the strongest economies in their region, and 
possess the biggest political voice within CARICOM. Thus their projections on how to 
deal with US policies sets the tone for how the rest of the region will perceive and react 
to the US. While there is no real threat to US interest posed by either of these nations on 
their own, as a group of nations, the Anglophone Caribbean occupies a significant portion 
of the Caribbean Sea and together hold a high enough level of geopolitical importance to 
US interests to warrant their nationalisms not fomenting any anti-US policy ideas. The 
Third Border Initiative, spearheaded by Bush circa 2000, outlined justice and security as 
its main thrust, specifically itemizing illegal drug trafficking, illegal migration and 
financial crime as the main threats for the US and the regional security. However, 
criminal deportation, small arms trafficking and drug demand reduction which remained 
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the main Caribbean concerns, were left off the main agenda showing that the US vital 
interests were still given precedence in this regional arrangement.197 
Bryan and Flynn argue that, “despite the Third Border concept, the US has paid little 
policy attention to the Caribbean countries as an integral part of its perimeter defense 
structure.”198 This harkens back to Pastor’s whirlpool imagery which has been used as an 
underpinning contextual theme throughout this thesis, showing that the importance and as 
such policy attention given to the region is directly related to the level of threat it poses to 
the hegemon. Arguably, when there is a greater nationalist response or opposition to a US 
policy, the nations receive a greater level of policy attention (in both carrot and stick 
form) in order to bring things back on track. Therefore, these small states can hope to 
temporarily place themselves back closer to the center of the whirlpool only if they 
choose to follow the strong-reactionary model.  
Thus the causal relationship between US drug policy and small state nationalism that 
was originally hypothesized at the beginning of this research was revealed to be much 
more complex than a simple unidirectional type of causality. Instead, it is that US drug 
policies do in fact have an impact on nationalism, while nationalism simultaneously has 
an impact on the reaction to US drug policies toward the small states. Thus there is a 
sense of circularity in the relationship between the variables because they feed into each 
other. What emerged in the investigation is that more importantly in this relationship was 
the intervening variable of the government/civil society relationship which determines the 
level to which US drug policies can weaken nationalism in the small state. Where the 
                                                          
197 Cedric Grant (2003), 59. 
 
198 Quoted in Cedric Grant (2003), 67. 
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government/civil society relationship was weaker, the impact of US policies on 
nationalism was stronger, while a stronger government/civil society connection yields 
greater nationalist responses to US policies. Given this information, it is possible to 
extrapolate that should US drug policy influences or strategies towards the region change 
in any way, there will also be a corresponding change in the relationship to nationalism. 
If policy influence were to be relaxed, then there would be no pressure point for these 
countries to react against therefore; nationalism may become a less overt observable 
characteristic for them.   
 
CHANGING IDEAS 
US domestic drug policies have recently begun a trend of relaxation as the 
discussion on harm reduction and decriminalization has opened up. Washington and 
Colorado have legalized the use and sale of cannabis while many other states have 
enacted legislation to decriminalize and allow for the medical use and sale of marijuana. 
The recent shift in the views of Dr. Sanjay Gupta, prominent CNN correspondent, has 
opened the discourse even further, showing that the clamor in the US for relaxed 
marijuana legislation has reached a critical mass which necessitates some action or at the 
very least policy attention for the issue. The foreign policy approaches of the US when it 
comes to illegal drugs has not substantively changed to reflect these domestic changes 
however, despite numerous calls in the past from op-ed journalists and former South 
American heads of government for such a relaxation as a means of reducing the levels of 
violence associated with the international illegal drug trade. This now raises the question 
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of how relations with other countries will be affected if US domestic drug policies take 
this turn across the board.  
For the past 40-odd years, the ‘war on drugs’ has been fought not only to keep 
heroin and cocaine, but also marijuana from crossing the border into the US. The policy 
pressures placed on countries such as Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico and Jamaica have in 
many instances caused political leaders and public opinion in these countries to take on 
an almost anti-American dynamic. Arguably, the reason for the rise in populist leaders in 
South America is due in part to the heavy US presence and pressure to reduce cultivation 
of drug crops since the 1970s. In Jamaica since the early 1990s, the country has certainly 
felt the threat of decertification when it comes to creating its own counter-drug strategies 
and in the mid-90s the proposed Shiprider Agreement caused a national outcry for its 
potential infringement of Jamaican sovereignty. With this history of policy pressure on its 
so-called third border states, what message is the US now sending with its internal trend 
of relaxation? Is this in fact another way for the US to create a monopoly for itself in yet 
another agricultural market?199 This movement towards legalization of marijuana opens 
up a new economic venture for the US given that it will now be able to tax the sale of 
marijuana as a legitimized product. However, the continued illegality of international 
transshipment from countries like Mexico, Colombia and Jamaica acts as a form of infant 
industry protectionism which prevents any other players entering this fledgling market.  
But yet another issue comes up when thinking about this as a new economic 
venture, should it be allowed to occur on an international scale – what will happen to the 
cartels? Will they become semi-legitimate economic actors given that a portion of their 
                                                          
199 This was suggested by some respondents in Jamaica. 
  193
trade will become legitimized or will there be some kind of transfer of service providers 
from cartel to legitimate sellers in these supplier countries? How will the trade of illegal 
drugs and “less illegal” marijuana co-exist? And will it mean increased opportunity for 
illegal drugs to cross into the US alongside marijuana? 
If drug policies were to mimic the US trend in Jamaica and Trinidad, then the 
results may not be quite as positive. Despite a small following of people behind the idea 
of decriminalizing marijuana, the wider society does not share this idea. The likely 
progression if marijuana were to be decriminalized in Trinidad would be that the price for 
the consumer would increase given that the government would now be able to tax the 
product and since it is mostly imported, the accompanying tariffs and duties would also 
contribute to raising prices. This would take distribution out of the hands of the current 
sellers who tend to be in the lower socio-economic classes, which would leave these 
people without an alternate means of subsistence. More than likely, the trade will become 
concentrated among the upper class that allegedly already controls the transshipment of 
marijuana into the island. In cutting off the distributer, it means that this segment of the 
population left without other moneymaking options will have to find some other means 
of survival. Given their comfort with distributing illegal goods, it is likely that they will 
diversify the types of drugs that they offer and in so doing, enhance the supply of cocaine 
in the country. It is unlikely that marijuana production will drastically increase for 
legitimate use in the country since there is already an aversion to agricultural work which 
some have argued is a vestige of the end of slavery. Therefore, it will continue to be a 
mostly importer country. Even if domestic production were to increase, it likely would 
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not be sufficient to satisfy demand and would not be considered a worthwhile job 
opportunity since farming tends to be such a low income sector. 
In Jamaica, it is likely that building a legitimate marijuana industry would create a 
short term economic boost given that the country already has a significant amount of 
locally grown marijuana. However, in the long term, it would create and opening for 
product coming from the US to enter the Jamaican market. The US product as discussed 
in Chapter 4 (Jamaica chapter) has a higher potency level and is likely to win out over the 
locally produced grade, thereby reducing the income that is currently earned by the sale 
of this product on the Caribbean black market. 
It is unlikely that small-state leaders will take kindly to a complete turnaround in 
US drug policies given that the strong policy influence that has pervaded the issue of 
illegal drugs since the beginning of the war on drugs has set a precedent for interactions 
with the hegemon. It has also led to a certain degree of internal framing of the drug 
situation for these case countries and has become an integral part of foreign aid that 
comes to these countries in each financial year. A relaxation of US drug policy at the 
international level, would likely lead to a significant scaling back of federal funding 
attributed to these small states, a change that they would most definitely find unwelcome. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In his article on national role perceptions, Holsti alludes to the importance and 
under-recognition of “the alter” in foreign policy analysis.200 He argued foreign policy 
analyses tend to emphasize the self conceptions of policymakers as the bases of national 
                                                          
200 Kal Holsti, “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 3 (September, 1970), 244. 
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interest. While he acknowledges that this in fact is a salient part of policy formation, he 
does give some acknowledgement to the notion that considering perceptions of what he 
terms “the alter,” and this thesis has referred to as the Other, do have an impact on the 
positionality, role conception, and ultimately the national role performance of a country 
(i.e., the overall foreign policy behavior of its government comes from the country’s 
understanding of itself and its status in the international system). Holsti’s point highlights 
a gap in the literature on drug policies in the case countries that my research sought to fill 
– looking at the impact of the Other and the relative policy relationship on 
conceptualizations of self.  
This project undertook to explain the relationship between US drug policy and 
nationalism in small states using Trinidad and Jamaica as its cases. It was revealed that in 
spite of the hypothesized causal relationship existing, the intervening variable of 
government/civil society relations was an important factor in the level of impact that 
could be observed. The major findings are therefore: 
 US drug policies have the effect of wearing down nationalism when there 
is already a weak government/civil society relationship – visible in the 
Trinidad case 
 They have less of an impact when the government/civil society 
relationship is stronger – visible in the Jamaica case 
 The government/civil society relationship is an important part of 
establishing a cohesive form of nationalism in these small states. 
From the lessons on small state behavior emerging from this research, it indicates 
that the strong-reactionary behavior evident in Jamaica results in more overt reactions 
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against policy influence, while in Trinidad, the weak-reactionary behavior does not. From 
these findings there is the indication that US drug policies, while accepted as having been 
unbalanced, with undue emphasis on the supply countries, does not necessarily have the 
level of sovereignty encroaching effects argued by some scholars. Even these small states 
are able to react to the policies in ways which have made them at times more relevant to 
the US security concerns. This is not to say that there is no need to alter drug policy, 
since it has arguably become a dated, monolithic, and expensive part of US foreign policy 
in general. Additionally, by all accounts, this ‘war on drugs’ strategy has been a failure. 
What must be the focus now, which would both ameliorate any mal-effects on 
nationalism and change the current policy discourse – which has thus far just pushed the 
illegal drug trade into different parts of the region – should be establishing a greater level 
of substantive multilateral cooperation in the construction of drug policies for the region. 
Policies that address both the internal concerns of small states, as well as the larger 
security objectives of the US are more likely to strengthen the “fight” against illegal 
drugs. This is because focusing on what small states have notably been lacking, like 
institutional development and capacity, would go a long way in making them more able 
to arrest control of the situation from the hands of illegal traffickers. 
 The cases of Trinidad and Jamaica indicate that considering nationalism in the 
drug policy relationship could in fact be helpful since strong reactions against policies 
have led to internal turmoil in Jamaica, while there has been mostly acceptance of very 
similar policies in Trinidad. It is not the intention of the author to claim that the 
weakening of nationalism is a positive quality, but to acknowledge that it has been 
favorable for US interests in this respect. However, there is no guarantee that nationalism 
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will continue to weaken in Trinidad since nationalism by its very nature is a fluid process 
which will indelibly continue to evolve. The same is true for Jamaica that its own 
nationalism will also continue to evolve. Therefore, US policy could benefit by not 
encountering strong anti-US nationalist reactions to drug policies, if it were to alter its 
strategic objectives to engage with a greater level of multilateralism. 
 
Recommendations for Future Research  
More research on the relationship between US drug policies and nationalism in 
the region can only be helpful in establishing which policy strategies provoke greater 
nationalist responses that are against the US. This would likely lead to the creation of 
policies which yield a higher level of cooperation from the small states in the region.  
 This project focused only on two countries in the Anglophone Caribbean. 
By only focusing on Jamaica and Trinidad, the study is limiting in how well it can 
describe the policy/nationalism relationship in other countries in the hemisphere which 
play a larger role in the illegal drug trade. Expanding the study to include countries such 
as Colombia and Mexico, which have been embroiled in the battle against illegal drugs, 
can bring valuable attention to where the policy discourse is lacking for these countries. 
Adding these countries will bring in an entirely new dimension since their roles in the 
drug trade are considerably different. Current research on the shape of drug policy tends 
to focus on the fact that it has habitually emphasized supply side policies and created 
balloon effect through its strong militarization strategies. While this stance has been 
acknowledged as a flaw in US drug policy by the policymakers themselves, there really 
has been no viable alternative. Shifting focus to nationalism and tangentially, the 
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government/civil society relationships in these case countries will uncover the gaps that 
have long existed in the ‘war on drugs’ because the problem of how states’ nationalist 
reactions to policy influence affect their actual implementation of these policies will 
come into question. This will uncover where the gaps in effective policymaking have 
been and possibly yield policies which can bridge these gaps. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
Questionnaire 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information about each participant. This 
information will not make you specifically identifiable to anyone. 
 
1. What is your age category? 
 18-25 years 
 26-35 years 
 36-45 years 
 46-55 years 
 56-65 years 
 65+ years 
 No answer 
 
2. What is your ethnicity? 
 Black 
 Chinese 
 East Indian 
 White 
 Mixed 
 Other ______________________ 
 No answer 
 
3. How do you primarily identify yourself? 
 By nationality 
 By ethnic group 
 By religion 
 Other ________________________ 
 No answer 
 
4. Do you consider yourself aware of the illegal drug situation in your country? 
 Very aware 
 Somewhat aware 
 Not aware 
 No answer 
 
5. Do you consider yourself aware of methods to address the problems caused by 
illegal drugs in your country? 
 Very aware 
 Somewhat aware 
 Not aware 
 No answer 
 
  Thank You 
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APPENDIX II 
 
Focus Group Questions 
1. How do you feel about the government’s approach to dealing with the problems 
associated with illegal drugs? 
a. What else, if anything, should be done? 
2. Do you think that the government should have more foreign assistance to deal 
with the issue? 
a. What kind of foreign assistance? 
3. Do you think the United States has a role to play in addressing the illegal drugs 
problems in the country? 
a. What is/should be their role? 
b. What is your impression of their current involvement? 
c. What do you think their goals are in the country or region? 
4. Do you think that [country’s] image is affected by the way it deals with the illegal 
drug problem? 
5. Do you think the government is doing enough to fight illegal drug problems in the 
country? 
6. Do you believe that government approaches to dealing with the problem victimize 
or privilege a particular group of the population? 
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APPENDIX III 
 
Delphi Study Questions 
1. When constructing drug policies, what are the problems that are prioritized (e.g. 
maritime interdiction, distribution, drug-related crimes, public health etc.)? 
2. Do you believe that more foreign assistance is necessary to combat this problem? 
a. What kind of foreign assistance and from which source? 
3. Do you believe there is a significant level of pressure from the United States in 
particular to create complementary drug policies? 
a. If yes, what effect does this have on domestic policy actions taken? 
4. Do you think that the country’s image is affected by the way it deals with the 
illegal drugs problem? 
a. Do you think that nationalism is affected and how? 
5. Where do you think current drug policies are most lacking? 
a. Is there a reason that this policy direction has not been followed? 
6. What impact do you think these policies have on nationalism? 
a. (If there is some impact) Is this positive or negative? 
b. (If negative) What measures could be taken to address this impact? 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
Consent Form for Focus Group Participants 
 
 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Does US Counter Drug policy Affect Nationalism in the Anglophone Caribbean? A 
comparative study on the impact of counter-drug policy on nationalism in Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Your participation is kindly requested for this study, which is necessary for the 
completion of a doctoral thesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact, if 
any, of United States drug policies on nationalism in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to participate, you will be one of 80 people in this research study. 
 
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require 1 hour.  
 
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate, these will be the tasks: 
1. Fill out a preliminary questionnaire.   
2. Participate in a guided discussion on the research topic with 5-8 other participants. 
The researcher will play the role of moderator and provide the questions. You are 
encouraged to respond to and build on the responses give by others in your group. 
The discussion will be recorded using a digital audio recorder.   
 
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
There are two possible risks that may arise if you participate in this study. First, given the 
style of group discussion that will be used, the researcher cannot guarantee that you will 
not be recognizable to the other participants in your group after the exercise is completed. 
However, your personal material, such as your name or any contact information collected 
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by the researcher will be kept completely confidential and no data that can specifically 
identify you will appear in the written product of this study.  
 
Second, the topic of illegal drugs may be a cause for anxiety, but this study is not focused 
on the criminal aspect of the illegal drugs trade. You will not be asked to identify persons 
involved in illegal activities and are discouraged from doing so. This study focuses solely 
on the effect of drug policies on the nationalism in your country. If you have any 
information regarding criminal activity, please contact the relevant authorities and do not 
bring up this information in the discussion group. If you cannot adhere to this request, 
kindly refrain from participating in this study. 
 
Finally, although participants in the group are asked to keep views shared in the session 
confidential, you should be reminded that other participants in the group may share with 
others the views that you have expressed. 
 
BENEFITS 
This study will not provide any direct benefit to you. However, the aim of this project is 
to potentially revise policy formation which may in the long run improve policy relations 
in the area of illegal drugs between your country and the United States. 
 
ALTERNATIVES 
There are no known alternatives available to you other than not participating.  However, 
any significant information that comes up during the course of the discussion session that 
might influence your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information relating to your participation will be stored on the researcher’s computer 
and encrypted using the program TrueCrypt. It will also be kept in a locked location 
which is only accessible to the researcher. Any written products of this study will not 
contain information that can specifically identify you. However, if for any reason Florida 
International University, the researcher’s institution, must audit your information, they 
will be bound by law to maintain your confidentiality.  
 
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
As compensation for your participation, refreshments will be provided at the end of the 
group session. Any costs outside of those you regularly face, which have been incurred 
due to your participation, will be reimbursed. Please make these costs known to the 
researcher so you may receive your reimbursement. If you decide to withdraw early from 
the study this will not affect the compensation or reimbursement due to you, but you are 
asked to wait until the session has ended to receive them. If you decide to withdraw early, 
you will not be able to wait for compensation or reimbursement inside the discussion 
room.  
 
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or 
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withdraw your consent at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of 
participation will not affect any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  The 
investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they 
feel it is in the best interest. 
 
 
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to 
this research study you may contact Krystel Ramdathsingh at the Department of Politics 
and International Relations, Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 440 
11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199; or by telephone at either 868 780 0462 
(Trinidad) or 305 321 7295 (US); or via email at kramd001@fiu.edu.   
 
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this 
research study or about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU 
Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or by email at ori@fiu.edu. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I 
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been 
answered for me.  I understand that I am entitled to a copy of this form after it has been 
read and signed. 
 
 
 
________________________________           __________________ 
Signature of Participant      Date 
 
________________________________ 
Printed Name of Participant 
 
________________________________    __________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent    Date 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  216
APPENDIX V 
 
Consent Form for Delphi Study Participants 
 
 
 
ADULT CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Does US Counter Drug policy Affect Nationalism in the Anglophone Caribbean? A 
comparative study on the impact of counter-drug policy on nationalism in Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
Your participation is kindly requested for this study, which is necessary for the 
completion of a doctoral thesis. The purpose of this study is to determine the impact, if 
any, of United States drug policies on nationalism in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
NUMBER OF STUDY PARTICIPANTS 
If you decide to participate, you will be one of 80 people in this research study. 
 
DURATION OF THE STUDY 
Your participation will require 1 hour.  
 
PROCEDURES 
If you agree to participate, these will be the tasks: 
3. Participate in a guided discussion on the research topic with 5-8 other participants. 
The researcher will play the role of moderator and provide the questions. You are 
encouraged to respond to and build on the responses give by others in your group. 
The discussion will recorded using a digital audio recorder.   
 
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS 
There are two possible risks that may arise if you participate in this study. First, given the 
style of group discussion that will be used, the researcher cannot guarantee that you will 
not be recognizable to the other participants in your group after the exercise is completed. 
However, your personal material, such as your name or any contact information collected 
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by the researcher will be kept completely confidential and no data that can specifically 
identify you will appear in the written product of this study.  
 
Second, the topic of illegal drugs may be a cause for anxiety, but this study is not focused 
on the criminal aspect of the illegal drugs trade. You will not be asked to identify persons 
involved in illegal activities and are discouraged from doing so. This study focuses solely 
on the effect of drug policies on the nationalism in your country. If you have any 
information regarding criminal activity, please contact the relevant authorities and do not 
bring up this information in the discussion group. If you cannot adhere to this request, 
kindly refrain from participating in this study. 
 
Finally, although participants in the group are asked to keep views shared in the session 
confidential, you should be reminded that other participants in the group may share with 
others the views that you have expressed. 
 
BENEFITS 
This study will not provide any direct benefit to you. However, the aim of this project is 
to potentially revise policy formation which may in the long run improve policy relations 
in the area of illegal drugs between your country and the United States. 
 
ALTERNATIVES 
There are no known alternatives available to you other than not participating.  However, 
any significant information that comes up during the course of the discussion session that 
might influence your willingness to continue participation will be provided to you.  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
All information relating to your participation will be stored on the researcher’s computer 
and encrypted using the program TrueCrypt. It will also be kept in a locked location 
which is only accessible to the researcher. Any written products of this study will not 
contain information that can specifically identify you. However, if for any reason Florida 
International University, the researcher’s institution, must audit your information, they 
will be bound by law to maintain your confidentiality.  
 
COMPENSATION & COSTS 
As compensation for your participation, refreshments will be provided at the end of the 
group session. Any costs outside of those you regularly face, which have been incurred 
due to your participation, will be reimbursed. Please make these costs known to the 
researcher so you may receive your reimbursement. If you decide to withdraw early from 
the study this will not affect the compensation or reimbursement due to you, but you are 
asked to wait until the session has ended to receive them. If you decide to withdraw early, 
you will not be able to wait for compensation or reimbursement inside the discussion 
room.  
 
You will also receive a token of appreciation for your participation and expert opinions 
in this study. These tokens will be given at the end of the study. If you decide to withdraw 
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early, you may still receive this token as a show of gratitude, however, you will be asked 
to wait away from the discussion room until the session has concluded. 
 
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW 
Your participation in this study is voluntary.  You are free to participate in the study or 
withdraw your consent at any time during the study.  Your withdrawal or lack of 
participation will not affect any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  The 
investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they 
feel it is in the best interest. 
 
 
RESEARCHER CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you have any questions about the purpose, procedures, or any other issues relating to 
this research study you may contact Krystel Ramdathsingh at the Department of Politics 
and International Relations, Florida International University, SIPA Building, Room 440, 
11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199; or by telephone at either 868 780 0462 
(Trinidad) or 305 321 7295 (US); or via email at kramd001@fiu.edu.   
 
IRB CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you would like to talk with someone about your rights of being a subject in this 
research study or about ethical issues with this research study, you may contact the FIU 
Office of Research Integrity by phone at 305-348-2494 or by email at ori@fiu.edu. 
 
PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT 
I have read the information in this consent form and agree to participate in this study.  I 
have had a chance to ask any questions I have about this study, and they have been 
answered for me.  I understand that I am entitled to a copy of this form after it has been 
read and signed. 
 
 
 
________________________________           __________________ 
Signature of Participant    Date 
 
________________________________ 
Printed Name of Participant 
 
_________________________________   __________________ 
Signature of Person Obtaining Consent  Date 
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